THE SOCIAL SYSTEM OF THE BANYARWANDA

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis presents an analysis of the conflict which arose between two groups of people in Rwanda, before it achieved independence from colonial rule in 1962.

I have set out to demonstrate that the conflict cannot be understood unless it is seen in relation to the traditional Rwanda social system and the impact of colonial influence on the traditional principles of social organisation.

The analysis demonstrates why violent conflict erupted between two major groups of people at that particular moment rather than unifying them in a common attempt to reach independence. It further demonstrates why these two groups aligned themselves in ethnic terms.

I have firstly made a functional analysis of traditional Rwanda society as it was operative at the moment it became subject to western colonial rule. Although Rwanda is essentially a social and political unit, I have developed the considerable intracultural and regional variations of an ecological, demographic, political, socio-economic and religious nature to be found within Rwanda. The analysis

shows how these variations are reflected in the different social institutions of Rwanda society. The functional analys demonstrates the existence of elements of competition and conflict in Rwanda society despite a highly complex but centralised political structure. However in the traditional system processes and mechanisms for containing conflict were provided through institutions making for cohesion in different ways.

Secondly, I have made a diachronic analysis of the impact of new pressures, during the period of colonial rule, on the principles of social organisation, especially in the political and socio-economic fields.

Lastly, I have analysed the ultimate conflict situation and correlated the form it took with the effect of these new pressures on the traditional system.

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INTRODUCTION

On the 1st July, 1962, the twenty fourth new African nation came into being. This was the Republic of Rwanda, which had hitherto formed a part of the Belgian Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi. This highland country, right in the centre of Africa, covers an area of 10,165 square miles and is, with its two and a half million inhabitants, one of the most densely populated areas south of the Sahara.

Up till January 1961, when the republic was first proclaimed, Rwanda had been one of the interlacustrine Kingdoms, and had been studied by scholars of many different disciplines. The firm impression conveyed by the various studies was of a homogeneous unit, based firstly on the traditional monarchy which was subsequently continued as a separate territory of colonial administration. Homogeneity was further emphasized by the fact that, as scholars and administrators observed, the inhabitants thought of themselve as one people who spoke one common language, Kinyarwanda.

However closer observation and analysis demonstrates the variety within and the complexity of Rwanda society.

But this variety and the complexity of underlying principles of the social structure did not destroy the image of homogeneity. On the contrary, it was its uniquely complex structure which distinguished it from other neighbouring Kingdoms and was one of the means through which it established its own identity, both to outsiders and to the people themselves.

The heterogeneous character of Rwanda society manifested itself to observers in the presence of three ethnic groups, which exhibit different physical characteristics, the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa. These formed sixteen, eighty three and one per cent of the population respectively.

Apparently these ethnic groups coincided to a large extent with social cleavage based on political hierarchy. On the one hand, rulers, with the King as their apex were identified with Tutsi. In this context the Tutsi stood out as the aristocrats providing the personnel for the machinery of government. On the other hand the ruled were identified with Hutu.

However, as will be shown, both these assumptions need to be qualified.

It was also held that ethnic differences coincided with social cleavage based on occupation in that Tutsi were

cattle people while Hutu were agriculturalists.

The Twa on the other hand were hunters, gatherers and potters, living partly in small groups scattered all over the country and partly as mobile groups of hunters or singers and story tellers. In this study, when speaking of duality in Rwanda society, I will be referring to Tutsi-Hutu relationships. Twa were dispersed and numerically unimportant. They had very little if any impact on the overall cultural pattern either of traditional or modern Rwanda society. Because of this and their lack of influence on the conflict situation which arose, they will be left out of this study unless they need to be drawn in when de facto they did play a role of sufficient importance in relation to the subject matter of this study.

The ethnic groups making up Rwanda society perpetuated themselves through endogamy. Miscegenation by legal marriages rarely occurred. However sufficient people show in their physical features proof of a certain amount of mixing of the ethnic groups such as to justify the assumption that it happened not infrequently. It is not surprising that this heterogeneous composition of Rwanda society and its social differentiation has led to its being identified as a caste structure.

However caste as an analytical model remains primarily a concept expressing an Indian phenomenon, not only including endogamy, hierarchy and occupational specialisation, but also repulsion. If we accept these differentia which are given a positive value based on religious metaphysic, then we should be extremely careful in applying the concept of caste to the different ethnic groups in Rwanda. While I shall not be concerned in this thesis to argue the case in detail for and against the classification of Rwanda society as a caste system, I prefer not to refer to the groups concerned in this study as castes.

There is considerable intracultural and regional variation in Rwanda which, as I will develop, are of greater importance than hitherto may have been recognised. These variations are also reflected in the different social institutions contained within Rwanda society.

The successful movement for independence by the people of Rwanda however was accompanied by violent conflict between the two groups. Because this happened at a time and in a continent where conflicts of this nature were not untypical, the danger exists of dismissing it as a typical pattern of African tribal society. The danger is all the greater if

the conflict results in overthrowing the "monarchy" and doing away with "feudalism" as elements which have no part in "modern" society. I believe however that this is an all too easy statement and does not answer fundamental questions about the nature of the particular form which conflict took in Rwanda.

The problem with which I shall be principally concerned in this thesis is the explanation of the conflict situation which arose in 1959.

An analysis is needed not only of the reasons why conflict erupted into open violence at this particular moment, but also of the reasons leading to the alignment of the two groups of people involved.

My method of approach will be first to make a functional analysis of the traditional Rwanda social system and to examine how far there were elements of conflict inherent in the principles of social organisation or between the various groups.

Secondly I shall examine the impact of new pressures and opportunities external to traditional society, during the period of European control dating from the beginning of this century.

Finally I shall analyse the situation at the moment of open conflict, correlating the form it took with the effect of these new pressures and opportunities on the traditional system.

This problem evidently poses specific difficulties of functional analysis of a highly complex society which has to be considered as a unit containing considerable cultural and regional variations.

Moreover we have the problem of a functional approach in the examination of a society undergoing radical change over a period of time.

One problem in the analysis of traditional society is that we are dependent on historical sources. No study has been published on traditional Rwanda society as a whole. Maquet's study deals with the central part of Rwanda and he obtained his information, as he confesses in his introduction to "The Premise of Inequality", (1961) exclusively from Tutsi informants. In 1960 Gravel did fieldwork in Gisaka in Eastern Rwanda and was thus able to draw attention to regional cultural variation, and the working of a community at the time of "the play for power" at the moment the country reached independence. The anthropologist d'Hertefelt also

published a number of studies as did Kagame. The former gave more attention to the Hutu, the latter to the Tutsi. However a vast amount of material of a descriptive and historical nature is available. My attempt to reconstruct the working of traditional society has been helped by my access to the sources contained in the Rapports Annuels of the White Fathers, especially those from 1900 to 1918. These it would seem to me are of great importance, not only because the Fathers had been established in several parts throughout the country for seven years before any form of civil administration was set up by the German authorities, but also because of the quality of the reporting by such persons as Fr. Schumacher, known for his publications in Anthropos as far back as 1910. They alone were able to observe at first hand the traditional structure and the first impact of new values exterior to that structure.

In the analysis of the traditional system we have not only to examine the existence of tensions within the society but also the principles of social organisation which were able to contain these latent conflict situations.

Previous analyses of the Rwanda social structure have been set in terms of the early functional approach, stressing

the integration of the social system. Maquet's study in particular puts across an image of a highly stratified but also highly centralised society with a remarkable degree of social integration and cohesion, and in doing so stressed the functionalist's impression of durable equilibrium, expressed in his premise of inequality. Although perfectly permissible as an analytical tool, this study has the disadvantage of presenting a static society.

However Simmel has stressed the point that "no group can be entirely harmonious for it would then be devoid of process and structure" (Coser, 1956 p.31).

More recent studies e.g. Fallers (1957), Kuper (1963) and Beattie (1965) have further stressed the dynamics of and conflict in social systems and demonstrated that the social institutions not only do not always complement one another harmoniously but are conflicting in one degree or another.

Initial reading, especially of the Rapports Annuels, made it evident that Rwanda was no exception. Although a general overall description of Rwanda society and culture is possible, there existed within it not only cultural variations but also various avenues for competition and potential conflict in the political and economic field.

Hence even in traditional Rwanda society there were signs of opposition and tensions which threatened the internal cohesion of the principles of social organisation and thus affected the relationships between the groups of people within the boundaries of the Rwandan kingdom.

Leach in his Political Systems of Highland Burma writes:

> "We must recognise that few if any of the societies which a modern field worker can study show any marked tendency towards stability. On the other hand I hold that it should be possible for anthropologists to develop methods for analysis of changing social systems." (1957 p.285)

The Rwanda material shows how a diachronic analysis of social change is necessary for the explanation not only of the ultimate conflict situation that arose but also of the principles of social organisation which were able to contain latent conflict within the traditional system.

In tracing the effects of new pressures and opportunities in traditional Rwanda society which resulted in a situation of incompatible opposition between two groups of people, the arrows of factual correlation will point away from the past but at the level of intellectual correlation the arrows will point both ways. In analysing the conflict situation which arose in Rwanda at the moment of independence, it is important

to distinguish those elements of conflict which were latent in the traditional system from new factors of conflict introduced through external influence. The system provided sufficient alternative avenues for competition and redress of grievances to prevent conflicting persons and groups from reaching a position of incompatible opposition. Through changes introduced in the system, new wants were created, at the same time as some important avenues for competition were closed. In this way the system lost its flexibility when competition between persons and groups had increased.

Although the idea of conflict may convey the notion of destruction, social conflict is closely related to the constructive process of social cohesion. Conflict at one level may engender cohesion at another. I shall demonstrate in my analysis of the development of the conflict situation how this resulted at one level in incompatible opposition between groups and at another level in creating group identity and strengthening group cohesion. Moreover I will demonstrate that there had been no development of alternative avenues of legitimate competition.

This was the situation at the moment when the seat of government was to be vacated and the system found two incompatible contenders between whom the only form of

communication had become the "minimum form of socialisation" which is open hostility. Functional flexibility and dynamism had gone out of the system where it had for so long played a functional role in upholding a complex heterogeneous structure within the boundaries of its homogeneous identity.

C H A P T E R I

THE COUNTRY AND ITS PEOPLE

PART 1. WHO IS WHO IN RWANDA

In the introduction I have spoken of Tutsi and Hutu who, with the Twa, are the inhabitants of Rwanda and have indicated that we are principally concerned with the former two. We are concerned with their place in traditional Rwanda. Further we want to analyse how they were affected by new opportunities, pressures and values, or in other words what changes occurred in their traditional society and how these led to the conflict situation which arose between the two groups of people. It is therefore essential to examine more closely who are the Tutsi and Hutu especially in traditional society as it is from there that our study starts. Moreover we have to examine whether we can establish certain patterns of Tutsi-Hutu distribution against the background of other ecological variables. (Cf. part 2)

Speaking about the population of Rwanda, every writer, be he historian, ethnographer, physical or social anthropologist refers to the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa as the inhabitants of Rwanda. Everybody agrees as well that the Hutu by far out-number the Tutsi and the Twa, and that there are more Tutsi than Twa.

Another point of general agreement is that, speaking about government in Central Rwanda, the Tutsi play a dominant role. With all this we can fully agree. But any further specification of them as 'patrons' or 'clients', 'agriculturalists' or 'pastoralists', 'tall' or 'small', needs further definition and precision.

In the official reports of the Belgian information service we read: "En Rwanda il-y-a trois groupes ethniques". Frankenberg in his unpublished thesis refers to them as "classes" and so does Gravel. Others again such as d'Hertefelt writes: "La population du Rwanda se compose de trois castes", but writes in the same article: "Le type physique des Hutu été influencé par les Tutsi; l'invers est également vrai." (d'Hertefelt 1962 p.16 and 17). Arnoux writes: "Rien qui corresponde aux castes fermées", and "Les Tutsi et Hutu contractent des marriages qui durent", (Arnoux 1947 p. 19) and Van Overschelde writes in the same terms.

We read further that the Tutsi form about fifteen per cent of the population, but that 'real' Tutsi form only five per cent (cf. Lacquer and Bourgeois) or even only three per cent (Arnoux). Bourgeois mentions as well that the Baswera "sont des Tutsi bahutuisés", and "Le terme Muhutu

désigne avant tout un état social", or "Le vocable Mututsi indique plus une situation social qu'un caractère racial." (Bourgeois 1957 p.58) Kagame, a Rwandan himself, says, "Du moment le Muhutu accède à la richesse bovine il est politiquement Tutsi". (Kagame 1954 p.26) The Rapports annuels of 1907 from Gisaka mentions:

> "Habitants du pays: Distinguons entre chefs et sujets. Parmi les premiers il-y-a des chefs Tutsi, riches en bêtes de cornes. Il y a ensuite des chefs Bahutu aisés sans êtres si riches commes les premiers. Voyons la masse, Batutsi appauvris ou déchus par marriages à des femmes Hutu puis les Bahutu ou paysans."

or from Shangugu in 1908:

> "La population qui nous entoure est, comme partout dans le Rwanda, composé de Batutsi et de Bahutu, qui s'adonnent à la culture des champs. Ces derniers sont le plus grand nombre; Parmi eux il y a beaucoup de Batutsi."

or a report from Maragara in Central Rwanda in 1907:

> "Posséder des vaches voila l'idéal du Mututsi, mais parmi eux il y a beaucoup qui sont forcés de prendre la pioche."

Examples of this kind could be multiplied many times, but the illustrations given indicate sufficiently the lack of clarity in ethnical, political or occupational terms as to whom one is referring. I believe that unless, with greater clarity, we describe whom we refer to we are open to misleading and confused statements and to incomplete or even

false conclusions. The remarks quoted above justify the query as to whether the ethnographer, the historian, the physical anthropologist, the administrator or the social anthropologist really refer to the same people? It is evident from the examples that the writers use different criteria as bases for their differentiation. As a result the boundaries of the groups referred to may overlap or the same word may refer to different categories of people. Although it may be possible to arrive at certain definite differentiations between those people collectively referred to as Tutsi, Hutu and Twa, it is essential to be clear about the exact criteria, in kind and in range, for differentiation, since otherwise the same word may be used to refer to different characteristics of these people.

The examples demonstrate that the criteria for differentiation overlap; each writer thus interprets the terms according to his own special interest. Equally, and maybe of greater importance, the reader, without being given sufficient explanation as to the basis for differentiation, may not be aware of the difference in criteria which may be used by different authors and interprets the words according to his own criteria of special interest. It may be not without interest to demonstrate how infringements against

elementary rules of logic have led to confusion and indeed false conclusions. By using the words Tutsi, Hutu and Twa indiscriminately, authors and readers, by not basing their conclusions on criteria but on words, establish an a priori identification of ethnic and social differentiation. This would, it seems, be not without importance in relation to the different assumptions that Tutsi, Hutu and Twa are castes, classes or ethnic groups. It is essential to raise this point as to whether they are really referring to the same groups of people because these are the realities with which we are concerned.

The practical application of Aristotle's dictum "quo maior comprehensio eo minor extensio, quo minor comprehensio eo maior extensio" - i.e. the broader the definition the more people it refers to and the narrower the definition the fewer people it refers to - is all too often overlooked. Infringements against this rule are at the basis of much misunderstanding and futile argument and misleading conclusions. We have an example closer to home in the recent discussion about the implications of British passport holders. If one person defines an Englishman as somebody born in Britain and another as somebody who holds or has the right to hold a British passport, they will find that their use of the word Englishman does not refer to the same

people. In other contexts even people who would agree in certain circumstances with the definition of "being born in Britain" will find that e.g. 'Scots' refers to different people from 'English'. Again in other circumstances, those who define an 'Englishman' even in the stricter sense will not agree with one another as to whom they are referring because some will include and others exclude West Indian immigrants, born in Britain, holding a British passport and who might even be cricket fans.

If it is true that unless we have the same range of criteria we are not referring in reality to the same people in Britain, this must also be true when referring to Tutsi, Hutu and Twa in Rwanda. In the examples quoted they are variously referred to as castes, classes or ethnic groups.

d'Hertefelt defines caste as follows: "Le terme caste définit un groupe héréditaire qui s'adonne à des occupations specifiques, qui est endogame et qui s'insère dans une système hierarchisés." The basis of recruitment is here 'ascribed'. This subject is dealt with in connection with the study of the political structure, but we can note here that on the basis of his stated criteria, d'Hertefelt cannot be referring to the same people as other writers who say that there has been considerable intermarriage or that there are many Tutsi

who are cultivators, who are poor or that there are Hutu who are Tutsi-ised through wealth or marriage.

Those who refer to Tutsi, Hutu and Twa as social classes imply the existence of social mobility. They refer to Hutu being enobled and to a certain amount of intermarriage in a hierarchically ranked semi-open system, in which recruitment to a class is based only partly on birth and partly on achievement. I am not discussing here whether Tutsi, Hutu and Twa are either castes or classes, I am only saying that the quotations show that authors have used widely different criteria both in kind and in range and that therefore they cannot be referring to the same group of people and that the disregard of Aristotle's rule must result in loss of clarity and precision. The same must be said of descriptions such as those used by Maquet that Tutsi are pastoralists and Hutu agriculturalists. (Maquet 1961 p. 10) First of all this is not a definition because it infringes the rule; "Definitio nil convertibilis cum definito". There are as we know from his own and other sources many agriculturists who are not Hutu and there are pastoralists who are not Tutsi. Moreover unless everyone clearly agrees on the nature and range of attributes which define a pastoralist or an agriculturalist descriptions of this kind only make for confusion. What has been said here can also be applied

to descriptions such as that Tutsi are nobles and Hutu are commoners. (Maquet 1961 p.10)

I would like, however, to take this point one step further. The population of Rwanda has been divided into three categories. A category is an analytical tool or a model, of which Leach has said that it is "too good to be true". (Leach 1964 p.22) It is a concept or a way of classifying a certain number of phenomena which the observer perceives as existing. Only when it coincides with a social reality is it useful in social anthropology if one wants to classify a population into different categories. The categories should neither overlap nor exclude anyone. For this it is necessary; (1) That the criteria are mutually exclusive and this will only be if the criteria are both exclusive and adequate. By exclusive I mean that the criteria referred to are true only of the group which one wants to indicate. If not there will be overlapping. By adequate I mean that all members of the group referred to can be described by these criteria, otherwise some of the group are left out and the category is no longer useful for classification. (2) That the classification itself (divisio) is adequate. By this I mean that all the members of the total group, in this case the inhabitants of Rwanda, should

be covered by the criteria used. If not some of the inhabitants will be left out and we cannot speak of adequate classification. e.g. 'rulers' and 'ruled'. From the examples quoted it is clear that any such distinction on the basis of political status held only for Central Rwanda and not for other areas of the country.

If these remarks are not without value in the wider context of anthropological discussions, they seem to be essential in the specific context of Rwanda. The importance of adhering to these rules will be more fully appreciated in the analysis of the political structure, the cattle and the land complex, but in this chapter I would like to go a little further into the division made on ethnic grounds.

It is said that the inhabitants of Rwanda can be classified as Tutsi-Ethiopoid; Hutu-Bantu; and Twa-Negroid. However in reality this classification fails to describe them exclusively and adequately, and scientists do not use the same set of descriptive criteria. These points may be illustrated as follows:

(1) By using the word Ethiopoid, one under-writes an as yet unproven theory cf. Johnston (1902) Baumann (1948) and Seligman (1930) that there is a link between certain people in Rwanda and Ethiopia. Moreover Vansina, de Heusch,

Olliver and many others agree with Seligman when he writes of the Rwanda, Rundi, Sukuma, Haya and Nyamwezi that:

> "It seems that all these tribes have a Hamitic (presumably Galla) element brought in by the Huma, far more recent than those incoming waves of Hamitic blood which, mixing with the Negro, originally gave rise to the Bantu." (Seligman 1966 p. 137)

But the various writers have used different criteria, including myth, legend, institutions connected with divine kingship, linguistics and agricultural methods to establish ethnic links between the Tutsi and their origin from the horn of Africa, without sufficiently defining who are the Tutsi.

Myth and legend, often indiscriminately used for historical examination, have been interpreted in so many different ways by e.g. Vansina, Kagame, d'Hertefelt and de Heusch that it would seem to be very difficult to reach any definite conclusion. The institutions of divine kingship have been described as occurring widely in Bantu societies as much as being characteristic of Hamitic culture, and any theory, based on diffusion of this institution, that Bantu culture has been influenced by Hamitic immigration and integration rests so far on conjecture.

Since everyone in Rwanda speaks the same or nearly the same Bantu language it is difficult, if not impossible, to use language as a basis for differentiating ethnic groups.

However there are certain physical characteristics which are considered to be typical of each group, and similarity of physical characteristics of the Tutsi with other peoples sometimes referred to as Hamitic have given rise to a presumption of Ethiopoid origin. According to the accepted stereotypes, a Tutsi is tall with an average of 69.5 inches and slender, while the Hutu is smaller with an average of 65.9 inches and stocky, and the Twa is small with an average of 61.1 inches. However one can quite easily find people who are called Tutsi who are smaller than their neighbours who are called Hutu. Prof. Hiernaux has done much through the publication of his objective measurements to undermine what might be called the Hamitic Myth, which has definite undertones of establishing 'favourable' comparison with certain European features. Although in general the Tutsi may have straighter or narrower noses than Hutu, the Tutsi have by far the thickest lips, while there is no difference in the kind of hair or the colour of the skin or eyes, contrary to general subjective opinion. Moreover blood-sampling on a very wide scale proved that Tutsi predominate in the O group. Both this and the classification on the R.H. system shows that it is impossible to differentiate between Tutsi and Hutu and Twa.

Posnansky therefore, rightfully suggested that on the one hand we need much more evidence, especially of an archaeological nature, to arrive at any definite conclusion about the movement of people from the Horn of Africa, and on the other hand he offers the suggestion that certain characteristics of the Tutsi might well be due to nutritional and social factors. (Posnansky 1966) If it is possible to trace definite physical differences as regards height and weight between the Hutu of the north and the centre of Rwanda or between the Tutsi of Urundi and Rwanda, as Hiernaux has done, and to relate these differences to climate and occupation, it is not excluded that a high protein diet and socially preferred marriages are at the basis of the natural and social forces which have operated to produce the differences so apparent to the first European observers. Recent statistics from the United States show an average growth of one inch in one generation due to a high protein diet.

Suggestions of this kind justify the conclusion that much more evidence is needed to substantiate the Hamitic Myth voiced since Speke in 1863, when he wrote in The Journal of the discovery of the sources of the Nile that:

> "The unusually complex political organization of the inter-lacustrine Bantu is explicable only in terms of the influence of superior immigrant people." (Wrigley 1958 p.11)

This myth has survived for a long time. We read in the official report of the Belgian Colonial Government in 1938:

> "Qu'il doit s'enfforcer de maintenir et de consolider le cadre traditionel de la classe dirigeante des Batutsi à cause de son indéniable supériorité intellectuel."

Even in the 1966 reprint of Seligman's Races of Africa, we read;

> "No doubt it is at least in part due to this 'European' influence that we find the curious mixture of primitive and advanced elements in the social institutions of the interlacustrine communities." (Seligman 1966 p.138)

To bring this discussion back to our original argument, it is clear from the remarks made above: (1) That the term Ethiopoid does not refer to the same set of phenomena, either in kind or range, acceptable to everyone and therefore not everyone is referring to the same number of people; (2) There is however a second reason for objecting to this classification. While 'Ethiopoid' refers to territorial origin, 'Bantu' refers to language. As Seligman remarks, and so far no one has disagreed with him,

> "The Bantu are a congeries of peoples, named from and defined by the peculiar type of language that they speak." (1966 p.117)

It is evident that on the basis of lack of exclusiveness of criteria, this classification has to be disregarded. There

is considerable overlapping, not only because those who are called Tutsi speak a Bantu language and can thus be called Bantu, but also because, as we have seen, some theories hold that the peoples who are called Bantu were already of a mixed Ethiopoid-Negroid origin before the arrival of 'Tutsi'. On the basis of this theory we might say that both Hutu and Tutsi are Bantu but that Tutsi are purer Ethiopoid than Hutu. (3) Moreover we come across one more difficulty on the basis of lack of adequate classification. The Tutsi, even within the context of the Ethiopoid theory, are not adequately described by it. By limiting the criteria to country of origin only, we not only include the people called Tutsi but also the Hima, who are semi-nomadic pastoralists much like the Masai, but who do not in any way take part in government. If one in Rwanda calls a Tutsi a Hima, he will understand, by analogy, what is meant, that is to say that they have one thing in common - a special interest in cattle. However the Hima cannot be and is not called a Tutsi because he is neither sedentary nor interested in government. The Tutsi is interested in cattle as an instrument of power, the Hima is interested in having cattle. Nevertheless Tutsi in the sense of the Ethiopoid theory must include Hima.

From this rather negative exercise we have to take the subject one step further. Who are Tutsi, Hutu and Twa?

As far as the Twa goes there seems to be little argument. Kagame gives the etymology of the words Tutsi and Hutu as the former meaning immigrant and the latter cultivator. Bourgeois draws attention to the fact that in Kivu a Hutu means patron, because they have Twa as serfs. Gorju has noted that Tutsi means having migrated from the place Ntusi in Ankole, which is not far from the Bigo archaeological site.

Although these opinions as such do little to contribute to the understanding of the terms Tutsi, Hutu and Twa, they clearly indicate a search for two different solutions to what are in fact two different questions. Gorju talks here in terms of an ethnic group basing recruitment on place or origin, whereas Kagame and Bourgeois speak in terms of categories. Indeed Tutsi and Hutu can be talked of either as groups of people or as categories, that is as elements of the system of social organisation.

(1) When we speak here of groups we do not mean it in the sense of 'corporate' group which Radcliffe Brown defined as existing:

> "if its members, or a considerable proportion of them, come together occasionally to carry out some collective action, e.g. if it possesses or controls property which is collective or performs certain rites." (1950 p.41)

Whereas it is not hard to identify the corporate characteristics of a group, it is much more difficult to define the boundaries of ethnic groups. The Irish or Italians who migrated to the United States do not constitute corporate groups, but few if any would object to calling them ethnic groups because the people referred to have a common link, in different degrees, to a common country of origin, a common cultural heritage and are moreover at times conscious of it. When speaking about Tutsi and Hutu we do not refer to them as ethnic groups, because as we have seen, the criteria of establishing the bases for recruitment into these groups of people are open to different interpretations and do not give sufficiently clear grounds for differentiation and therefore identification of the members of a group. The term reference group according to M. Kuhn:

> "denotes a social group with which an individual feels identified and to which he aspires to relate his identity. A person derives from his reference group his norms, attitudes and values and the social object these create." (1964 p.41)

It is in this sense that I would refer to Tutsi and Hutu as groups of people.

Setting aside the disputed question of origin, Tutsi are all those who think of themselves on the basis of kinship or affinity as related to the two clans which provide

the king and the queen mother. These links are expressed and justified, through myths and legends, in terms of ethnic origin. Moreover these links are externalised through certain prototype physical characteristics, certain patterns of behaviour and ideals, standards of moral conduct and the observance of certain taboos. In this way Tutsi are ideally linked with the royal family. This privileged minority group needed to protect itself by drawing into the group by means of hypergamy those who, through power and wealth, became a threat. On the other hand, less successful Tutsi were forced away from the group through marriage to Hutu. If their descendants remained less successful, they would become in the full sense Hutu, even if they retained some Tutsi physical characteristics and were related in some degree to the Tutsi group, just as descendants of the hypergamous unions might retain the physical characteristics of their Hutu origin. The people involved in this two-way mobility constituted the fringe cases of the reference groups Tutsi and Hutu. Rwanda recognise this process of social mobility since they have special names to indicate the persons involved. Ashyhuture means someone who has moved up into the group of superior social status, while umuwore means someone who has dropped into the group of inferior social status. (Lacquer 1939 p.53)


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CONGO
UGANDA
TANZANIA
BURUNDI
Kagera River
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LAKE KIVU
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Miles 0 50
Kilometres 0 50

Those Tutsi who are ideally linked to the royal family, expressed in terms of ethnic relationship, but who do not themselves participate in the political power structure, and are semi-nomadic herdsmen, are the Tutsi-Hima, often called Hima. They belong to the same reference group because of this ideal link and the fact that their women marry the Tutsi of the administration.

The basis of membership of the Tutsi group is therefore social recognition of ideal ties expressed in the idiom of ethnic origin and supported and justified in myth and legend. It is in this sense that we must understand the figures published by I.R.S.A.C. when speaking about Tutsi-Hutu population, Tutsi constituting sixteen per cent and Hutu eighty five per cent of the population. Moreover they gave in 1956 the following pattern of population distribution:

Province	% of Tutsi in population
Astrida	22.97
Kigali	12.79
Nyanza	19.34
Biumba	12.67
Kisenyi	5.62
Ruhengeri	8.37
Shangugu	22.08
Kibuye	30.71
Kibungu	15.77

The overall average of Tutsi in the population is sixteen per cent. We find an average percentage of Tutsi in eastern Rwanda, a low percentage in the north and north-west, a higher than average in central Rwanda and the highest percentage in western Rwanda.

(2) On a different level, when talking about categories, Tutsi and Hutu are referred to as elements of the system of social organisation. Here the basis of differentiation and classification is the element of actual or potential participation in the government of Rwanda, through the channels established by the king. Here the criteria for Tutsi differentiation are extended to all those who actually or potentially participate or have access to all levels of the system of power as exercised by the king, and is therefore limited to those areas where the king had de facto established authority.

We therefore must, with Prof. Vansina, speak of Tutsi as a category within the context of the political structure of kingly power. It is in this context that the remark of Prof. Vansina becomes clear:

> "In Noord en West Rwanda bestonden er van 1900 geen kasten, daar er geen Tutsi waren."
> (In the north and west of Rwanda we cannot speak of castes, because there were no Tutsi.)
> (1962 p.98)

It remains unfortunate and a source of confusion that we have only one verbal expression for both the reference group and the category. Such an identical expression is only justified on the basis of reality if the categories used in the classification coincide with actual membership of the reference group. Writers saying that Tutsi form sixteen per cent of the population but real Tutsi form only five per cent are speaking about Tutsi as a reference group in the former and as a category in the latter instance. Writers dealing with Tutsi as caste or class, that is in terms of categories, are not talking about Tutsi or Hutu as groups of people who constitute the actual population of Rwanda. In terms of categories we can speak of Tutsi or Hutu only in Central Rwanda, where the king had established channels of administration and military power. In the other areas we can only speak about Tutsi and Hutu as groups of people.

Tutsi	North-west		Central	East
As groups of people	-	+	+	+
As categories	-	-	+	-

PART 2 ECOLOGICAL FACTORS

(1) Geographical situation and discovery.

Rwanda as we find it on the map today lies in the centre of the African continent just south of the equator. Being equidistant from Capetown and Cairo and roughly nine hundred miles from Mombasa on the Indian Ocean and one thousand two hundred miles from Boma on the Atlantic, it had for a very long time escaped the enquiries of the early discoverers. Although Speke arrived at its eastern borders in 1861, he was forcibly prevented from entering. It was only in 1894 that the first European, von Götzen, entered Rwanda, crossing it from east to west, accompanied by his six hundred and twenty askaris. He met Kigeri Rwabugiri who was on one of his military operations in western Rwanda in Kingogo of Kisenyi district.

Little did this expansive warrior king know that at the Berlin Conference, British, Belgian and German diplomats had decided nearly ten years previously in 1885 that his kingdom was part of the German zone of influence in East Africa and was marked on the maps as district fourteen

of the vast area called Deutsch Ost Afrika. It was only in 1900 that the first permanent garrison along the Congo border was established and Rwanda thus militarily occupied in a definite form, having formerly been controlled from the station at Usumbura, in Urundi.

From the early missionary reports it is evident that before civilian occupation took over there were never more than five or six German officers in permanent residence in Rwanda. Although in 1907 civilian administration took over, during the whole period of German rule there were never more than ten Germans stationed in Rwanda. They introduced a system of indirect rule, putting the force of their authority behind the current political hierarchy and established the boundaries as we now know them. The only changes were made in 1910 when the same diplomats decided that the Kinyarwanda speaking provinces of Gisigari and Zomba and the isle of Idjwi in Lake Kivu were to be given to Kivu, while the northern district of Bufumbira was to be attached to the Uganda Protectorate. In 1919 a large strip was taken from its eastern borders and given to Tanganyika in connection with the plans for the Cape-Cairo route, but this was restored to Rwanda on January 1st 1924. In this way the actual boundaries of Rwanda do not coincide either

with the Kinyarwanda speaking peoples or with those territories which in one way or another were part of the zone of influence of the king of Rwanda prior to European intervention.

Rwanda as it appears on the maps today covers an area of slightly over ten thousand square miles. But the actual surface area must be considerably larger on account of its extremely hilly terrain. On the north it is bounded by Uganda where the frontier runs through open country. The north-western and western boundaries with the Congo are formed from north to south by the Virunga mountains, Lake Kivu and the Rusisi river. The north-west is volcanic, the highest peak being the Karisimbi (fourteen thousand seven hundred and eighty feet). A number of these volcanoes are still active. Over the last sixty years, apart from a number of smaller eruptions such as those in 1903 and 1905, great natural disasters were caused by the Katerusi in 1912 and the Nyamulagira in 1930. In 1938 a very fertile and densely populated area covering two hundred square miles was destroyed between the volcano and Lake Kivu.

On the south the boundaries with Burundi run along the Lua and Akanyura rivers, along the lakes Tshohoha and Rugwero and along part of the Kagera river which also forms the eastern border with Tanzania. From a hydrographic point

of view Rwanda is in a strategic position. The waters from the western slopes of the Viruga mountains find their way westward and flow into the Congo river, while the waters flowing eastward contribute to the Kagera which flows into Lake Victoria and thence into the Nile.

The fact that Rwanda has so many natural boundaries in itself strengthens the image of internal homogeneity and unity. On the one hand, as we have said, these boundaries do not contain all the territories where the king of Rwanda had some sort of influence. On the other hand it should not be assumed that prior to the introduction of European authority the king had traditionally by any means the same degree of power or effective authority over all the territories within these boundaries. The nature of this authority will be more closely examined in chapter two. However it seems imperative both for the understanding of the word "Rwanda" as we are going to use it with reference to the beginning of this century and for the appreciation of the ecological factors within the territory and the importance to be attached to certain variables within the territory, that we define the nature of the boundaries as we find them around 1900. It is even questionable whether we are able to speak of boundaries at all. Without going

into detail and staying within the realm of verifiable historical data, the following very brief survey of Rwanda after 1850 will throw sufficient light on how the nature of these boundaries should be understood.

In the year Speke tried to enter Rwanda, King Rwogera died. The kings of Rwanda had their court in Nyanza, which is situated in the heart of that area which is known as Central Rwanda and contains the provinces of Astrida, Nyanza and Kigali. King Rwogera had just conquered Gisaka, which had for some time sent tribute to the King of Rwanda. The three local chiefs had started to quarrel among themselves. One of them had appealed to the King of Rwanda for help which was promptly given. Gisaka however continued to be ruled by its own autonomous chiefs but the king of Rwanda left three representatives to keep an eye on things. Such was the situation when the first mission was founded in 1900. We could call the east and south-east an area controlled but not administered by the king of Rwanda although these early missionary reports also stress that all the people of Gisaka considered themselves Banyarwanda and expected protection from the king to whom they paid tribute. In some sense he was their king. In 1861 Rwabugiri succeeded Rwogera. He tried to extend his influence over a wider territory.

Accompanied by his troops, he entered Kivu in 1874, Ankole in 1886, and Bushubi in 1889, where he killed King Nsoro. Although he tried to establish effective authority in these areas, the campaigns had no lasting effects from the point of view of territorial expansion.

Within the territory of Rwanda he led campaigns against the largely autonomous chiefs of Bugoyi, Bwishaza, Kingogo, Mulera, Bubereka, Busigi, Nyantonga and Kinyaga, where he established some form of nominal authority by leaving representatives who tried to destroy or undermine the influence of the local chiefs. All these regions are in the north-west. The western regions were all brought under his effective influence with the exceptions of Bukunzi, Bosozo, Bushira, Kibari, Bunyabiri and Impara. As late as 1924-26, a military occupation of Bukunzi and Bosozo was needed to bring them into submission. The Belgian government replaced these chiefs by Tutsi. Thus, in recent historical times we must distinguish three distinct zones within the current boundaries of Rwanda. These were Central Rwanda, the north-west and west which had been recently occupied and brought under the military control of the king, and eastern Rwanda which had been recently attached to the centre.

We can agree with Prof. Vansina when he states; "Assigner des frontières au pays, en 1900, est impossible", but would like to qualify this statement to some extent. We surely can speak about boundaries, but only if we mean that outside these frontiers, with the exception of the corrections made in 1910 by the colonial powers, the king of Rwanda had no permanent influence, but on the other hand no outside power had any form of authority within these boundaries. Furthermore it does not mean that the degree of influence of the king in the different districts was everywhere the same. The degree of his authority was determined to a large extent by the following factors:
(1) whether these districts had been brought under the influence of Central Rwanda at a recent date or not,
(2) the relative strength of the different Hutu and Hima chiefs at a certain moment, and
(3) the power the king could exert in keeping the different autonomous districts in control.

In his report from Nyundo in Kisenyi district in 1906, Fr. Schumacher sums this up:

> "Dans cette partie montagneuse les Batutsi, délégués du Roi, ne viennent qu'à epoques fixés lever leur impôt. Ils n'y ont aucune habitation même pas un pied a terre."

Or Classe in 1904:

> "Dans les cantons du nord les Batutsi ne sont guère représentés que par les fonctionaires du Mwami récemment imposés d'offices."

Or from Bugoye in 1905:

> "Au lieu d'enlever à la classe dirigeante des Batutsi du centre quelque peu de leur pouvoir, les Européens vont le leur augmenter. Ils ont fait du roi le grand percepteur d'impôts en lui donnant une compagnie de soldats pour l'aider dans cette besonge. La conséquence en est que les gens au lieu de devenir plus libres le seront un peu moins at auront double impôt a payer. Ils travaillent pour leur propres chefs comme par le passé at du plus il leur faudra trouver tout ce qui est demandé par le roi. Les cris de mort contre les Européens retentissent partout."

However the same reports stress that there are pockets of Tutsi, as for instance in Mulera, who sent regular tribute to the king and in whose areas the king had his regular established representatives. Before the arrival of the Europeans we find a very fluid situation with regard to established authority from central Rwanda in the west, north-west and south-east. It is in the light of this that we have to understand the nature of the boundaries of Rwanda around the beginning of the twentieth century when the area was made into <u>one</u> district of Deutsch Ost Afrika.

Topographically Rwanda slopes from west to east in three relatively homogeneous regions. The north-west and

west lie at an altitude of six thousand feet and above, the central upland plain lies at five thousand feet descending towards the east at between five thousand and three thousand sevenhundred feet. In the north-west and west we still find some forests which cover about three per cent of the total surface of Rwanda while we find some savannas covering another three per cent of the total surface.

Coinciding with these natural regions we find clear differences in soil fertility. The west and north-west is very fertile while the centre and eastern regions have rather poor sandy soil, with the exception of Mirenge in Gisaka, which is the best banana growing area in Rwanda. Again we find a remarkable difference in rainfall between these historically and physically distinct regions. Average rainfall per annum varies from sixty inches in the west and north-west to forty inches in central Rwanda and thirty inches in the east and south-east. Significantly, rainfall is subject to considerable annual variation especially in central and east Rwanda. The irregularity of rainfall together with steep contours and porous sandy soil contributed to large-scale famines at irregular intervals when literally thousands of people died and an equal or greater number were uprooted to find food in other parts of the country,

especially in the north-east or in Uganda. The early missionary reports give some indication of the gravity of these recurrent famines especially when they were almost invariably followed by epidemics of disease. References include the following:

Gisaka in 1902 -

> "On nous parle souvent de la fameuse famine de 1900, le Rugaya; elle fit périr un grand nombre de personne et obligea beaucoup d'autres à aller s'établir ailleurs. Nous trouvons les traces encore un peu partout. Huttes abandonnés et misère."

Nyundo in 1910 where about six thousand people are reported to have died within a radius of twelve miles of the mission;

> "Il-y-a très peu de familles où il n'y a pas un ou deux morts."

Nyanza in 1907 -

> "Famine désastreuse: par milliers les gens quittent le pays, pour le Ndorwa ou Nord. Beaucoup d'autres sont morts de faim."

Astrida in 1910 -

> "Nous avons dans nos livres 2,000 Chrétians. Cette année notre liber defunctorum compte plus de 300 déces dus à la méningite." "Plus que 7,000 sont baptisés en articulo mortis."

Astrida in 1919 -

> "Sur 170 hibitants de notre colline, 40 sont morts dans l'espace d'un mois à cause de la grippes espagnol."

According to Government statistics, the great famine of 1928, despite all the efforts made to control it, caused

forty thousand deaths and forced eighty thousand people to leave the country. Again in 1942 famine and disease struck on a very large scale in Central and Eastern Rwanda. In later years with the improvement in communications, medical facilities and administration, these disasters were largely controlled, but the early reports, dealing especially with the period before civil administration was set up after 1919, give a picture of great insecurity and instability especially in Central and Eastern Rwanda, due to irregular rainfall followed by outbreaks of severe epidemics.

In the context of these physically distinct regions, attention should be drawn to the variables listed below

	REGIONS		
	W.N.W.	Central	East
Recent occupation	+	-	+
Rainfall	+	-	-+ (1)
Distance from King	+	-	+
Soil fertility	+	-	-+ (2)

(1) + for Mirenge

(2) + for Kirenge

N.B. Missionary reports of 1902 and 1903 estimate a population of between eighty thousand and one hundred thousand in Mirenge.

(2) Population.

The first serious and sustained effort to enumerate the population of Rwanda was made by the German ethnographer Czekanowski in 1906. He spent a full year in Rwanda going from hill to hill counting huts. He arrived at a figure of one and a half million people. In the Rapports annuels the fathers report having checked Czekanowski's findings against their own and remark how astonishingly accurate his estimates are. They report him as an extremely methodical and conscientious observer. On the basis of his findings we would arrive at a population density of one hundred and fifty per square mile at the beginning of this century. From 1931 onwards, the Government produced annual statistics in their reports to the United Nations. In Lè plan décennal the following official figures are published for 1949.

Province	Total Population	Population density per square mile
Kisenyi	260,581	209
Ruhengeri	217,453	320
Shangugu	162,435	156
Biumba	130,012	118
Kibungu	161,671	65
Kigali	226,808	156
Nyanza	363,956	250
Astrida	305,860	230
	1,808,776	

Average population density in 1949: 180 per square mile.


POPULATION DISTRIBUTION
C O N G O
U G A N D A
T A N Z A N I A
LAKE
KIVU
B U R U N D I
District boundary
One dot represents
500 inhabitants
Miles 0
50
Kilometres 0
50

In 1952 I.R.S.A.C.[1] became responsible for census calculations and produced a figure for the total population in 1958 of two million four hundred thousand giving an average of two hundred and forty persons per square mile. Comparison of the breakdown of these figures by province has become impossible because in 1953 the Government changed the boundaries of the provinces and created one more province. If we have no reason to doubt the findings obtained through prolonged scientific research by the specialists of I.R.S.A.C., we can equally safely accept the figures of Le Plan Décennal of 1949 as it would mean that there had been an average population increase between 1949 and 1958 of 3.5 per cent, a figure which compares well with findings from other parts of Africa. Czekanowski's estimate of one and a half million around 1900 would mean that for the first forty years of this century there was only a marginal increase. This is not very surprising when considered in relation to the frequent famines and epidemics, and also the very late start of any form of efficient civil administration and its services. We have noted that the German civil administration from 1907 to 1916 never had more than ten

(1) Institute pour la Recherche Scientifique en Afrique Centrale

civilians. From 1916 to 1919 there was a Belgian military occupation, while the Belgian civil adminstration was only slowly established after 1919. The first government hospital was built in 1931, while the protestant mission opened its first hospital in 1937 and the Roman Catholic mission only in 1946.

Although we have no way of knowing whether Czekanowski's estimate was entirely accurate, it can be taken as sufficiently exact to allow the conclusion to be drawn that in the period around 1900 we cannot speak of overpopulation as far as the whole of Rwanda is concerned. However, more important for our argument is information on population distribution. Astrida, Nyanza and Kigali, the districts which comprised Central Rwanda, with a total surface of four thousand square miles had a population of eight hundred thousand in 1949, i.e. an average of two hundred per square mile. Within the limits of this area in which there are no lakes or forests, the population was evenly dispersed without dense concentrations. In the north-west, in the provinces of Kisenyi and Ruhengeri, with a total area of one thousand nine hundred square miles, we find a population of five hundred thousand, i.e. two hundred and sixty per square mile, and here we must add that a substantial area


CATTLE DISTRIBUTION
UGANDA
CONGO
TANZANIA
LAKE
KIVU
BURUNDI
District boundary
One dot represents
500 head of cattle
Miles 0
50
Kilometres 0
50

is taken up by a part of Lake Kivu and the forest. Other densely populated areas are found in the north, in the western part of Biumba province, and along the western borders with the Congo, as well as a concentration in Mirenge in Gisaka.

	REGIONS		
	W. & N.W.	Central	Gisaka
Population	+	-	-

- = relative average

The following conclusions seem to be justified:

(1) Well over half the population lived outside Central Rwanda.

(2) The greatest population density was found along the borders at the periphery of Central Rwanda's zone of influence.

Figures for the cattle population given in Le Plan Décennal are as follows:

Province	Area in square miles	Cattle population	Number of cattle per square mile
Kisenyi	1,243	56,000	45
Ruhengeri	677	35,000	52
Shangugu	1,000	35,000	35
Biumba	1,100	45,000	40
Kibungu	2,400	45,000	18
Kigali	1,500	116,000	77
Nyanza	1,500	168,000	112
Astrida	1,120	88,000	78

R E G I O N S

	North-west	Central	Gisaka
Cattle	-	+	-

The plus and minus signs indicate a marked difference between Central Rwanda and the other areas, not only in the total number of cows but also in the cattle-density per square mile.

I am aware that this is not an exhaustive description of the ecological factors within the Rwanda setting. Further cultural variation as expressed in such matters as dress, smoking and eating habits would have to be considered if this was a study of cultural variation in Rwanda. However in the context of the task which I have set myself, the points mentioned throw sufficient light on the fact,

which functionalist writers like Maquet seem to have overlooked, that the terms Rwanda, Hutu and Tutsi require greater specification and refinement. Even with reference to the operation of the system of social stratification which has been the object of these studies, it would seem to be important for the successful isolation and identification of criteria for comparison and classification to be aware of the regional variables if one wants to talk about Rwanda, Tutsi and Hutu. For the understanding of the process of political and social change leading to a violent clash of groups of people, it is essential not only to indicate these variables but also to indicate the correlations between these factors which are shown in the following graph:

	REGIONS			
	North	West	Central	East
Newly acquired territories	+	+	-	+
Distance from the court	+	+	-	+
Rainfall	+	+	-	- +(1)
Soil fertility	+	+	-	- +(1)
Population density	+	+	-	-
Number of cattle	-	-	+	-
Cattle density	-	-	+	-
Tutsi as group	-	+	+	-
Tutsi as category	-	-	+	-

(1) + for Mirenge

The importance of the isolation and the correlation of these factors will, I hope, be more fully appreciated as the argument proceeds, especially in the context of the political structure, the development of new interests, the emergence of conflict and the formation of group identity.

PART 3 KINSHIP

In Rwanda, Tutsi, Hutu and Twa, independent of the region they lived in, reckoned their descent patrilineally. The four named groups based on the principle of agnatic descent are the clan (ubwoko), the sub-clan (shanga) and the lineage (umulyango),[1] while the shallower lineage group is called inzu.[1] The shanga group is found only in the North and North West.

In this chapter, I propose to consider the relative importance and different functions of these groups and the variations as between Tutsi and Hutu and as between Central Rwanda and the peripheral areas. In later chapters I propose to demonstrate how these differences can be correlated with other factors of variation within the wider framework of the political and economic system of Rwanda. In this chapter I shall also explore the composition, organization and activities of the various descent groups and of the family as the smallest social unit based on kinship, and indicate correlations between certain patterns in kinship

(1) For clarity the kinyarwanda terms for lineages will be used in the text:
s. umulyango; pl. imilyango
s. inzu; pl. amazu

organization and other elements of the social system within the framework of variables of a demographic, geographic and ecological nature as already outlined in the previous chapters.

Although these internal variables have to be stressed, it should be noted here that the overall unity of Rwanda society is also expressed in the form of quasi-kinship relationships. All Rwanda recognize a genealogical link with a mythical common ancestor, Kanyarwanda. His three sons, Gatutsi, Gahutu and Gatwa, who were full brothers, were the founding ancestors of the three groups Tutsi, Hutu and Twa. In accordance with this myth, all Rwanda recognise a common mutual loyalty expressed in the term bumwe (literally - togetherness). The same word bumwe is used to express kin solidarity at all levels of the kinship system from brothers in the nuclear family through lineage and clan up to this level of all members of Rwandan society whose solidarity is thus expressed in terms of kinship following the genealogical charter of common origin. While the actual obligations based on bumwe differ at each level of kin organisation, the expression of bumwe defines the boundaries of Rwandan society in that it implies an obligation of solidarity in the context of warfare with external groups. In this context, it is important to note

that despite the fact that peripheral areas were brought under effective control of Central Rwanda only recently, they were evidently afforded protection from external threat since Arab slave traders were never able to gain access to these areas.(1)

The clan

In Rwanda we find fifteen named clans or patrilineal descent groups each claiming an apical ancestor and each having a common totem animal which must be protected by all members of the clan. Contrary to other sources, (Kagame 1957 p.272 and Bourgeois 1953 p.112), Maquet writes that the clans were not exogamous and moreover states that according to his Tutsi informants, not all the members of the same clan were descended from the same ancestor. (Maquet 1961 p.46) However here Maquet, in the case of exogamy, must be interpreted as referring only to the special case of the royal clans in Central Rwanda who alone had a special prerogative of endogamy. Maquet's data further

(1) Ref. G. van Overschelde 1957 p.114, who quotes the slave trader Ahmed Ibrahim admitting to Stanley in 1875 - "During my stay in Karagwe I have tried for the last twelve years to enter Rwanda and have even sent important presents to the King's mother in order to obtain permission to trade in Rwanda. Khamis ben Abdullah, Tippo Tip and Said ben Habib have more than once tried to cross the border but never succeeded." (Translation from Dutch)

poses the problem that if we are to refer to groups as clans this should imply adherence to at least the minimal definition which demands acceptance of putative descent from a common ancestor. We need not be concerned to argue here on the validity of the translation of the kinyarwanda word ubwoko as clan, as used by all authors on Rwanda. But the statements of Maquet's Tutsi informants justifies us in stressing the point that we have to interpret the relevance of clan or other group membership according to the actual or verbal behaviour of the members themselves. We have here a situation in which Tutsi, Hutu and Twa recognise their common membership of a named group, e.g. Abanyiginya or Abega. Such groups are categorized by Banyarwanda as ubwoko, normally translated as 'clan'. According to Maquet, who is referring to the situation in Central Rwanda, Hutu members of a clan accept the implication of common ancestry with Tutsi co-members, but Tutsi in some contexts choose to refute the implication of common ancestry with Hutu. This would seem to imply that while in some reference situations common membership of an ubwoko provides a context for cross-cutting ties of allegiance as between Tutsi, Hutu and Twa, in other situations the value of clan membership for Tutsi, which implies common ties with Hutu, may be overruled by the desire

to express internal hierarchical distinctions between Tutsi and Hutu belonging to the same ubwoko.

The clans were permanent descent groups in that there was no recognition of clan fission over time or through growth in membership. All clans, including the royal clan (Abanyiginya) included Tutsi, Hutu and Twa. Although no exact data are available concerning the distribution of these groups among the clans, authors refer to the fact that Tutsi comprised ninety per cent of the Abanyiginya and Abega clans while Hutu comprised ninety per cent of the Gisera, Zigaba and Singa clans. The presence of Hutu in predominantly Tutsi clans has been explained through adoption and clan identification of Hutu servants and clients with their Tutsi masters. (Pauwels 1965 p.262, and Maquet 1961 p.46) But this suggestion cannot explain the presence of Tutsi in predominantly Hutu clans. Kagame (1954), basing himself on the oral traditions of the court historians, states that all clans are of Tutsi origin and that Hutu adopted the clan of their masters. (Pauwels 1965 p.260) It would seem however that this suggestion cannot be accepted without further evidence since it leaves us with the unsolved problem of how to account for the fact that Tutsi clients did not apparently adopt the clan of their masters. Furthermore,

(ref. p.37) whole areas of Rwanda existed where Tutsi influence was only minimal and royal domination only nominal. While it is possible that certain lineages should have adopted the clan and totem of their chiefs, the fact that whole clans should have abandoned their clan allegiance and adopted another clan and totem without retaining any trace of their original clans would, it seems, demand further proof, especially if seen against the background of large autonomous areas and the fact that the clans are everywhere dispersed rather than localised. Anyone attempting to define who are the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa must at least recognise that this problem of recruitment into the same clan must be taken into consideration.

Although the clans were not corporate groups, and had no internal organisation nor clan heads nor councils, the members recognised and expressed a vague kinship bond. Czekanowski (1917 p.233) especially was very much impressed by what he called the "clangemeinde". The early missionary reports also mention the obligation of members of the same clan to help one another in times of famine and disease although no specific mention is made that clan ties were operative as between Tutsi and Hutu. One important role of the clans was in providing a context for cross-cutting ties of affiliation between Tutsi, Hutu and Twa.

While the above characteristics held for all clans throughout Rwanda, there were certain regional variations which should be noted. In Central Rwanda there was a concentration of those clans whose membership was predominantly Tutsi. Clan membership was here important in relation to the power structure of Central Rwanda, especially in the case of the royal clan and the Bega clan which had provided the Queen Mother for the last six reigns. Other clans who were to some extent also directly involved in the Central Rwanda power structure were the Baha, Bakono and Bagesera who could possibly provide the Queen Mother and were known to have done so on previous occasions. Only the Bagesera could perform the duties connected with the ritual required for the building of a house which was necessary even for the King's palace or for houses required by his wives. The Bazigaba performed the ritual of purification necessary after a death had occurred in the house.

In Central Rwanda, clan affiliation was mainly important in relation to the manipulation of ties in the context of the central political power structure, either when participating directly in the struggle for power or, for those who were excluded from participation, when seeking protection.

In the peripheral areas of the North and North-West, we find evidence of the existence of clans dually linked by

joking relationships. This is indicative of a difference in the role of clans which is correlated with the presence of localised clan groups and evidence of widespread feuding in the northern areas. In this context, the clan joking relationships may have been linked with a framework for preferential marriages and the containment of feuding with neighbouring clans. Such an interpretation is supported by d'Hertefelt's reference (1962 p.451) to institutionalised joking relationships between affines of the same generation and also to a predominance of neighbourhood marriages among the Reera of northern Rwanda. (d'Hertefelt 1954)

The sub-clan (shanga) is, like the clan, a permanent group with no internal organization, no authority structure and no collective activities, but is, unlike the clan, only found in the North and North-West. Here again, paired sub-clans were dually linked in joking relationships, and were also paired for ritual services and games. (d'Hertefelt 1959 p.118) This indicates that sub-clans were clearly localised and further acted as a framework for the operation of specific social ties between sub-clan and clan members, despite the absence of internal organization and authority structure. These institutionalised relationships may also be interpreted as a containment of potential clan fission and

as serving to prevent the outbreak of feuding.

Correlatively, the notable absence of sub-clans in Central Rwanda must be seen against the background of the different political and social organization which gave primacy to the centralised political authority and hence to the possibility of individual vertical mobility. In the centre, in contrast to other areas, security lay in establishing relationships with powerful chiefs and not, as in the peripheral areas, in affiliation to relatively large autonomous descent groups which were not hierarchically ranked.

Umulyango and Inzu

It is among the patrilineages of varying depth that we find the most significant differences as between the different areas and as between the social groups. The umulyango was larger in membership than the inzu. An umulyango contained two or more constituent amazu whose members were able to trace direct agnatic descent from the founder-ancestor of the umulyango.

Before discussing the differences with reference to the various areas and social groups, certain general characteristics should be noted. The lineage, (umulyango and inzu), was everywhere a non-permanent descent group of varying depth formed through the process of segmentation which in turn is

related to factors of a socio-economic nature. Pauwels (1965 p.137) gives several examples of how this segmentation occurred. The hiving off of three inzu heads and their dependants who were formerly members of one umulyango is cited: Rugaga, who had distinguished himself as a warrior, was rewarded by the king with an appointment as hill chief in some other part of the country. Gahenda was given charge of a herd of cattle by the king because of his successes as a rain maker. Karuranga, owing to land shortage, migrated to another part of the country and established himself there. People refer to descendants of these three men as Abagaga, Abahenda and Abaruganga, indicating membership of the separate amazu. However, the members of these amazu continued to refer to themselves in addition as members of their original umulyango.

> "Les descendants de ces personages continueront a se dire appartenir à leur umulyango". (p.138)

From this it is evident that it is the social context which determines whether members refer to themselves as either belonging to the inzu or to the umulyango. It is for this reason that I would like to draw critical attention to Maquet's remark that:

> "There was some uncertainty in terminology: the same group, say the Abahindiro, has been referred to by our informants sometimes as inzu and sometimes as umulyango." (Maquet 1961 p.33)

The lineages were invariably exogamous groups which, in contrast to the clans and sub-clans, include only either Tutsi or Hutu or Twa. On the other hand certain differences of a general nature emerge in relation to the different areas and social groups. The degree of internal organisation, the authority structure and the extent to which they have some of the characteristics of corporate groups is related to patterns of political authority which differs as between the Centre and the peripheral areas. Thevariations in lineage depth, which were also correlated with the degree to which the lineages had corporate group characteristics and the variations in the extent to which lineages tended to be localised or not, also differs as between the Tutsi and Hutu groups.

I shall now first discuss the umulyango and inzu as found in the central area of Rwanda.

Umulyango

The umulyango varied in depth between three and seven generations. However the Tutsi imilyango tended to be of greater depth than among the Hutu, and this fact is correlated with differences in authority structure within the lineage. The lineage was a non-localised group but here again the Tutsi lineages tended to be more dispersed than the Hutu lineages and this was related to the need for greater mobility among

Tutsi in connection with administration and political manoeuvering. On the other hand the dispersal of Hutu lineages was related to the availability of land since in the centre there had been a greater fragmentation of landholding (ref. p. 54-55). The Hutu imilyango had no head, while the Tutsi lineages in contrast had heads who were at the same time political chiefs. Internal organization and authority depended on the existence of a lineage head. Moreover the degree and extent of his authority within the lineage was related to his importance in the wider political structure.(e.g. as a court for appeal cf. Maquet 1961 p.146) There was no collective ownership of property by the umulyango and we do not find any trace of an ancestor cult at this level. Members of the lineage recognised a general obligation of mutual assistance but the nature of the assistance differed widely as between Tutsi and Hutu. In the case of the Tutsi, the larger size of the lineage and the existence of a head, who was at the same time a political chief, lent itself to the possibility of greater manipulation of lineage ties in political affairs. These could be operated both directly through the political chief and indirectly with other members, particularly in view of the importance to the political chief of rallying support. (ref. p.167) In the case of the

Hutu, mutual obligations of support between lineage members was primarily in the context of agricultural activities such as harvesting and planting, and in house-building. In both Tutsi and Hutu lineages, members recognised a mutual obligation of assistance in feuding, which was, however, subject to interference in the case of both groups by the superior political chief, especially in the case of the politically headed Tutsi lineages.

Inzu

For the same reason as applied to the umulyango, the Tutsi inzu was on the whole of greater depth than the Hutu inzu and varied from three to seven generations. The amazu among Tutsi tended not to be local groups and this was again related to the greater need for mobility and the control of circumstances conducive to successful political activity. Among the Hutu, the amazu tended to be localised. Segmentation and geographical hiving off occurred more frequently, thereby giving rise to a shallow depth umulyango composed of the separate inzu sections. This segmentation was primarily related to the availability of land and to political pressures. In the case of both Tutsi and Hutu lineages there was a recognised inzu head. In both cases he was chosen by his predecessor, subject however to the approval of the political chief. Failing the chief's approval, the inzu members would

have to propose another candidate. If the inzu members themselves did not agree, appeal could be made to the umulyango head where he existed or to the political authorities. The inzu head was the representative of the group vis à vis the central authority and was also responsible to the various chiefs for the collection of levies and the recruitment of army personnel. The inzu was the administrative unit in the context of the central administration as for instance in collective assessment for the inzu dues and services.

The inzu head had internal judicial authority over the members. Among Hutu he represented members in all cases of dispute with persons external to the inzu. Among the Tutsi however, he only represented members in cases of dispute with members belonging to a different umulyango. In cases of intra-umulyango dispute between members of different amazu, authority rested with the umulyango head. Inzu heads, among both Tutsi and Hutu, controlled the arrangements for marriage alliances of members. There were no patterns of preferential marriages and patrilateral cross-cousin marriages were permissible. All amazu had councils whose members were elected by the adult male members of the inzu and who assisted the head. Only those disputes which the inzu head could not

or did not want to settle himself were referred to the council. For certain decisions the council and the inzu head would invite all adult male members of the inzu to participate in the discussions. These facts suggest that there was no clear cut division between the powers of the head and of the council, since the council had no recognised specific function save as a forum. However, the political chief, especially in the case of the Tutsi amazu, could exert great influence.

The inzu held regular collective rituals in connection with mourning, harvest celebrations and the ryangombe cult. These ceremonies were attended by all adult male members, who had to bring their share of contributions for the collective feast which was held at the family shrine of the inzu head, who performed the ceremonies. Whereas the Tutsi amazu had no collective property rights in land or livestock, the Hutu amazu had a collective estate in land, which was controlled and distributed by the inzu head. This was of particular importance in the context of finding and clearing new land and of its distribution among members. The inzu head also allocated a plot of land to each male member on marriage. The types of collective action and support were the same as at the umulyango level, but the obligations were

stronger and more frequently activated. The responsibility of organising the collective services required by the political chiefs and patrons lay with the inzu head.

In summary we may say that in Central Rwanda the role of the umulyango was more important among Tutsi than among Hutu. For both Tutsi and Hutu the significance of the umulyango and the inzu was related to centralised political government in that the autonomy of the lineages was subject to the control of political chiefs. The umulyango was a corporate group only amongst Tutsi and only in the limited sense of having a head and some collective activities and obligations, but with no common property. The inzu however was a fully corporate group among Hutu. It was of equal importance among the Tutsi in its political role although it lacked the characteristic of collective property. In terms of social groups based on kinship, the inzu was the most important unit and had a considerable degree of autonomy vis à vis the umulyango. Moreover it was more important than the umulyango because of its role as a unit of administration in relation to central government, although it thereby lacked political autonomy.

I shall now compare and contrast the umulyango and inzu in the peripheral areas as distinct from CentralRwanda.

The umulyango

In the peripheral areas the umulyango was of much greater importance than in central Rwanda in the case of both Tutsi and Hutu. Evidence for this is to be found in certain differences of organization and activities. The umulyango in the North and North-West tended to be shallower even among Tutsi and was always a localised lineage group exercising collective ownership over land and cattle, the latter especially referring to Tutsi. It was a politically autonomous unit whose head, nominated by his predecessor, was not subject to the approval of the political chief. Members of the umulyango council were elected by the heads of the constituent amazu. The umulyango head controlled the estate and allocated new land to the separate inzu heads. The umulyango head had supreme judicial authority in that he not only settled disputes between members of different amazu but also between disputing members belonging to the same inzu if an appeal was made to him. He was also the representative of all members of the umulyango in disputes or relationships with members of other imilyango. He had very strong influence in the arrangements for new marriage alliances. In the peripheral areas the umulyango performed the same ritual activities as were found in central Rwanda at the

level of the inzu. Correlated with its greater degree of internal organization, obligations of mutual assistance between umulyango members were more frequently activated than at the umulyango level in central Rwanda.

The Inzu

The main differences in the organization and role of the inzu in the peripheral areas as compared with the centre were related firstly to its integration into the wider kinship framework of the umulyango, and secondly to the fact that it did not occupy any special position as an administrative unit within the wider political framework.

The inzu head was normally nominated by his predecessor, but in case he had failed to do so, before his death, it was the umulyango head assisted by his council who made the new appointment rather than the members of the inzu. Moreover his appointment was, in contrast with central Rwanda, not subject to the approval of the political chief. Once usufruct rights in land had been granted to the inzu by the umulyango head, it was the inzu head who controlled its redistribution among members. Land vacated by any member of the inzu, or lacking an heir, reverted to the umulyango head and could be redistributed to other amazu. Another aspect of the integration of the inzu into the wider kinship

structure has been referred to in the context of the inzu head's limited judicial powers. For instance, in case of dispute over property, members of the inzu could appeal to the umulyango head.

Collective activities of inzu members in ritual and mutual assistance were the same as in central Rwanda with the exception of additional emphasis on the obligation of support in feuding. From the early missionary reports there is strong evidence that feuding occurred on a very wide scale. Pages (1930 p.647) gives a list of thirty-seven families who, in the area of Bugoyi alone, had in the one year 1910 a member killed in feuding. In the peripheral areas patrilateral cross-cousin marriages were forbidden while on the other hand matrilateral cross-cousin marriages were preferential.

Summarising this outline of the kinship structure in the peripheral areas we can say that the much greater importance of the larger lineage group - the umulyango - is related to the security sought by large autonomous land holding groups in mutual competition over access to and exploitation of land outside the context of central political control. The influence of the umulyango head in establishing marriage alliances should be seen in the same light. In

contrast, the relatively greater importance of the smaller lineage group - the inzu - in central Rwanda, is related to the pattern of vertical manipulation of the centralised political system in which security is sought through political affiliation and economic clientage. Equally the importance of the inzu group was strengthened by the fact that it was the largest kingroup recognised as a unit of administration by the political authorities.

In the context of these differences of a socio-economic nature as between central Rwanda and the peripheral areas, the different patterns of preferential cross-cousin marriages in the two areas receive added importance. Leach (1951) has pointed out how preferential matrilateral cross-cousin marriages establish wife giving and wife taking relationships between a number of lineages even if these marriages do not materialise. This divides the range of people with whom, through kinship, one is more likely to come into contact, into lineage mates and potential affines of two kinds:- those whom he may marry and those whom his sisters and daughters may marry. In the context of Rwanda the emphasis on preferential marriage of matrilateral cross-cousins and the exclusion of patrilateral cross-cousin marriages in the North is related to the need for multiple marriage alliances

with potentially hostile or competing neighbouring lineages of a different clan. In contrast, in central Rwanda, the absence of preferential marriage on the one hand and the permissibility of patrilateral cross-cousin marriages on the other, indicate the importance of a wide ranging freedom of choice in marriage alliances and the subordination of the exploitation of kinship ties to achievement within the political context.

Against the background of these differences in size, organization and roles of the lineage groups as found in different areas and social groups in Rwanda, it seems pertinent to reconsider the usefulness of Maquet's terminology for the kin groups. He writes:

> "We would suggest calling the inzu a primary and the umulyango a secondary patrilineage in order to convey the idea that the umulyango originated from the inzu and that the inzu's functions were more important for the individual and society at large than those of the umulyango," and that the latter is " rather the surviving shadow of the first." (Maquet 1961 p.34)

This description of "descent groups in Rwanda" (Maquet 1961 p.34) can be seen to apply only to the central area since in fact, as has been shown, the umulyango was of considerable importance outside central Rwanda, and was moreover not in any sense a "surviving shadow". The evident lack of regularised lineage segmentation and the absence of an

internal authority system at the level of the umulyango in central Rwanda must have prompted Maquet to dissociate himself from the kin terminology as used by Evans-Pritchard (see Maquet 1961 p.34) and to refer to the inzu and umulyango as primary and secondary patrilineages respectively. However this introduces confusion into the interpretation of what seems to be a not abnormal process of segmentation which was, however, operating under widely differing political and economic conditions in the different areas. An umulyango is a group of living persons who are able to trace their relationship to a common ancestor, but who, as a result of segmentation, are divided into constituent amazu i.e. patrilineages of shallower depth. Examples of quite normal patterns of segmentation occurring in Rwanda have already been given (p.65). Moreover, as we have seen, outside central Rwanda the umulyango had the characteristics of a corporate group whereas in the centre many of these characteristics were absent and were only present at the inzu level. From this it seems evident that Maquet is not, as he states, speaking about "descent groups in Rwanda" but is limiting his description to the special conditions characteristic of central Rwanda.(1)

(1) Maquet's data were based entirely on information received from three hundred Tutsi informants. (Maquet 1961 p.3)

The rugo

The smallest social group based on kinship is the rugo or household which normally coincides with the nuclear or polygynous family and may include dependent members. There is no evidence of significant differences in organization and activities of the rugo as between the different areas nor as between Tutsi and Hutu, except in terms of the occupation of members, a point which will be developed later. Before his death the father indicated who was to be his successor and often this was not done on his deathbed. His successor did not need to be his eldest son. The one who succeeded had a larger share of the inheritance while other sons received equal shares. However, the father's choice could be reversed by the lineage head, by the political chief or even by the patron. The successor took over responsibility for members of the rugo where necessary, especially in the case of any unmarried younger brothers and sisters. The widow of the deceased family head retained usufruct rights in the land which was left to her and which was, at her death, divided among the children of her husband. Because of the absence of fixed rules for succession, brothers competed for their father's favour and there was often considerable rivalry and distrust between them. Wherever possible the father's

choice was publicised in advance by the gift of a cow called inka y'indabukirano. This cow was a recognition or a public registration of the new relationship.

Marriage and affinal ties

In all areas the wives retained membership of their own lineage and became adopted members of the husband's household. In cases of ritual obligation, as for instance after child-birth, a wife had to go to the shrine of her own lineage. Moreover she retained the right of protection in her own lineage. Patrilineal affiliation of the children was subject to the transfer of the bride-wealth.

Apart from these characteristics which were valid for both Tutsi and Hutu in all parts of Rwanda, we find some differences related to these variables. The extent of the control over marriage alliances in this context have been dealt with when discussing differences between the umulyango and the inzu in the different areas and groups of people. Marriage was virilocal among Hutu but was more often than not neo-local among Tutsi. This is related to the fact that the role of the Hutu wife was primarily one of child bearer and as furnishing labour for agricultural production which necessitated residence on her husband's land. Women could not own land but had the usufruct of their husband's land subject to the duration of the marriage. On the other hand

the pattern of neo-local marriages among Tutsi is concomitant with the mobility of the Tutsi husband, the lack of agricultural duties of the Tutsi wife and the usefulness of having links in different parts of the country which served as channels of influence and sources of information.

Ideally the bride-wealth was one cow, but among poor people, including Tutsi and Hutu, the bride-wealth often consisted of goats or hoes. Moreover in the North and North-West we find evidence that the bride-price was sometimes in the form of groom-service in which the husband had to work a certain number of days for a certain period for his father-in-law. Among Tutsi and Hutu alike the parents of the bride gave the parents of the bridegroom a return presentation equal in value to the bride-wealth. This was called indongoranyo. In case of divorce, both the bride-wealth and the indongoranyo were returned but if the indongoranyo had not as yet been paid, the bride-wealth did not need to be returned. In central Rwanda, important Tutsi families did not accept bride-wealth, neither did the King, while other important Tutsi paid their indongoranyo on the same day as the marriage took place. This must be seen against the background of their quest for freedom from indebtedness in relation to political manoeuvring. In the same light must

be seen firstly, the occurrence of child marriages outside central Rwanda, and secondly, the existence of the levirate and ghost marriage in the peripheral areas. The latter were related to the role of the wife as a provider for the matri-segment and of the increase of the lineage. Since the wife's security is only provided for through the institution of marriage, the marriage tie had to be continued with another member of the inzu. This was normally the deceased husband's brother or his son by a senior wife. The absence of these institutions in central Rwanda indicate weaker control exercised by the lineage over the wives of their members, and the subordination of the role of kinship and affinal relations to the political structure. This is concomitant with the greater importance of the wife in providing new political links rather than in producing food and children for the lineage. In the case of a widow, the freedom obtained through her husband's death again enabled her to be used for the creation of new political links.

Blood Pacts

A relationship, expressed in kinship terminology, resulted from the blood pact which was very widespread in all groups in Rwanda. Two persons could enter into a blood pact so long as they did not belong to the same umulyango

or inzu. Blood pacts between members of the same clan were however allowed. Normally only men entered this pact, but cases are known (ref. Pauwels 1958) where husband and wife entered into a blood pact in particular cases where one of the parties was related to a very powerful Tutsi chief, to prevent the divulging of secrets. Whereas the Tutsi were very secretive about their blood pacts, the Hutu were much more outspoken about them. This difference must be seen against the wider background of the particular aspects of power manipulation in central Rwanda where blood-brothers who were unknown to others could render great service by obtaining information or when acting as witnesses in court cases. The number of blood-brothers one had was related to the importance of one's status in the social system and therefore the powerful Tutsi of the centre and the Hutu chiefs in the peripheral areas often had a large number of blood-brothers. Moreover Banyarwanda concluded blood pacts with other people. Pages (1930 p.137) and Arnoux (1940 p.100) describe how Banyarwanda who made regular caravan safaris to Bukoba in Tanganyika had concluded blood-brother pacts with people on their way to assure themselves safe passage through non friendly territories. Even King Rwabugire concluded a blood-brother pact with the Hutu king of Bwito.

The ritual was held in private before some witnesses. While the people who became blood-brothers drank some drops of one another's blood, the principle witness explained the obligations of mutual assistance and the supernatural punishment which would fall on the person who broke the blood pact. The nature of the ritual and the fact that Tutsi and Hutu and even Twa, although less frequently, became blood-brothers, is another example of the existence of specific cross-cutting ties between members of the three social groups. In this context the pact assumed not only the absence of any recognition of social inequality, but also a high degree of intimacy between the individuals concerned.

C H A P T E R I I

THE POLITICAL COMPLEX

PART I INTRODUCTION

Up to this point I have been concerned with providing a basic outline of the ecology and population of Rwanda as a framework for the analysis of social control and conflict. It should be clear from the preceding chapters that pre-1900 Rwandan society constituted a bounded political and social system within clearly defined territorial boundaries which nevertheless contained within it considerable internal variations. The nature of these variations have been brought out in the comparisons between the central and peripheral areas of Rwanda.

I now come to the major concern of the thesis, the analysis of social control and conflict situations in Rwanda which form a necessary part of the explanation of the situation of overt conflict which arose in 1961. An adequate explanation requires both diachronic and synchronic analysis. We have to analyse the "traditional" Rwandan social system, the impact of new factors on the system and the conflict situation which arose at the moment of independence from colonial rule. It is necessary to make a synchronic analysis of the Rwanda social system prior to the impact of

major changes occurring from the early 1900's. Here we have to analyse the latent elements of a conflict situation and the flexibility and forces of cohesion in the social system which contains these tensions. In this context it is important for the subsequent analysis to consider the latent conflict situation arising from the opposing centrifugal tendencies of the peripheral areas and the centripetal tendencies of central Rwanda. Developmental analysis is necessary to show how the forces of social cohesion were rendered inoperative over the time period from 1900 to 1961. A final synchronic analysis is necessary of the changed social system at the time of the eruption of conflict in 1961.

This process of analysis which is necessary for an adequate interpretation of the problem of social control and conflict in Rwanda, relates to the wider controversy over the relationship of social anthropology and history. M.G. Smith has summarised the position in his discussion of the opposite views of Radcliffe-Brown's radical rejection of history, whether conjectural or established, and Evans-Pritchard's contention that "history alone provides a satisfactory situation in which the hypotheses of functional anthropology can be tested." (M.G. Smith 1962 p.73)

The problems of analysis of the Rwandan material fit in general Smith's concept that:

> "the appropriate field of study is a unit over time, not merely a unit at a particular point in time." (Smith 1962 p.81)

He advocates that, as for our case in hand, the field of study is a spatio-temporal unit or continuum, we may usefully begin with the hypothesis that this unit is, or forms part of, a system, many elements of which are somehow interelated. Moreover his hypothesis that the continuum under study represents a system neither includes nor excludes the possibility that it is part of a larger system or contains other systems. Since the system is a temporal unit it includes continuity and change alike and therefore requires combined synchronic and diachronic analysis.

In the case of Rwanda, prior to 1900 we are dealing with a largely self-contained system, which was subject to external influence only through its aggressive or defensive relations with other neighbouring societies. Prior to 1900, Rwandan society was a closed system in that there were institutionalised prohibitions on external contacts. This situation was given value and supported in myth. As a result of the introduction of colonial rule, Rwandan society became incorporated as a dependent sub-system in a different framework. This process of incorporation changed the nature of the former relationships of the Rwandan system with outside forces. By becoming a

sub-system, Rwandan society was no longer closed and self-contained.

In terms of developmental analysis, the fact of incorporation into a wider unit of colonial administration, introduced new factors which impinged on and changed the pre-existing balance of relationships determining the flexibility and forces of cohesion relating to social control and conflict. A diachronic analysis of these changes both as they affected the total system and as they affected the inter-relationships between its various parts are imperative for the explanation of the conflict situation in 1961.

Moreover the Rwandan material demonstrates that a closer and more specific account of historical data may have to be taken than that which seems to be implied in Smith's conceptual framework. Smith writes that:

> "Synchronic regularities isolate units and relations within static systems. Diachronic regularities reveal the outlines of an order within processes of simultaneous continuity and change. The objectives of diachronic analysis are to identify this order, to determine its constancy, and to discover the logic which regulates it. The structure of a diachronic process consists of these elements and their inter-relations."
> (Smith 1962 p.82)

It is my contention that social anthropological analysis may sometimes profit by going one step further in the use of historical data. In the case of Rwanda we can see that

a system is not only "a set of relations among events", (Radcliffe-Brown 1952 p.5-6) and thereby neither completely continuous nor completely changing. Further than this it should be realised that a synchronic analysis of a system at a particular point in time may be influenced by the fact that not only is it subject to " diachronic regularities", but also the form of the system itself may be influenced by particular historical events. This is of particular importance if, as in the case of Rwanda, the particular and possibly temporary form of the system at the introduction of colonial rule then becomes frozen and perpetuated in the process of being absorbed as a sub-system within a wider framework.

The form of the Rwandan social system which was found by the first German occupiers and which was subsequently adopted as the "traditional" Rwandan system by the Belgian administration and missionaries in the process of indirect rule, had been strongly influence by certain specific and verifiable historical events. The most important of these concerned the military campaigns of King Rwabugiri, a recent rinderpest epidemic and a serious famine. As will be evident from a more detailed examination of these events, the form of the Rwandan system taken over under colonial rule was one in which the position of the king had reached a zenith point.

Territorially this was a result of his successful military campaigns, while within central Rwanda he had successfully eliminated powerful Tutsi lineages. His position was further favoured by the fortuitous occurrence of famine and rinderpest which created a situation of greater need and competition for the king's favour. I shall now deal with these events in more detail and point out their implications for the current pattern of the Rwandan system in the early 1900's.

King Rwabugiri, who reigned from 1853 to 1890, was the last king who tried to extend his influence through a series of military excursions. He failed to effectively incorporate regions which are now in the Congo, but through military campaigns managed to enforce his control over large areas of North, North-East and South-West Rwanda. His campaigns against Urundi, the last of which was conducted in 1873, were a complete failure. Many Tutsi from those areas of Rwanda where he had managed to exert greater control went to Kivu Province of the Congo. (Vansina 1962 p.90) However other areas remained completely outside any form of administration from central Rwanda.

> "Jusqu'au début de notre siècle touts les territoires de Kisenyi, Ruhengeri, Biumba et Shangugu restèrent en pratique en dehors de l'administration central."
> (Maquet and d'Hertefelt 1959 p.8)

Moreover Kibungu, which had formerly submitted, revolted in 1900.

To enforce his position, Rwabugiri rearranged the districts, increased the number to twenty one and established a whole series of head-quarters all over the country. (ref. Vansina 1962 p. 42) He broke up the power of important Tutsi lineages as much as possible and reduced the autonomy of local chiefs. His successor, Rutalindwa, lived only for one year when he and his family committed suicide to avoid falling into the hands of a rival to the throne. Rutalindwa was succeeded by Musinga who reigned until 1931.

The great rinderpest epidemic of 1890 to 1891 decimated large numbers of cattle. Several wars into neighbouring countries were organised "pour combler les vides". (Bourgeois 1957 p.163) These raids were called "mulyamo" or rinderpest razzia. On the one hand these wars contributed to the forces of social cohesion on account of the common aim which inspired them. On the other hand they demonstrate how those relationships which were based on the possession of cattle were upset, since the shortage of cattle created a situation of fiercer competition for the restoration of what had been lost. This gave the king greater power in manipulating relationships. This particular circumstance

shows how external factors may have great influence on the internal operation of the system.

Another factor of great importance was the great famine of 1900. The early missionary reports testify to the enormously disrupting effect of this "act of God". The famine was called Ruyagu - "the great famine". The missionaries reported on their arrival in 1901:

> "There is hardly a family which has not lost at least one victim. Many have left and a large number of hills and houses have been abandoned."

The great famine was long remembered by the people who, as soon as another famine threatened, expressed the hope that it would not be as severe as the Ruyagu. From the missionary reports of 1917 to 1918, we can gather the extent of the casualties which were likely to have ensued from a serious famine.

> "Au 30 Juin 1918 le Vicariat comptait dans ses livres 27,536 Chrétiens vivants. Tandis l'an dernier nous accusions un chiffre de 27,594. Nous sommes en diminution de 58!"

In that year two thousand six hundred and forty six people were baptised as Christians, about as many as during the previous year (two thousand three hundred and sixty one). Out of a population of twenty seven thousand five hundred and ninety four Christians, two thousand seven hundred and four had died, or ten per cent. These figures give an

impression of the ravages of a famine in one year at a time when colonial rule had already been established, roads had been improved and large scale relief work (with more than fifty lorries!) was put into operation. We can thus well imagine the disrupting effect which the great famine had had on the system of social relationships at the moment when the colonial power had its initial impression of "the traditional system".

Although my diachronic analysis is taken only from 1900, there is sufficient documentary evidence, discussed on page 126 that the Rwandan political system followed a cyclical process of aggressive expansion and peaceful consolidation. Military campaigns in warfare and raiding and also outbreaks of famine and disease were recurring phenomena in Rwanda. Although these events were regular occurrences, they brought about peculiar situations in the balance of relations between central Rwanda and the peripheral areas and also as regards internal social cohesion which is related to the power structure within the social system of Rwanda. In the traditional i.e. pre-colonial period, such temporary imbalances were subject to redress in the cyclical process. The point that I wish to make here is that when Rwanda became incorporated as a sub-system within the colonial framework, the peculiar

pattern of events found in 1900 was no longer subject to redress through the operation of "traditional" processes, but was frozen and perpetuated through the support of exterior forces.

It is clear that the German and Belgian colonising powers and also the missionaries accepted this particular, albeit possibly temporary form of the Rwandan system as "traditional" and that which should be incorporated by them in the system of indirect rule. Von Gotzen, the first military governor wrote in 1902:

> "Our policy should aim at supporting the rulers' authority" (Ryckman 1953)

His successor, Dr. Kant, repeated this position:

> "Our political and colonial interest require that we should support the king and maintain the Tutsi domination."

In 1916 Belgian troups entered Rwanda and administered it as an occupied territory. In 1919 Belgium was given Urundi and Rwanda as a mandate territory. This was confirmed by a decision of the "Societé des Nations" in 1923 and accepted by the Belgian Government on thirty first of August 1924. When they took over from the Germans the same policy as expressed in the letters of Von Gotzen and Dr. Kant was followed, as is clear from the following:

Ordonnance legislative 6.7.1917

> "Les sultans (i.e. les rois) exercent leurs attributions politiques et judiciaires dans le mesure et de la manière fixée par la coutume indigène."

This intention to maintain and continue the traditional system as it had existed at the particular period of 1900 is evidenced in further official documents up to as late as 1939. The following quotations illustrate this:

> Rapport sur l'administration belge au Rwanda - Burundi 1921
> "l'autorité belge s'inspire de la ligne de conduite suivie anterieusement par l'autorité allemande: assurer la paix et l'ordre public en maintenant l'équilibre qui existait entre les groupements indigènes".

> Rapport (idem). 1939 p.77.
> "Qu'il doit s'efforcer de maintenir et de consolider le cadre traditionel de la classe dirigeante de Batutsi, à cause des grandes qualitiés de celle-ci, de son indéniable superiorité intellectuelle et de son potential de commandement."

This same attitude we find expressed in the missionary reports. in 1919, Mgr. Classe, the Roman Catholic bishop of Rwanda remarks:

> "Nous n'aurons pas de meilleurs chefs, plus intelligents, plus capable de comprendre le progres et meme plus acceptés du peuple que les Batutsi."

While in 1924 he wrote to the Governor of Rwanda:

> "If we wish to further the well-being of the country we must maintain the privilege of birth. The aristocracy of birth is a necessity at the moment."
> (Lumen Vitae 1966 p.13)

The developmental analysis of the social system will have

to take into account this historical evidence as to the attitude of the colonial powers.

This brings us back to the more specific implications of the fact that, under the influence of the colonising power, Rwanda became incorporated into a different and wider framework. This had a twofold effect. First of all the boundaries and external relationships of Rwanda remained fixed at the point which had been reached in 1900, having forces exterior to the system at its disposal, to ensure its stability. The importance of this will be more evident from the following survey.

In 1898 the peoples of the North and North-East revolted against the King, and the German troops very forcefully supported the king's troops in bringing them back under his authority. In the missionary report of 1905 we read:

> "Les cris de mort contre les Européens retentissent partout"

or in 1908:

> "Pendant l'année trois fois les mausers allemands sont venus prêcher à nos voisins les avantages de la paix. Espérons que ces lecons de choses ont été comprises."

In 1901, Gisaka, which had been annexed after a bloody campaign in 1850, revolted, the German troops intervened and the Tutsi leader of the revolt, Rukura, was imprisoned in Usumbura, where he died. The years 1911 and 1912 saw a long and

fierce rebellion in the North where both Tutsi, Hutu and Twa managed to hold out against several European conducted military campaigns. It is significant to note that the rebellion was led by a Tutsi challenger to the king, Ndungutse, who had the support of Hutu and Twa. The Hutu were led by the local Tutsi chief Rukara, while the Twa were commanded by their own leader Basebeya. Ultimately Rukara and Basebeya were caught and executed by the Germans, while Ndungutse fled to Uganda where he was interned at Jinja and died there in 1918. In the South-west the districts of Busozo and Bukunzi managed to escape incorporation into the administrative structure operating from central Rwanda until 1926, when the Belgian authorities for the first time forcibly instated a Tutsi administrator. In 1913 a military campaign aiming to establish a Tutsi chief in Bashiru in the North-East had to be abandoned. In the same year, the Governor, Kr. Kant, wrote to Mgr. Hirth, bishop of Rwanda:

> "Les missions facilitent la tache du Governement. L'influence de vos missionaires nous à epargne la necessité d'y entreprendre des expeditions militaires. Le district du Bashira est reste insourcis jusqu'à ce jour. Je prie la Mission Catholique d'y établir un poste."

From the above two points are clear. Firstly that as far as effective territorial control of the administrative system of central Rwanda is concerned, very large areas of

Rwanda were not only recently subjected through military campaigns, but also the situation was stabilised only as a result of the assistance of the colonial military force. Secondly, these revolts were not clashes between Hutu and Tutsi. On the contrary they were conflicts arising from the combined Hutu/Tutsi resistance of the peripheral areas against the efforts of central Rwanda to incorporate them into a unified administrative structure.

Although it is true that the North was largely Hutu, contrary to the pattern of central Rwanda, where Hutu and Tutsi were residentially interspersed, in the North, North-East and South-West, concentrations of Tutsi were found in the less fertile places (Vansina 1962 p.83) and formed isolated pockets among the Hutu population. (Vansina 1962 p.75) These Tutsi took part in or even led these rebellions. These examples could be multiplied but are enough to illustrate the importance of the particular historical circumstances. This has special reference to the peripheral areas where;

> "la normalisation administrative ne fût atteinte que sous l'époque coloniale européenne vers 1925-1930. L'assimilation psychologique n'eut jamais lieu." (Vansina 1962 p.81)

The administrative incorporation of peripheral areas was thus a direct result of Rwanda having become a sub-system in the wider framework of German and Belgian colonial policy.

The second effect to be considered as a direct result of becoming a sub-system is related to the field of cosmological thought which was given value in myth and expressed and upheld in several institutions. Since Rwanda came increasingly under the influence of western and Christian influence, these cosmological concepts and their associated institutions were undermined. Banyarwanda saw their society as the centre of the universe and

> "Le principe essentiel de la société Rwandaise était unifier tous les pays sous le roi unique de la dynastie de Banyiginya, on ne peut jamais avoir la paix définitive avec les pays voisins."
> (Kagame 1952 p.54)

However this situation was brought to an end firstly by the demarcation of borders and secondly by the incorporation of Rwanda into one administrative unit together with Urundi, its enemy with which Rwanda had been perpetually at war. By coming under the authority of the colonial administration, and thereby no longer having the possibility of taking part in aggressive and defensive politics, the system lost one of its elements making for internal social cohesion.

There is moreover the further point that before European intervention Rwanda had so successfully cut itself off from external influences that there was practically no contact with people outside Rwanda. Since it was not only forbidden under pain of capital punishment (Kagame 1952 p.56) to leave Rwanda without the special permission of the king, nor were

foreign traders allowed to enter Rwanda, Banyarwanda were deprived of the possibility of making comparisons with other social systems. By becoming a sub-system, these boundaries and limitations were lifted and the social system as such became exposed to the possibilities of external influences from which it had hitherto been isolated.

It is unnecessary to raise the question as to whether the peculiar combination of events described above can or cannot be seen as diachronic regularities of the system of political and social relationships in Rwanda. This is immaterial to the two points which I wish to stress. The first of these is that the peculiar form of the Rwandan system found in 1900 can only be fully explained as the result of certain specific historical events. Secondly, the possibilities of redress which were an inherent characteristic in the developmental cycle of the traditional system were removed when Rwanda became a sub-system in a wider framework. In this wider system the controlling authority eliminated these characteristics and stabilised the peculiar form of the system in 1900 as it had been influenced by particular historical events.

TERRITORIAL DIVISIONS

PART 2

Having dealt with the historical setting and its importance regarding the framework of analysis, I now intend to make a synchronic analysis of the political and administrative structure of Rwanda in the precolonial period. In this analysis I want to draw special attention to those processes through which forces of social cohesion operated and latent tensions within the system were contained. The administrative structure includes those institutions through which public affairs were conducted and decisions were carried out. In Rwanda these functions were performed by the king, his central government and the two substructures which have been called the administration and the army.

Within the political system we can distinguish this administrative structure from political processes. These refer to the contest both for obtaining power in the wider political system and for maintaining and manipulating power within the administrative structure. This distinction is of importance in relation to the fact that in Rwanda the fields of administration and politics were not identical since the clientage system was not part of the administration

but formed, as we will see in Chapter III, a framework for political activity and as such was related to the system of political control. However as this is only one aspect of the clientage system, it will be dealt with in a special chapter. By excluding the clientage system, I have limited the scope of this chapter on the political system to the central government, the administration and the army.

In Rwanda the supreme political authority was vested in an absolute monarch called Mwami. Both the extent and configuration of the country and the size of its population demanded that in the actual exercise of his power he needed to delegate authority. The difficulty of rapid communication in "Le pays des milles collines" imposed obstacles for centralised government and demanded effective control over those to whom power was delegated. The historical extension of centralised authority made this all the more necessary. This resulted in an extensive and hierarchically ordered system of administrative officers. Moreover this elaborate administrative machinery required considerable taxation for its upkeep and resulted in a system of rewards for the faithful execution of the delegated power. This in turn created positions of economic privilege which were of special importance in a country which was densely populated and had

only a small margin of agricultural surplus.

These positions of power with their incumbent economic benefits were the object of political competition not only within the political system, which included the administrative and army structure, but also through the clientage structure. Only the former two will be dealt with in this chapter. The juridical apparatus was not independent from the administration but was incorporated into both the administrative and army structures.

Before starting my analysis in more detail one point must be made. The system of political control through the administrative and army structures did not operate throughout Rwanda either in the same way or to the same degree. This is in the first place related to the extent to which central government was able to effectively back up its delegated power and secondly to the fact that the Mwami had reserved certain territorial units under his own direct control. Although these were not subject to full control by the delegated power structure, they were all the same part of the territorial system created by the Mwami. The first qualification relates to the peripheral territories whereas the second relates to central Rwanda. It is to this latter part that I now turn in more detail.

Central Rwanda was for administrative purposes divided into Provinces, Districts, Hills and neighbourhoods. These divisions and subdivisions form the basis of the description of the administrative structure by Maquet (1961). However it must be pointed out that the actual boundaries of these territorial divisions changed frequently according to decisions of the Mwami. Moreover, within this territorial system, we must distinguish between those territories, i.e. hills or districts which were directly administered by the Mwami and those which came under the control of the administrative structure. Among those directly administered by the Mwami we can distinguish:

(a) Small freeholds, called Ibikingi Bwi Mwami which comprised fifteen to twenty rugos, the owners of which were all clients of the king. Hundreds of these freeholds were to be found all over Central Rwanda and constituted pockets of direct control, foci of rewards and centres of information.

(b) The hills on which royal and princely cemeteries were found also fell directly under the Mwami's control. Since the inhabitants were exempt from all taxation even to the Mwami himself, they provided an opportunity for preferential treatment to his favourites.

(c) The royal residences were also spread over the country.

These were "hills" of different sizes and were administered by one of the king's wives, concubines or siblings. These hills were not only not subject to the normal system of administration but also served as centres of observation and reporting and as tax collection centres.

(d) Certain hills belonging to the queen mother or the Biru, were exempt both from the control of the administrative structure and of the Mwami.

From the point of view of territorial division we can summarize the situation in Central Rwanda as follows. The country was divided into eight provinces (Lacger 1939, p.486) each of which was headed by either a high chief or in the provinces bordering on Urundi by an army chief. These provinces were subdivided into districts. Sources differ as to the total number of districts, giving forty (Maquet 1961, p.102), fifty five (Lacger 1939, p.86) and eighty (d'Hertefelt 1962, p.62). At the head of each district were two chiefs, the cattle chief and the land chief, who were, like the army chief and high chief, appointed directly by the Mwami. Each district was divided into a number of hills, (average fifteen to twenty cf. Lacger 1939 p.486) each with its hill chief who was appointed by the army chief. The hill was subdivided by the hill chief into several neighbourhoods, at the head of which was placed one of the rugo heads

appointed by the hill chief.

However, within this changing pattern of divisions and subdivisions were interspersed the hills and neighbourhoods directly dependent on the Mwami, the queen mother or the Biru.

Every office holder had his own "hill" to administer apart from possible wider responsibilities. Thus the cattle and land district chiefs each had their own hill. Assuming a hypothetical example in which there are twenty hills in one district, the distribution of hills under the various administering authorities might be as follows:

1	6	9	9
2	7	9	9
3	8	9	9
4	9	9	9
5	9	9	9

1. Hill of the District land chief appointed by Mwami.
2. Hill of the District cattle chief appointed by Mwami.
3. Hill of the Chief of the Province managed by his representative.

4. Hill of the army chief managed by his representative.
5. Hill of the royal residence: chief appointed by Mwami.
6. Hill of the queen mother: chief appointed by queen mother.
7. Hill of the royal cemetery: chief appointed by Mwami.
8. Hill of the Biru: chief appointed by Biru.
9. Hill chiefs, representatives of the district chiefs, appointed by army chief.

N.B. (a) The Biru, the army chiefs and high chiefs lived at the court and therefore needed local representatives.

(b) 3 - 8 all these subdivisions would not have been found in the same district.

Outside central Rwanda, where the above mentioned divisions were organised by central government, the same type of division was not possible, as central government did not have the effective power to implement it. However, neither were these regions totally independent. They recognised in one way or another the authority of the King of Rwanda and in a sense could be considered as protectorates. Here again we can make some distinctions within the field of non fully integrated areas which is not without importance in relation to the extent to which Rwanda can be considered as a plural society.

Firstly, within Rwanda as a whole there existed not only the Kingdom of Central Rwanda but also the kingdom of Gisaka

(Kibungu Province). Gisaka had been a completely autonomous Tutsi kingdom with its own administrative structure and up till 1853 had managed to avoid paying tribute to the King of Central Rwanda. In that year it had been conquered and the royal drum captured. The Gisaka royal family had been almost exterminated and a brother of the king of central Rwanda had been appointed high chief of Gisaka. The rebellion of 1900 against the usurper was put down by German troops and central government appointed and maintained its own officers.

Secondly, there were regions such as Biumba which had for some time been militarily subject to Central Rwanda and which were forced to pay tribute but which had managed to different extents to escape full integration into the administrative structure. (Vansina 1962 p.60)

Thirdly, there were more or less autonomous regions in the North and North-East under Bahutu lineage heads, called Bahinza, most of whom paid tribute to the king of Central Rwanda but who had successfully resisted incorporation into the administrative systems of Central Rwanda (Vansina p.9b).

Fourthly there were the Hutu kingdoms in Shangugu, whose ritual kings paid regular tribute, but which were not part of the pattern of divisions and subdivisions headed by officers

appointed by Central Government. Their kings were also called Bami.

It is within this territorial framework of Central Rwanda and the peripheral areas with its pattern of different areas subject to and exempt from delegated power that we must further consider the institutions of political control in Rwanda.

The pivot and centre of all power in Rwanda was the Mwami, whose allegedly divine origin was the justification for his power and at the same time the basis of his absolute sovereignty over all the land, cattle and people of Rwanda.

The position of the Bahinza however needs to be further examined. In a sense they were more than Hutu lineage heads, since their authority extended over a wider area than their own lineage and included a number of other lineages. Lacking further evidence, we could accept de Lacger's suggestion that these chiefdoms were the result either of a confederation of lineages or an institutionalised instrument of arbitration between the often feuding lineages (de Lacger 1939 p.75-76). Like the Mwami of Central Rwanda, the power of a Bahinza was absolute and the heads of different lineages in his territory paid annual taxation to him. He had likewise several residences spread over his territory each of which was managed by one of his wives. His council consisted of the heads of the different lineages in his territory. He did not however

delegate his power to other lineage heads, who were only intermediaries between him and his subjects. (Vansina 1962 p.78).

Next to these autonomous chiefdoms comprising several lineages we find in Bugoye, Kibale and Bubereka completely autonomous lineages ruled by their respective lineage heads, who were also called abahinza (Kagame 1959 p.27). Their territory was often very small, comprising only a few hills. They did not possess a political structure other than the internal lineage structure. Pauwels (1967 p.210) gives them the name of abakonde to distinguish them from the abahinza, which avoids confusion. Most of the abahinza and abakonde paid tribute to the Mwami in token of their acceptance of his sovereignty and in exchange for his protection not only against attacks from outside Rwanda but also in case of interbahinza or bakonde conflicts. Pages (1923 p.690) gives the names of twenty one autonomous abakonde chiefs who traditionally paid annual tribute to the Mwami of Central Rwanda. Moreover he describes an eyewitness account of Rwabugire's visit to Bushiru and Bahinza in 1894 during which he obtained cattle from the Bahinza and Abakonde to replenish his decimated herds. The political power of the Mwami over these areas was very fluid.

PART 3 THE CENTRAL COURT

Myth of Origin

(a) The Mwami

> The first King of Rwanda, Nkula, lived in heaven with his wife Nyagasani, their two sons Kigwa and Tutsi and their daughter Nyampundu. One day the three siblings fell from heaven and settled on a hill in Rwanda. There Kigwa married his sister and their descendants are the Nyiginya clan, which have since constituted the royal line. Mututsi married one of his nieces and their descendants are the members of the Bega clan, who by tradition most often provided the Queen Mother.
>
> After an invocation by Kigwa and Mututsi, God sent them a cow and a bull together with sheep, goats, hens and all the seeds needed for agricultural produce.
>
> Moreover God taught them how to make fire and forge iron objects.

This myth not only upheld the sovereignty of the kingship in Rwanda and gave it the support of divine approbation but also implied the king's intimate connection with the country and the people as a symbol not only of the country's security in relation to the outside world but also of the well-being and fertility of its inhabitants, cattle and agrarian produce.

This relationship was brought out in the word Mwami

which is derived from the verb Kwama, being fertile. He was Rwanda personified and this mystical identification was further expressed in a large number of avoidances and rituals. According to myth the first 'known' king of the Nyiginya dynasty was Gihanga. His sons became the founders of the different royal lineages existing in Rwanda. Kanyadorwa, Kanyagisaka and Gafomo inherited Ndorwa, Gisaka and Bushubi respectively (Pages 1933 p.204). Kanyarwanda was the father of Gatutsi, Gahuti and Gatwa (d'Hertefelt 1960 p.126). The king therefore was neither Tutsi, Hutu nor Twa, he was Umwami (Kagame 1954 p.50). However he belonged to the Nyiginya clan and was the issue of a Nyiginya father and normally a Mwega mother, but at the moment of accession to the royal drum he changed his Tutsi name for a new name according to the following four fold cycle in which the first king of each cycle was alternatively Cyirima and Mutara. (d'Hertefelt and Coupez 1964 p.51). Thus the sequence was: 1. Cyirima or Mutara; 2. Kigeri; 3. Mibambwe; 4. Yuhi.

The first and last Mwami of each cycle of four Kings were 'peaceful' kings and were moreover obliged by tradition to execute special rituals relating to the well-being of the kingship and the country.

The incorporation of the burial rituals into the accession ceremony underlines the relationship between

the sacredness of the kingship and the continuation of the royal lineage. This is also emphasized in certain texts taken from the ceremony (d'Hertefelt 1964 p.225 and 261;262). The heir to the royal drum was chosen by the king, generally one of his younger sons was selected. The name of the heir apparent was however kept secret even from the one who was chosen. It was revealed only after the king's death by the three 'Keepers of the Secret', two of whom were abiru and one army chief (d'Hertefelt, Coupez 1964 p.5) to whom the Mwami had confided his decision.

However the sons who were not chosen together with their mothers, did not always acquiesce in the decision of the Mwami and sometimes challenged the appointed successor to the drum. This happened in 1895 in the case of Rutalindwa (ref. p.91). Although we cannot say that wars of succession were virtually institutionalised, as in Ankole, nevertheless from the accounts of the court historians we gather that they occurred frequently. Vansina, (1962 p.2) in his study of the history of Rwanda, concludes that a war of succession occurred about every other reign. In practice this would have eliminated the likelihood of a revolt against the person of the Mwami during his reign and hence these violent competitions over the possession of the royal drum, the Kalinga, had a stabilising influence. At the same time

they constituted a testing ground for the loyalty of the king's followers.

Although in theory the Mwami was an absolute monarch, whose supreme powers were divinely sanctioned, in actual practice his powers were limited, not only by customary limitations but also because he had to delegate his powers. This he did through office holders of the administrative and army structures, within the framework of the territorial divisions we have mentioned. The royal enclaves and especially the royal residences which were both dispersed throughout the country, constituted centres of control over the office holders of both structures. At the time of Rwabugire there were twenty one of these royal residences with a further three belonging to the queen mother (Kagame 1952 p.124). Apart from his personal clients, the abanyi-bikingi, or holders of ibikingi land, the Mwami had at his personal disposal an extensive array of court personnel, court historians, judges, spys, bodyguards, dancers, executioners and palace retainers.

The most important members of the court were however the abiru. These were a group of men belonging to certain Tutsi lineages who were charged with preserving the continuity of the tradition in its entirety. In contrast with all other

offices, their status was ascribed.

The abiru, together with the high and army chiefs, who nearly all lived at the court, formed a kind of council, called Inama, which the king could consult at his own discretion. One of the members of the council was appointed by the Mwami as 'favourite counsellor' who fulfilled a function comparable to that of the Kàtikiro or prime minister to the Kabaka of Uganda.

In the magico-religious field the king kept at the court the keepers of the sacred drums and the ancestor shrines, the healers and the official diviners. D'Hertefelt (1962 p.87) gives an enumeration of the 'Spécialistes de l'invisible'. The great variety and number of these specialists have been the subject of detailed description by Lacger (1939 p.234-252 and 304-321); Overschelde (1947 p.321-369) and Bourgeois (1956 p.104-367).

The Mwami exercised his political and administrative power through delegation, using these channels at the same time to obtain from his people the taxes needed for the upkeep of his very extensive court. This meant that the king had at his disposal a large number of sought-after positions for distribution, especially as all these with the exception of the abiru, were non hereditary. In this

way the system made it possible for the king to publicly demonstrate his absolutism. It also constituted a framework for political manoeuvring to obtain the favour of the king. In this way his supreme power was not only not dimished through delegation but further, since the whole system of delegated power and the multiplicity of offices found its apex in the king, it formed an instrument enhancing the actual exercise of his powers.

Without any obligation of further consultation, the Mwami decided on policies of war or peace and he appointed the army, provincial and district chiefs. He made new laws, which were publicly announced throughout the country (Bourgeois 1957 p.66), fixed the boundaries of provinces and districts, established new army units and appointed the court magicians. Furthermore he was not only the supreme commander of the armed forces, head of the civil administration and law maker, but he was also the chief justice. He constituted the final court of appeal. In this he was assisted by a series of judges, both Tutsi and Hutu who were appointed by the king. Moreover he could overrule any court decision and condemn anyone without trial to capital punishment or on the other hand commute a verdict of capital punishment by the courts into material compensation. In the latter case the

compensation was kept by the Mwami except in the case of murder. Pages (1939 p.190-192) gives a list of thirty four important Tutsi who were condemned to death by Mwami Rwabugire.

The fact of having obtained important status in no way constituted a protection against royal suspicion or vengeance. This point is brought out in the early missionary reports e.g. Save 1907:

> "Il n'y a pas de grande famille qui n'ait plusieurs de ses membres tués par le roi. Rares sont ceux qui conservent jusqu'à la fin de leurs jours les bonnes graces du roi"

and the reporter adds the commentary:

> "Dans le Rwanda plus d'ailleurs la fortune est fragile".

Although kingship was sacred, the king himself was not a ritual specialist as e.g. a rain maker. He stood over and above the official rain makers as a controller of their activities. This absolved the Mwami from possible blame. The king would punish those ritual specialists whose efforts had not succeeded. The same report of 1907 states:

> "Le roi fait tuer entre autres la chefesse de la colline de Imaza. Elle appartenait à la famille des Bashara qui ont l'apanage de faire la pluie. Maintenant que la pluie refuse de tomber, quelques uns le paient de leur têtes".

Moreover although the nature of the kingship in Rwanda cannot be described as a divine kingship, the king had an

important ritual role which was complementary to his political, military and judicial functions. The hierarchical stratification of the power structure in Rwanda has lent itself to neat functional analysis within the framework of cross-cultural comparisons. However since Rwanda kingship had dual political and ritual functions, consideration limited only to the political aspect must result in inadequate analysis.

The explanation of the role of the Mwami in purely political terms must be limited to those areas where his political power was sufficiently established to allow for the operation of the delegated power structure, since it is through these channels that his political power operated.

However, it is my contention that the consideration of the ritual function of the king cannot be excluded from any adequate analysis of the nature of the kingship in Rwanda. Inclusion of the ritual function of the king not only adds depth and perspective to the analysis of kingship as a political force in those areas where his political power was fully operative but it is also significant in relation to the analysis of the kingship as an important factor in social cohesion.

Moreover the ritual function of the Mwami as a unifying force in Rwanda extended beyond the area of Central Rwanda into those regions which, although politically not fully

part of the administrative system, were protected by the Mwami from external threats and domination. Hence these areas as well as the centre were intimately concerned with the king's well-being as a protector. This protection was held to be divinely ordained and was not only activated in effective military protection but also expressed in myth and ritual at the court. The same can be said of the king's ritual function relating to the well-being and fertility of people, cattle and agricultural produce.

The extension of the king's ritual power was thus wider than the territorial extent of his political power. The principle integrating force of the rituals performed by the king did not always consist of widespread participation of the population, although in many instances, as we will see, such participation did occur. The shared conviction that the king's performances of the rituals protected the whole country against all sorts of calamities and demonstrated him to be a divine instrument for the distribution of supernatural benefits, was an important contributory factor in social cohesion. This was seen as a continuation of the divine plan expressed in the origins of the first kings, the founders of the dynasty and the country, to whom God had entrusted the well-being of its people, cattle and produce. Against this

background I will now examine in more detail both the nature of the rites and the occasions on which they were performed, since they clearly expressed the nature of the kingship as a force of social cohesion not only in Central Rwanda but also in Rwanda as a whole. In 1964 d'Hertefelt and H. Coupez published the Kinyarwanda text of the rituals of divine kingship with a French translation. It is this text which I use as the basis for my analysis. We can distinguish, following d'Hertefelt and Coupez, four kinds of ritual. (1) Accessional rituals, (2) Rituals which were periodically performed, (3) Rituals relating to war and (4) Rituals to be performed on accession to the sacred drum.

The rituals prescribed by tradition and to be performed by the king on certain occasions were all related to fertility. The occasions were times of great calamity due to famine or disease. The first two rites deal with controlling the effects of drought or excessive rain. The king went through sacrificial rites and invocations to his ancestors and sent one of the ritualists round the country with a pot containing remnants of the sacrifice in order to let the people know and see that the king had performed the rites to stop the drought or the excessive rains. The third ritual was performed if disease struck the bees. (Honey was an

important ingredient in the making of first quality beer). The ritual again consisted of invocations to the royal ancestors, "who brought the bees into the country" and sacrifices were made. Again messengers were sent round the country with potions used in the ritual with which the hives were sprinkled. The text makes special mention of sending messengers to Mugamba (p.33). This is of particular importance as Mugamba was one of the highly independent and autonomous districts in the mountain region in the North. Although it was outside the direct control of central Rwanda, the people paid a regular tribute to the Mwami in honey (Pages 1933 p.563).

The other two occasional rituals were performed to prosper hunting, a specifically Twa occupation, and to stop the ravages of rinderpest. In both rituals the text used in the invocation to the royal ancestors brings out how they had brought the skills of hunting and cattle breeding into the country. Sacrifices were made and ritualists were sent all over the country carrying pots containing concoctions used in the ritual which were used to sprinkle the cattle.

Apart from these five rituals which the King had to perform on certain specific occasions, he was required by tradition to perform four periodic rituals, two of which

were to be enacted annually while the other two were reserved for the beginning and the end of the cycle of four kings.

The first ritual took place annually in May, just before the start of the long dry season, and towards the end of the invisible moon period just before the new moon appeared. Through the ritual the country is in fact associated with this cosmic renewal of life and death. During the ritual, which lasted for several days, sexual intercourse was taboo and the beating of the drums was forbidden. The end of the ritual coincided with the appearance of the new moon and this renewal of life was expressed in great festivities and much beer-drinking. This ritual took place at a time when there was no more agricultural work to be done on the fields and more time was available for festivities. Moreover at this particular season there was a marked difference in temperature between day and night while at the same time the stock of provisions was running low. It was therefore the season when epidemics and disease were most likely to occur.

Hence the king performed his ritual of protection against the background of the symbol of life and death (the moon) which coincided with a time of increased danger and the start of the dry season. In the text the king is portrayed as the

as the symbol of continued fertility and well-being - a sign of hope. Once this ritual had been performed, there was national rejoicing during which the royal drums were beaten and echoed by drums throughout the country. It was at this time that those who were liable to pay taxation in beer had to bring it to the chief.

The other annual ritual was the rite of "the first fruit of sorghum". It consisted of several parts. Firstly a Hutu ritualist received hoes from the king with which to cultivate the sorghum destined for the ritual. Later on some unripe sorghum was brought and the king performed a fertility ritual, calling upon his royal ancestors. When the sorghum was ripe, it was brought to the court and the king, together with the queen mother, the head of the Tutsi lineage of the Tsoobe and the Hutu ritualists, prepared porridge from the newly harvested crop and ate it together. The people had to abstain from eating the new harvest of sorghum until the first fruit ceremonies had taken place. Moreover taxation of sorghum was paid at this particular time of the year.

Although there are several notions relating to social relationships and occupational divisions present in the rite, the fundamental concept underlining the ritual is the

identification of the king with the success of the agricultural activities of the people. On this basis the ritual transcended several cleavages in Rwanda society. These cleavages were not concealed, they were expressed but in the context of interdependence. The fact that the king handed out hoes associated him specifically with Hutu agricultural occupations. Moreover, the text of the ritual "Quand le Roi était encore Tutsi" (d'Hertefelt p.81 vers 94) underlines the idea that the king is no longer purely Tutsi but king of all the people. In the ritual, the king and the queen mother together with representatives of Tutsi and Hutu, all co-operated and all ate together. Moreover the Tsoobe lineage mentioned inhabited an area in Rwanda outside the confines of Central Rwanda. They lived in Bumbogo, Kibari and Rukiga districts. (Delmas 1950 p.106. Kagame 1947 p.367).

Another periodical rite was performed during the reign of every King called Yuhi, one of the peaceful kings, who was the last of the cycle of four. The ritual concerned the renewal of the perpetual flame which was kept burning as a sacred fire at the court. It was believed to have been started by the first king of Rwanda, Gihanga. It symbolised the perpetuity of the royal lineage and the well-being of the country was believed to be magically related to the continuation

of the fire. During the ceremony the king forged a hoe in the sacred fire. This hoe was heralded as a symbol of unity. During the ceremony the king showed the hoe to the people asking "People! What is this?" They replied "The hoe of unity", and the king said "The country is truly united under its king Yuhi" (p.67 vers 258-261). The king then offered a sacrifice to his royal ancestors, who first received fire from Imana and promised his people increase in population.

The last ritual in this category was performed at the beginning of the royal cycle by Cyirima or Mutara alternatively. Like Yuhi they were peaceful kings. The Yuhis were called Bami of the fire while the Cyirimas and Mutaras were called cattle Bami and had to perform the important ritual called "The watering of the cattle". Maquet states that the kings named Cyirima, Yuhi and Mutara were called peaceful Bami, "They were not allowed to cross the river Nyabarongo, a river which runs in the centre of the country" (Maquet 1961 p.125), and this symbolised the fact that they should not send their armies abroad. The Nyabarongo approximately divided the central from the northern districts of Rwanda. "Abroad" in this context therefore included the peripheral areas. Maquet further remarks that "this rule very wisely allowed the country to recuperate and to assimilate new territories

during a preceding war-like reign (1961 p.125). The text of the ritual however does not support this conclusion. It not only establishes the fact that there was a cycle of only four and not of five kings but also states that only Yuhi were prohibited from crossing the river Nyabarongo. Maquet's interpretation of Yuhi's position can readily be accepted as he succeeded two war-like kings, but this cannot apply to Mutara or Cyirima. The point made here may seem trivial at first sight but the interpretation of the ritual at the beginning of every royal cycle and the obligatory ritual crossing of the Nyabarongo is significant in relation to the nature of the kingship as a force of social cohesion, especially in the context of spatial divisions between central and peripheral areas. As we have said the kings of Rwanda followed a fourfold cycle beginning alternately with Mutara and Cyirima. In the ritual we find, corresponding to these alternating periods of the cycle, a ritual division corresponding to the spatial division of Rwanda made by the river Nyabarongo. As we have already mentioned the last king of the cycle, Yuhi, had to stay inside central Rwanda and this might well have been related to the factors indicated by Macquet.

The first king of a new cycle also had to stay within central Rwanda until the moment during his reign when he had

to perform the ritual of the "watering of the cattle". The appointed time for the ritual was decided by the abiru or traditionalists. On this occasion the king had to make a ritual crossing of the river and thereafter live until his death outside central Rwanda, since he was not permitted to return across the river. At his death a Kigeri succeeded him and was invested with the royal power at the place where his predecessor had died. Kigeri then ritually crossed the river into central Rwanda and took with him the mummified body of his predecessor. This mummified body was not buried but was kept in a special sanctuary near the royal palace throughout the reigns of Kigeri, Mibambwe and Yuhi. The successor to Yuhi again crossed the Nyabarongo during the ritual watering of the cattle and took with him the body of his fourth predecessor who was only then buried there and the cycle was renewed.

The fundamental idea expressed through this ritual and its associated movements is that every reigning king shared his authority with the initiator of each cycle. This king was, through special rites, identified with the good fortune of having cattle and was the protector of all cattle. For this reason every initiator of a new cycle was called a cattle king. The fact that every cycle started with a name

different from the former one emphasised the beginning of a new cycle. Moreover through the ritual crossing of the Nyabarongo and the burial of the king outside central Rwanda each cycle renewed the mystical identification of the kingship with Rwanda as a whole. Moreover the cyclical element gave an opportunity of periodically expressing a rejuvenation of the kingship. It is of special importance that this rejuvenation in the reign of the first Mwami of the cycle coincided with the cattle ritual which involved the crossing of the river and was hence associated with the unity of Rwanda as a whole. At the time of the ritual, the skins of the royal drums were renewed. The people were also associated with this rejuvenation of the royal drums, the kingship and therefore of Rwanda, through the obligation to change and renew the skins of their own drums.

The rituals relating to war all express a fundamentally identical idea. The strength of the kingdom and its invincibility depended on the strength of the king. This idea was particularly well expressed in the ritual called "The king in hiding". This ritual was performed when a king of Urundi died, except when he died in battle with the Rwanda. At that moment Rwanda was believed to be threatened by the spirit of the deceased king, the eternal enemy of Rwanda.

In practical terms the king was most likely to be succeeded by a more youthful and vigorous king. To avert the threat of attack and to strengthen the king of Rwanda, the Mwami went through an elaborate sacrificial ritual and went into hiding for eight days during which sexual intercourse was forbidden. He was held to be in intimate contact with his royal ancestors who gave him new strength. In him the country was revitalised and strengthened in opposition to any possible threat from the new and young king of Burundi.

The three rituals associated with royal succession demonstrated how the Mwami of Rwanda was superior to all other heads of administration and the head of the army. In the ritual he presents himself as a powerful master and an aggressive warrior, a man to be feared because he is the master of everybody and everything by virtue of being the rightful successor.

From this analysis of the royal rituals several conclusions seem justified in relation to the ritual function of the king as a factor of social cohesion. The status quo of political power of the king is related to his position as rightful successor within the Nyiginya clan. The identification of his kinship with divine ordering is concomitant with the identification of the Mwami with the country as a whole. Following from this both the Mwami's

personal welfare and his actions are held to coincide with the well-being of the country as a whole and of all its members. The king and his ritual are necessary for protection against outside domination. Other aspects of the royal ritual emphasize the legitimacy of the Mwami's position in transcending ethnic cleavages. The king, although a Tutsi, is king of all Banyarwanda. He ceases to be a Tutsi and becomes Mwami, he is a successor to Kanyarwanda, the father of Gatutsi, Gahutu and Gatwa (ref. p.17). This is expressed in his dynastic name and in the actual performance of the rituals as well as the texts. The first fruits ritual and the ritual of the new moon specifically underline the point that he transcends ethnic cleavages. The king is not only successor to the first Mwami who brought cattle, agricultural seeds, bees etc. into the country, but also the link between fertility and the royal ancestors. This is brought out in the rituals concerning drought, excessive rain, bees, cattle and first fruits. In all these rituals he is shown to transcend occupational cleavages.

He is the king of the whole of Rwanda. The symbolism of the ritual of the watering of the cattle, the war rituals, the ritual of the bees, the first fruit rituals and the new moon ritual, all refer to the king as also transcendental

to spatial cleavages in Rwanda as a whole.

This unifying transcendental character of the kingship is not only ritually expressed and mythically upheld, it was also externalised and expressed by all Banyarwanda through joining the Mwami in certain avoidances e.g. the ritual of the new moon. Moreover the rituals performed at the court were further publicised by the ritualists who went to all parts of the country to sprinkle the cattle or the bee hives.

In other rituals the people were not only aware of the Mwami's performances of the rituals relating to fertility but also took an active part by beating the drums, renewing the skins of the drums or eating from the new sorghum harvest. Another way of emphasizing the rituals was that certain taxes had to be paid in connection with them. The Mwami was unique, the centre of the universe and the direct link with God's ordering of things. He was the symbol of all things good: Rwanda, cattle, agricultural produce, health and fertility. He was Rwanda personified. "Son foyer couvre tout le pays" (poème dynastique Kagame 1951 p.53). His uniqueness was further expressed by the use of special words for every day activities of the Mwami such as walking and sleeping (Pages 1933 p.491).

All these aspects of his ritual function are complementary

to his political function as the absolute monarch, issue of the Nyiginya Tutsi clan and free to favour whomsoever he wants to favour.

The total effect of the impact of colonial rule on the nature of the kingship in its political and ritual capacity will be discussed in the last chapter. Through becoming dependent on foreign military force which at the same time restricted his powers, many aspects of the traditional function of the kingship and its traditional image were changed. The end of traditional Rwanda kingship did not come when in 1961 Rwanda was declared a republic, but in 1931. In that year Yuhi Musinga, the last of the cycle of four kings, was deposed by Belgian Colonial rule and sent into exile. One of his sons, Charles Mutara, succeeded him. Yuhi Musinga, before he died, instructed his faithful followers to bury him in a secret place, because he feared that his son, Mutara, was not going to continue the ritual of the " watering of the cattle".

Maquet and d'Hertefelt (1959 p.14), referring to the appointment of Charles Mutara III as successor to Yuhi Musinga, note that:

> "Ceux qui l'ont designé, c'est à dire les autorités administratives et religieuses européennes, ne l'ont choisi de la manière traditionelle".

In the preceding years other economic, political and religious factors had already undermined the function of the traditional kingship in Rwanda. However 1931 brought the end of traditional kingship not only because Mutara was not chosen in the traditional way but also because he was a Christian and as such no longer combined the political and ritual functions of the traditional kingship in his person. It was especially through its ritual function that the kingship was a strong force making for social cohesion in a country with many cleavages. When the king no longer fulfilled his ritual function one of the major principles of social cohesion was lost and with it occasions for a demonstration of the king's identification with Rwanda and its people.

The total effect however of this developmental process can only be assessed in relation to a complex of other processes. The two central points I want to make are firstly that the king's complementary ritual function was a significant force for the unity of Rwanda as a whole and secondly that with the departure of Yuhi Mutara the traditional kingship came to an end and with it an important principle of social cohesion disappeared..

(b) <u>The Queen Mother</u>

Although the Mwami's powers were absolute he shared his

prerogatives with the queen mother. She ruled with the king, had her own court and her own personal clients on Ibikingi land. She had her own herds and she could intervene in court cases and pass judgement. Not only did she have her court close to the king's but she always accompanied the king wherever he went, even on his military expeditions. She was given the same honours as the Mwami and was called Mugabekazi. It may be noted that the king of Ankole, who claimed to be of the Bega clan, was called Mugabe. The same word mugabe was used in Rwanda for the head bull of the royal herd and for the four royal drums.

The king and the queen mother were referred to jointly as the Bami of Rwanda which indicates that she really shared in the kingship. However in this partnership the king retained a dominant position and in fact the role of the queen mother depended on the king. This personal dependence became especially evident when the king died. At that moment she lost all her powers and became a normal subject. When Musinga was sent into exile, the queen mother went with him. If the queen mother's husband died, she could not remarry. Although the Nyiginya clan had the prerogative of endogamy, sons who were issues of endogamous unions were excluded from succession to the royal drum. The successor

had to have a mother from a different clan. In practice the Bega clan had most often provided the queen mother. However within the Bega clan several lineages competed for this important privilege. Moreover five other clans had at different times provided the queen mothers. These six clans with the royal clan and the abashambo and abahondogo constituted the nobility of Rwanda.

The abashambo and abahondogo however could not provide a queen mother as they were regarded as brother clans of the Nyiginga clan (Pauwels 1965 p.273). This possibility, open to a number of clans, of providing the queen mother implied a plurality of concomitant potential avenues of favour in relation to the king and the queen mother. This situation led to continuous competition among the important Tutsi lineages of the clans from whom the queen mother could be chosen. It also constituted a framework for divisions among possible opponents to the king's power.

Like the Mwami, the queen mother dropped her Tutsi name and received a dynastic name, the same as that of the king with the prefix Nyira: thus Nyirayuhi, Nyirakigeri. If his mother died the king had to be given another official "mother". But in that case she had to be of the same lineage as his real mother (Kagame 1952 p.65). In case the real

mother of the heir apparent died, the reigning Mwami had to give him a new official mother who could not in this case already have a son sired by the reigning Mwami.

This shows that it was the lineage that had the right to produce the queen mother. The first rules made for stability in as much as they were a safeguard against the assassination of the queen mother being rewarded by giving the office of the queen mother to a different lineage.

The second rule made for stability in as much as it prevented conflict between the king and the real son of the official queen mother. The wisdom of this rule was made evident when Rwabugire (1853-1895) transgressed it and appointed Rutalindwa as his successor. His mother, who was of the Komo lineage of the Bega clan, had died and Rwabugire had given him a new "mother" from the Kagaara lineage of the Bega clan. However she was Rwabugire's wife who had a son by him called Musinga. Soon after Rutalindwa's accession, the Kagaara lineage saw an opportunity not only to have one of their lineage as queen mother but also to have as king Musinga, issue of the queen mother. The obstacle was Rutalindwa himself. He was attacked and he committed suicide with his family. Only one son Ndungutse escaped to the North and challenged Musinga in a bloody revolt.

Musinga obtained the help of the German troops and quelled the rebellion. However, the legitimacy of Musinga remained a matter of dispute, especially in the North and North-East, which had supported the person who pretended to be Ndungutse. It is against this background of intrigues related to the position of the queen mother, that we must see the introduction of the Tutsi chiefs and the imposition of the pattern of the administrative structure with the aid of German and Belgian military power in the peripheral areas of the North and North-East.

Pauwels (1967 p.230-233) gives details of the dates and places where for the first time Tutsi chiefs who had been faithful to Musinga and his mother were introduced into these areas and were supported by the Belgian forces. He concludes

> "Il est donc incontestable que l'est aux Belges que le roi du Rwanda était redevable de la stabilité de ses représentants dans ces régions. Comme d'ailleurs aussi du remplacement des Bahinza par des chefs Batutsi".

These facts not only show the importance and power of the position of the queen mother but also shed light on the actual relationship between the North and North-East and the court.

It was the first king of each royal cycle, Cyirima or Mutara who determined in which lineages their successors had

to find their wives who were to become queen mothers. This information was however kept secret even from the Biru and official councillors and was confided to a neutral ritualist (d'Hertefelt 1964 p.334).

This institutionalised mechanism of rotation involved fluctuation in the possibility of political influence as between the various lineages of the nobility and resulted in a longer-term balance of power. It was both the element of secrecy and the pre-arranged pattern of lineages set at the beginning of the cycle which set limits on competition between the lineages, thus making for stability. The actual operation of this in reducing the extent of political competition would obviously be least effective at the end of a cycle, as for instance at the time of Musinga.

Within this context of the distribution of power and the uncertainty in the pattern of rotation, the Tutsi lineages concerned were however all foci of possible power positions and ties with them were important in the search for protection within the Rwanda system of social relationships. The division in the royal power structure inherent in the special position of the queen mother, constituted a check on the king's absolutism in his relations with the nobility. On the other hand it reduced tensions between this absolutism

and these lineages by creating both a sense of and actual avenues of participation in his kingship.

Moreover it constituted a framework of hierarchical ranking of the nobility, based on actual and possible participation in the king's power through the queen mother. The changing power positions of the lineages, resulted in a certain amount of flexibility in the system since the actual status of the competing Tutsi families was precarious and their ability to distribute favours while holding their favourable power positions was accordingly temporary. The whole system of power-relations culminating in the queen mother constituted another avenue to obtain favour or justice and as such was a factor both in promoting and in containing tensions by being an alternative focus of power.

However when the Belgian Government deposed Yuhi Musinga and appointed Charles Mutara, the first of a new royal cycle, this traditional pattern was upset. This was further finalised when Mutara married a member from a clan which had never provided a queen mother. Moreover the mother of Mutara was no longer allowed to live near the court but was forced to live in Kakanzi in the Marangara district.

The role of the queen mother had come to an end and with it went some of the flexibility in the political system.

Moreover the reduction of the power of some of the lineages had the effect of increasing the power of the king.

(c) The Biru

The next highest authority in the kingdom was the body of traditionalists, or royal councillors who were referred to collectively as the Ubwiru. Around 1900 there were ten abiru (Kagame 1947 p.366) (d'Hertefelt 1962 p.71). They were dignitaries holding different offices relating to the safe keeping and continuity of tradition. They were hierarchically ranked and all belonged to certain Tutsi lineages. The offices were ascribed and although the Mwami had the power to dismiss an ubwiru for neglect or forgetfulness, the office stayed within the lineage. The office holder appointed his own successor within the lineage. Their office was rewarded not only by outstanding prestige but also by numerous privileges, the most important of which were their independence of the normal pattern of administration and their exemption from taxation. Because their office was hereditary within the lineage, the king's power over them was very limited.

The nature of their office and the fact that theirs was an ascribed status and one which was economically independent, made it one of the stable institutions in the political system of Rwanda. They were the ritualists necessary for

the execution and timing of the royal rituals related to the well-being and fertility of the king and the country. They moreover constituted the group of wise men, holding the body of knowledge required for the right behaviour of the king in the light of tradition.

They were the holders of tradition and the secret knowledge relating to ritual succession and the interpretation of events. They kept the king's will. In order to prevent them from divulging this secret knowledge the abiru were obliged, at the time of initiation, to drink a potion which, it was believed, would automatically kill them if they told a part of the secrets to outsiders.

The total body of knowledge however was only held by three members of the ubwiru. The others knew only parts of it. To prevent the knowledge from being forgotten or from being lost in case of accidental death, the abiru were allowed to have some of their lineage members as assistants whom they themselves chose and who again were put under the seal of secrecy by being administered the potion with its automatic sanction. Their function insured the continuity of the royal lineages and prevented the king from making too many innovations. They could effectively control the king because he needed their knowledge and assistance for

his ritual function. Their economic independence moreover prevented the king from exerting direct material pressures. Because their function was hereditary within certain Tutsi lineages and not only unassailable by the king or the queen mother but, by necessity, complementary to the kingship, it was a stable safeguard of the interests and power position of the important Tutsi descent groups. On the other hand, because of the hierarchical ranking and the complementary function of each of the lineages, and because of the stable power position of the ubwiru as a group in relation to the king, it formed a focus for political manoeuvring and the seeking of alliances. As such it was one more important channel for 'politics' in the wider political system.

In 1931, when Charles Mutara III Rudahigwa was appointed king, he was given a council of four men of important Tutsi lineages to replace the ubwiru. Maquet and d'Hertefelt (1959 p.14) write:

> "A cette époque, l'intervention des autorités belges se manifeste plus par des décisions de la sorte que par des réformes structurelles".

The official function of the ubwiru came to an end and with it went another element of constraint on the king's power and another avenue of political mobility.

PART 4 DELEGATED POWER WITHIN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

In the previous section I have analysed the Rwanda political system as it existed at the court. The system through which the king delegated his powers must be seen as an extension of the royal power, particularly as the king had ultimate control over the distribution of offices within the delegated power structure. The Mwami administered the country through two structures: the army and the administration, headed by army and high chiefs respectively. Moreover the king had at his disposal for consultation a council composed of these chiefs.

This section deals specifically with these three institutions which can however only be understood in relation to the previous analysis of political organisation at the court.

(1) The Council of Paramount Chiefs

This council had neither a fixed number of members nor was it called for consultation on certain occasions or on fixed issues. Neither was the council in any sense representative. The king consulted his council mainly in times of crisis or on occasions of special importance.

He would summon some of the high and army chiefs although he was in no way bound to accept their advice. Nevertheless the council acted as a screen between the king and his subjects, since blame resulting from any miscarriage of the king's policy could be diverted from his person on to one or more individual members of the council. It also constituted an instrument of ranking within thebody of high and army chiefs as not all of them would be summoned. Through it, the king's pleasure was expressed and competition for the king's favour took place.

The function of the council as a screen and as a focus of competition largely determined the actual choice of the council members. The greater the support and popularity of the chiefs chosen as council members vis à vis their own direct subjects, the less damage was done to their image by being used as scapegoats. The weaker their support, the greater was the danger for them of being relieved of their position. Although membership of the council enhanced their status and increased their power position within the system, the hold on their office of chief became more precarious as the result of the potential role of scapegoat which membership of the council involved. This risk could only be offset by strong and extensive support from their subjects.

Concomitantly the institution of the council of the high chiefs acted as a brake on possible abuse of the powers of the high chiefs vis à vis their subjects since this would result in discontent and loss of support. Further the element of competition for the king's favour, involved in membership of the council, again made for dependence of a chief and for building up support amongst his subjects.

In 1931 this council was replaced by a four-member council and another process of competition among the Tutsi chiefs for the king's and the subjects' support went out of the system, thus removing one of the checks on the power of the chiefs.

Within that part of the political system which constituted the delegated power structure, we can distinguish two complementary structures, the administration and the army. Maquet (1961 p.100-120) has given a detailed description and functional analysis of each of the two structures separately, interpreted on the basis of his "premise of inequality". He concludes:

> "to sum up, this political system was a means of maintaining a certain social order in which the group of rulers and their caste appropriated to their consumption a considerable part of the country's goods without having to use their labour in the productive process".

In my analysis of the delegated power structure I will concentrate more on ths interrelation and complementary aspects of the interlocking structures. I want, moreover, to underline the fact that the system not only contained elements of inequality and tension but that the nature of this inequality and these tensions must be further qualified. The system contained major elements making for social cohesion. Some of these can be seen in the checks and balances in the manipulation of power, the various alternatives for power support and different avenues for the seeking of justice. Others concern a certain redistribution of wealth and a complex pattern of cross-cutting ties.

(2) The Army Structure

Every male, independent of his age or whether he was Hutu, Tutsi or Twa, was by birth a member of one of the dozens of armies, ingabo, existing in Rwanda. At the beginning of his reign the new Mwami started to organise a new army unit. The original nucleus of recruits for the new army unit were some one hundred and fifty to two hundred sons of important Tutsi families, most often the king's personal clients, who had not as yet received any military training. They were called intore and received an extensive and prolonged military training under the army chief called Chief of the

royal palace. Every five or seven years a new group, recruited on the same basis, would be organised and added to the ingabo. These different units formed the warrior section of the army and consisted exclusively of Tutsi, whose families were moreover sufficiently rich to give the Chief of the royal palace a cow for every member incorporated into the new army. By being recruited into the new army they were detached from the army unit to which they belonged by birth.

After the formation of a section of warriors the king would call all his army chiefs and withdraw from each of their armies a certain number of lineages, Tutsi, Hutu and Twa, who were to be detached from their original army and incorporated into the new army. These comprised the herdsmen section. In this way the warrior section was recruited on an individual basis and the herdsmen's section on a lineage basis, normally on the inzu level. The army continued its existence through the descendants of the original recruits, with the exception of those who would in turn again be recruited into other army units under a new king.

At the death of the king, the Chief of the royal palace became one of the army chiefs, head of his particular army. His office however was not only not hereditary, it was not

necessarily for life either. However the king could give the office to the army chief's son. As soon as a new army unit was formed the warrior section became the army on active duty and the warriors belonging to the army organised by the previous king were withdrawn from active service. From the recruitment it is clear that the warrior section is entirely Tutsi but that like the rest of the army it is recruited without reference to territorial division; unlike the rest of the army however recruitment was on an individual and not a lineage basis. In the army the inzu was incorporated as a group under the inzu-head and constituted the smallest unit within the army structure.

The king was the commander-in-chief and all army members were in this respect his direct servants owing individual loyalty to him. By virtue of his role in the army structure every male had the right of access to the king and the right to be tried by his court. However the normal representative of the king not only in the field of command but also in the field of appeal was the army chief whom he had appointed. It was a crime meriting capital punishment if the army chief tried to prevent one of his army members from having direct recourse to the king in lodging complaints or seeking justice (Kagame 1959 p.279 and d'Hertefelt 1962 p.67). The inzu

was taxed for the upkeep of the army structure, including the training of new recruits, outfit of the army, etc. The inzu-head apportioned this tax among the different rugos of the inzu.

However the army was not only a fighting unit, it was in the civil sphere also a unit of jurisdiction and protection. The army chief was not only a commander but also a protector of its members in inter-army disputes and in disputes with the administration. He was judge between members in inter-army disputes. The right of the army members to lodge a complaint against him or demand his removal from office provided a sanction to ensure that the army chief fulfilled his obligations towards members. This was of special importance as the office was not hereditary nor did it necessarily remain within the army chief's lineage. Kagame provides evidence that the replacement of army chiefs was not uncommon. He gives three names of army chiefs who were relieved of their function by Rwabugire, following complaints of the army members, and one instance during the reign of Musinga (Kagame 1953 p.38).

Just as every Rwanda was a member of an army unit, so was every head of cattle associated with and incorporated in the army structure. All cattle, regardless of the basis

of their possession, were attached to the army of the possessor, except in the case of cattle held in usufruct by a client in which case the cattle were attached not to the client's army but to the lord's army. We must however make a distinction between the cattle owned by the army as such and cattle attached to the army because they were held by the army members.

The chief of the army was in charge of the official army cattle but these cattle were public property under the Mwami in the sense that the chief of the army could not use them for his private property. Among these public cattle under the charge of a particular army we must still distinguish between royal cattle and army cattle proper.

(i) Royal cattle. In this category a distinction, necessary for the understanding of the role of the army and the importance of the army chief, must be made between cattle belonging to the king and cattle belonging to the dynasty.

(a) The king's cattle. In principle all cattle-owners customarily gave one cow to the king on his accession. These were called <u>indabukirano</u> (the same word as used for the cow given by the lineage head to his successor as an external sign and public registration of his will).

These head of cattle plus those obtained by him as his share of possible war or raiding booty constituted the king's personal herd. These cattle he could use for the building-up of his own private circle of clients.

(b) The cattle inherited by the king from his predecessors however became not his own but dynastic property and could not be used for his private purposes. These inherited cattle became public property inasmuch as they were given to a particular army unit or units. (Kagame 1952 p.330)

The dairy products from these herds were used by the herdsmen caring for them and by army members who were sick. Young mothers needing milk for their babies or girls needing butter to oil themselves before marriage could also claim these products.

(ii) Army cattle. Tutsi who were incorporated into a new army unit had to give the army chief, who was called Chief of the royal palace, one cow (indabukirano) while non-Tutsi gave him a sheep or one or more hoes. Kagame remarks, "On appelle Tutsi en droit pastoral, quiconque possède plusieurs têtes de gros bétail" (1952 p.96). These cattle formed the army chief's personal herd to which could be added

his share in the war booty. These cattle could be used by him to build up his following of personal clients. But the clientships thus formed were related to his office and not to his person or to his lineage, which is of special importance as his office was not hereditary (Kagame 1952 p.31).

Among all these cattle a distinction was made between pedigree cattle, i.e. heads of cattle which were light-brown with long curving horns called Inyambo. All cattle of this kind were king's property and much of the breeding and rearing techniques were directed towards producing these cattle. A chief called Umuzware w'inyambo was placed in charge of the long-horned pedigree herds, while the chief in charge of the other herds was called Umuzware w'inka. These latter herds were sub-divided into smaller groups of thirty five to forty five head of cattle and the army chief appointed an official herdsman called umutahira in charge of these smaller herds. None of these positions were hereditary and the man in charge could not use the cattle to create a following of clients as these herds were not allowed to be further sub-divided. Products from the herds accrued partly to the herdsmen themselves and partly to those in need of them (cf. p.151).

Among the cattle attached to the army but which were privately possessed we must distinguish between those cattle

of the warriors which they had received as part of the war booty or as a reward for special military bravery and the cattle of all the army members, whether warriors or herdsmen, which were their private property (imbata) acquired through exchange, gift or bride-wealth. The private cattle of the members of the army were not grazed communally but individually by their owners or by those to whom they were given in usufruct. The official army cattle herds had their own grazing ground.

Although, as we have seen, the army structure was a supra-territorial one and recruitment was based on lineages and not on the neighbourhood or hill, the structure was in different ways related to and integrated with the system of territorial divisions. In all parts of Rwanda where the army had efficient control, the land was divided into pasture districts equal in number to the army units, which we will call zones. Every zone had at its head one army chief. With the creation of a new army unit the borders of the zones were redefined. The hills within each zone were administered by hill chiefs appointed by the army chief. These hill chiefs were nearly always Tutsi, although either a warrior or a herdsman could be appointed. The territory for which a hill chief was responsible was called igikingi (plural ibikingi) which should not be confused with the Ibikingi by'i

Bwami, which were crown domains outside the normal pattern of the administrative and army structures. Ibikingi land referred specifically to pasture and the hill chief was the guardian of the pastures of his hill. The public herds were given special hills but the inyambo herd had to be grazed in the hill of the army chief. The function of the hill chief was to ensure that all those who had cattle in the area, whether belonging to his army or not, had sufficient pasture for their cattle. It was the hill chief who allocated rights to pasture on unoccupied land. To add to the confusion a concession to pasture was also called ibikingi.

Once granted, a right to pasture could not be withdrawn as long as the dues were paid. The extent of the pasture granted as a concession was in relation to the number of cattle to be grazed. If the number diminished the hill chief could reclaim a pro rata portion and could give it to somebody else whose herds had increased. Thus a cattle owner could be given a new piece of pasture hitherto not used or by extension of his grazing rights he could obtain a piece which had already been in use as pasture.

Having obtained pastureland the holder could reserve a part of it for agriculture and give it to his clients, thereby obtaining the products which he needed in exchange

for the usufruct of cattle. In this case the owner of the ibikingi kept his right to graze his cattle on the cultivator's land after the harvest, but as long as the cultivator paid his prestation he could not force him to leave or to leave his lands fallow. If a cattle owner obtained, through extension of his pasture rights, an ibikingi which already had cultivators settled on it, these cultivators did not owe the new holder any prestation.

According to Kagame (1952 p.100) the hill chief could not prevent settlement of Hutu cultivators on land not reserved as pasture and not as yet occupied. Although the hill chief was the administrator and judge responsible for the pastures of his hill, the actual distribution was done by the chief of the nyambo and the umutware w'inka.

The basic unit of organisation of the army was the inzu. The inzu head was the link between the descent group and the army structure and he determined who, in case of war, was to go on active service. He also determined the contribution of each rugo to the total tax demanded from the inzu. If a member refused to obey the inzu head's orders he was liable to be deprived of his possessions but this was not kept by the inzu head but became official army property. The normal way for an army member in need of protection of the army

chief was to make his demand through the inzu head. However in case of dispute with the inzu head, the individual member could approach the army chief without passing either through the inzu head or the hill chief. It was only at the inzu level that the two structures interrelated.

Apart from military organisation, bovine administration and jurisdiction, the army structure was also a channel of taxation. The army had to have some cattle near the court in order to provide the court or other royal residences with a traditionally fixed number of jars of milk. Moreover the army had to provide the court with a number of young steers for sacrificial rituals. Bourgeois states that in 1926, one hundred and twenty two steers were provided to the court for this purpose (1959 p.88). However the cattle acquired by warriors as war booty were exempt from all taxation. Taxation in milk and butter was also paid to the army chief and the hill chief. Moreover the cattle owners had to help in exercising the official herds of the dynasty and of the army in building their kraals and in their general upkeep. Members of the army who were not cattle owners had to pay their taxation in agricultural produce. However inhabitants of certain regions, especially those which were more distant

from the court or which produced specialised products, paid their tax in tobacco, mats or ironware such as spearheads, etc. These products were partly used by the king and the court and partly by the army units, either those in training as for example the ntore, or those on active duty in the different camps along the border. The Batwa paid their tax in pottery and in hides used for ritual and royal ceremonies such as the leopardskins for the dancers. The king, however, always made a return gift to the Batwa in a form which they highly appreciated, i.e. bullocks which were not kept by them but eaten.

It is clear from this description that through the army structure the king had a powerful instrument in the control of cattle and chiefs and that it constituted a channel of taxation. The description also shows how the instrument of coercive power was exclusively recruited from among the Tutsi lineages. However, the fact that recruitment of warriors disregarded normal territorial divisions and that it was on an individual basis, meant that warriors on active duty were all members of army units different from the units of the lineages to which they belonged.

An analysis of those forces and processes making for social cohesion in both the army and the administrative

structure is not only related to the structures separately but must also be made in terms of the complementary function of both structures. It is for this reason that the analysis of the processes of social cohesion will be dealt with after the description of the administrative structure.

(3) The Administration

Independent of but complementary to the army structure there existed what has been called a system of administration, which was based on the territorial division of Rwanda.

The chief of the province who was not uncommonly also an army chief was, like the district chiefs, appointed directly by the Mwami. The administration of each district was generally committed to the two chiefs who were independent of each other: the chief of cattle, and the land chief. As one of the major functions of the district chiefs was the levying of taxes, the fact that generally the cattle chief was a Tutsi and the land chief a Hutu was of added importance in relation to the dual administration at this important level. The duplication acted as a check on the activities of both chiefs and increased the king's control over his officials when they attempted to become too powerful or overstepped their rights. The land chief, in contrast to the cattle chief, also had judicial powers in disputes

over arable land but not over pasture as this was reserved to the army chief. However each of the hills which made up the district had only one hill chief and he was not the district chief's representative because he was appointed by the army chief. The hill chief chose the neighbourhood chiefs called abakoresha from among the inzu heads of his hill. Taxation for the king was levied on agricultural and dairy produce but the province, district and hill chiefs had the right to keep a portion of it for their own use. This taxation, like that for the army, was demanded from the inzu head who had to apportion the amounts due from the various lineage members. It is very important to note that the amount to be paid was not fixed and that it was left to the discretion of the hill chief to strike the balance between the demand of the court for regular supplies and overburdening his people. It is especially against this background that we must see the importance of the mechanism of control resulting from the fact that the hill chiefs were not representatives of their immediate superiors, the district chiefs. The organisation at the local level was left to the omu koresha and the inzu head neither of whom could claim a portion of the tax collected. The products themselves were sent to the royal residences in each district from

where the king claimed whatever he needed. The timing of the levies coincided with the harvest and at no other time of the year could demands be made. Next to this taxation in dues, the people were obliged to work a certain number of days for the administration either in the local area or at the royal palaces. This taxation was not demanded from the inzu but from the rugo. Maquet states moreover that labour prestations were exclusively demanded from the Hutu stratum of the population (1962 p.105). The prestations demanded from the Tutsi were more in the form of acting as advisers and companions to the different chiefs.

Cutting across this pattern of administration were those territorial units which were directly controlled by the king and which were given by him to his personal clients or close agnates. Here we must also include the enclaves administered by the queen mother and the abiru. Those who held these areas were exempt from normal taxation and paid their dues directly to the king, the queen mother or the abiru. In this and other ways they did not fit into the normal pattern of administration.

However they were incorporated into the army structure as far as membership was concerned. But as long as they were direct clients of the king, the queen mother or the

abiru they were exempt from direct army taxation. Recruitment for office holders in both the administration and army structures was largely based on kinship. Chiefs were recruited largely from the king's consanguineal and affinal kin, and therefore often changed from one reign to another, especially as these offices were not hereditary. d'Hertefelt estimates that the total number of office holders involved only some thousands of individuals (1960 p.116). However - most of them belonged to a limited number of lineages relatively close to the king (d'Hertefelt 1964 p.426). The fact that there were unequal rewards attached to the different offices led to competition for office between and within those lineages. The nature of this competition is described by the same author as "une jungle politique ou les plus puissants menacaient et annihilaient les plus faibles" (1962 p.69).

The monopoly of political power was held by:

1. The Nyiginya clan which provided the king;
2. The different clans which provided the queen mother;
3. The abiru lineages who were the repositories of tradition and the safeguards for the continuity of the power structure.

Together these formed the stable power-holding group.

On this basis we can say that power was the monopoly of the Tutsi, although this does not mean that all Tutsi were rulers. Pauwels sums this up:

> "Or parmi ces 16% (% Tutsi sur la population) les très grand nombre n'etait guère plus fortuné que les Hutu. Ce n'est donc qu'une très petite minorité des Tutsi qui faisait au Rwanda la pluie et le beau temps" (1967 p.301).

However the full extent of the rulers' power position cannot be expressed in numbers as their sphere of influence, emanating from their office, must be assessed in the light of the clientage system.

This description of the two structures as instruments of political control brings out two main elements. On the one hand we find clearly a premise of inequality while on the other hand we find inbuilt mechanisms for practical limitations on benefits accruing from this unequal access to power. The political system formed a "network of reciprocities in which power carried obligations and lack of power had its real compensations". (Lemarchand 1966 p.317) We find tensions but also counterbalancing mechanisms containing these tensions. We find divisions and cleavages but also mechanisms operating for social cohesion. It is this element of social cohesion that I will now examine in more detail.

1. Ideological framework and social cohesion

An ideology has been defined as:

> "a more or less coherent system of beliefs held in common by the members of a group or collectivity and which, through an interpretive evaluation (Weber) of the situation in which the group is placed, explains and justified its existence and contributes to its integration" (d'Hertefelt 1967 p.217).

When speaking about the court, as distinct from delegated power, particularly in the case of the king (cf. p.129-130) I have pointed out how the sacredness of the king and his ritual function expressed his identification with Rwanda as a whole and at the same time provided an explanation and a justification for his position in the overall political system. This body of beliefs was known to all the members of the society and was regularly and publicly expressed in ritual and ceremonies. Thus it contributed to the integration of Rwanda society because of the common dependence of all members of the king for their individual well-being, fertility and occupational success and for the prosperity of the community at large.

Moreover, as we have seen, the body of beliefs, basic to the ritual and to the kingship, embodied a concept of common rights in the kingdom inasmuch as the king transcended ethnic and occupational cleavages. To this transcendence of the kingship corresponds a subjective role expectation

by the people. As in all societies with a centralised government, the king delegated his powers. In Rwanda this was done through the administrative and army structures. As such they were accordingly extensions of his kingship since it is through them that the powers of the king flowed, not only in demands, e.g. for taxation and army recruits, but also in the administration of justice and the provision of land and pasture.

d'Hertefelt has explained how:

> "an abundant court literature (dynastic, genealogic, pastoral and martial) was directly or indirectly intended to glorify and exalt the dynasty as well as the existing social and political structure". (1960 p.128)

Independent as to whether it was indeed "intended", the fact that the structure was mythically and historically sustained, served not only as a rationalisation and explanation of the status quo but gave it the sanction of being a link with and an expression of the kingship of divine origin. This mythical sanction constituted a justification of existence of the kingship and contributed to the integration of all groups in Rwanda society.

In relation to this some points should be made concerning the superiority of the Tutsi. These have been classified according to the following themes:

(a) The celestial origins of the Tutsi

(b) The fundamental and natural differences which exist between Tutsi and others

(c) The superior civilisation of the Tutsi

(d'Hertefelt 1964 p.221)

d'Hertefelt further remarks that these inegalitarian myths were on the whole not known by the Hutu and Twa and that some were only known at the court as a great secret. Important as this ideology might have been for the cohesion of the power-holding lineages it does not detract from the ideology as expressed in the king's ritual and as seen by the ruled.

The existence of opposing ideologies constituted however a weakness in the system. It led to a conflict between the role expectancy expressed in the body of beliefs of the rulers assuming inegalitarianism and the role expectancy corresponding to the body of beliefs held by the ruled. It is in the office of the chief that this latent conflict is focussed. The nature of the power of the king and the nature of the delegated power structure enabled the expression of conflict to be confined to the field of inter-personal relations. Conflict could be solved by the king in removing the chief.

2. The system of delegated power and social cohesion

We have noted that the total body of office-holders within the administration and army structures were largely drawn from lineages related to the king. However within this limited sphere of recruitment, access to individual office was largely through achievement, in the sense that particular offices were not the monopoly of certain lineages nor was there any guarantee of retaining an office within the lineage through succession or direct appointment by a predecessor. Moreover there was no necessary security in office. An appointment for office was not for life but its retention depended on an individual's ability in holding office. A chief could be either promoted, demoted or removed from office altogether. In this respect there was a greater element of achievement as opposed to ascription in the recruitment to and retention of office within the delegated power structure than in the system of offices at the court.

A direct result of this characteristic of the delegated power structure was to encourage competition for the king's favour, since a position in the power-holding group depended ultimately on the king. As a result of this internal struggle and competition among potential and actual office-

holders, the lineages holding a monopoly of power did not present themselves as an unified group vis à vis the non-power-holding section of the population. This was all the more important as the non-power-holding section was drawn into this personal struggle for the king's favour.

One of the factors determining the king's favour was related to the amount of support which a chief could muster. This was demonstrated by the quantity of the taxation obtained, especially as neither the amount nor in all cases the times for payment were specified. Another way in which the extent of a chief's support or lack of support was demonstrated was the number of complaints made at the court not only by his subjects but also by competitors for office. The force of the charge made by competitors was often related to the actual following which could be mustered by the office-holder and his competitor respectively. All these processes made for a sense of participation by the ruled in the values underlying the holding of office.

The transcendental character of the kingship was concomitant with a role expectancy on the part of all his subjects that the king had the obligation to protect them. This expectation by the ruled was potentially threatened in the monopoly of office by close relatives of the king. It

was the element of achievement and insecurity in obtaining and retaining office which enabled the king to prevent conflicts presenting themselves in a structural form between rulers and ruled. On the contrary by removing and replacing individual chiefs who no longer commanded the support of their subjects, the king reduced conflicts to the level of inter-personal relationships.

This emphasis on the inter-personal nature of conflicts between chiefs and subjects was given further emphasis in the fact that tension was not only confined to chiefs and Hutu subjects but also occurred between chiefs and Tutsi subjects, especially in relation to competition for office.

Thus the values embodied in the kingship together with the effective control of power by the king prevented grievances from taking the form of protest against the system of office-holding. Protest was rather directed against the evidently personal exercise of power by individual chiefs. Related to this is the fact that the instrument of coercive power, the warrior units of the army, were under the direct control of the king. This was ensured through the individual recruitment of warriors from different areas of the country in contrast to the rest of the army which incorporated lineage groups on a territorial basis.

It was further ensured through the demobilisation of warrior units at the accession of a new king who built up his own personally selected army unit. The recruitment of warriors by the king from lineages related to him through ties of kinship or clientship ensured that the active military force was a reliable instrument for protecting the power structure. Nevertheless its personal control by the king prevented its use by locally powerful chiefs or lineages as a threat to the Mwami and his control over the distribution of power.

3. The complex pattern of the political system

The complex pattern of the political system resulted partly from the large number of office-holders and their stratification in hierarchical ranking and partly from duplication of certain offices and the overlapping and interlocking of the two structures.

In dealing with "delegation and centralisation of political power" Maquet has stressed that

> "the main factor which prevented local authorities from asserting their independence from central government, was the plural character of the political and feudal organisation" (1962 p.156)

> "Engendered by the hierarchic plurality, the mistrust which prevented the subordinate chiefs from uniting against the central government, which led them to spy on each other and to inform the king of anything suspect, was the main check against tendencies towards local autonomy in Rwanda." (p.157)

Maquet is here emphasising the effect of these elements on the cohesion of Rwanda society within a horizontal territorial framework. These same factors of competition in the struggle for power operating within the complex and overlapping hierarchies of office also made for social cohesion within the framework of social divisions in Rwanda society as a whole. The duplication in the system of offices in the delegated power structure have been described. Here we have the two parallel hierarchies of the army and administration which interlocked at the level of the hill chief. There was also duplication within the administrative structure in the institution of two chiefs at the district level - the land and cattle chiefs.

This duplication of offices not only allowed for checks on the abuse of power but also opened up alternative avenues in the search for justice or favour. In this context it is of importance to consider the dual role of the army chief, not only in his military capacity but also in his role as a protector. Although in no sense can we speak of a separation of judicial power from the administrative power as a whole, jurisdiction over matters relating to cattle lay not with the cattle chief of the administrative structure but with the army chief. Direct jurisdiction over matters relating

to land disputes however lay with the land chief of the administrative structure who was regularly a Hutu, but even in these matters an individual could have recourse to his army chief. Moreover as d'Hertefelt has remarked,

> "since the military structure skipped the territorial divisions of the administrative organisation, an army chief was able to assume his role as protector in a very efficient manner, for the members living in any district of the country were authorised to invoke his protection against their administrative chief" (1960 p.117).

Furthermore, if an army chief consistently failed to fulfill his obligations towards army members, complaints could be made and the king could dismiss or otherwise discipline him.

The fact that the army chief's position could be threatened by his subjects was of the greatest importance in relation to the execution of his role as a protector and judge. It is evident that it was moreover essential to the prosperity of a country as aggressive as Rwanda that the king could count on his army chiefs having the support of their army members.

It is against this background that we must consider the integration of the kinship structure into the wider political system. With the exception of the Ntore, the lineage formed

the basic unit of administration within the army. The lineage head apportioned the taxes incumbent on the lineage. The king and his court were the main beneficiaries of their products and labour which were needed for the royal household, the king's ritual, ceremonies, his government and his army. On the other hand it was through the lineage head that was channelled the redistribution of protection, resulting from the king's ritual, military, judicial and administrative functions and the re-channelling of cattle and their produce.

Furthermore integration into a single system restricted the authority of the lineage head. In inter- or intra- inzu disputes, the individual member had other avenues open to him in seeking justice. It is the army structure, into which the inzu and its members was incorporated which constituted an alternative way, open to all members, of seeking justice in dispute with the administration. This is of special importance in relation to the way judicial procedures operated in Rwanda.

Sandrart notes of the Rwanda,

> "On ne peut concevoir que celui qui détient le pouvoir, ne puisse en meme temps punir" (1939 p.118)

This concept is related to the fact that any individual invested with authority could dispense justice among those

over whom they had authority. Thus not only did lineage heads at different levels have authority over their lineage members and patrons could settle disputes among their clients but also political authority, wherever existing, superseded the kinship structure as loci of jurisdiction. Courts were therefore hierarchically ranked and ran parallel with the political structure but anyone could have access to a higher court without passing through the lower ones. However some specialisation existed at the lower levels of political authority in that land disputes were dealt with by land chiefs and that cattle chiefs were competent only in matters of taxation and not with regard to rights over cattle or pasture. No political authority could pass the death sentence without reference to the Mwami. Moreover the king could overrule any decision of the courts and could stop feuding. When he forbade further vengeance his decision was publicly announced by one of his personal special messengers. Disobedience of the king's will in this regard was punished by extermination of the rebellious family. Kagame gives several instances of this (1952 p.133).

As the judiciary was linked with political authority, judicial processes constituted a testing ground of socio-political power in the continuous competition for a place in

the political structure. This led to seeking the support of sufficiently important chiefs and patrons in defending one's case in order to demonstrate one's strength. Similarly chiefs and patrons would show their position by being accompanied and supported by their following when attending court. This was moreover related to the fact that the judiciary had no coercive power at their disposal for the implementation of their verdict and thus the verdict was directed towards a compromise, i.e. consensus. The greater one's support the more favourable the verdict was likely to be, the weaker the support the less was the likelihood of a favourable verdict and the easier it was to bring pressure to bear in the implementation of the verdict.

The importance of the army chief, with his local representative the hill chief, as an alternative avenue for justice must be assessed in the light of the overall pattern of judicial processes in Rwanda. The fact that the two district chiefs had only one subordinate chief constituted an instrument of direct and effective control in the hands of the army chief.

The duplication of hierarchies and offices thus made for checks on the exercise of power not only from the point of view of central government but also from the standpoint

of the ruled in the maintenance of their rights. The complex pattern of the system containing:

(1) A multiplicity of hierarchically ranked and unequally rewarded offices, which made for competition and strife;

(2) duplicated structures which interlocked at different levels;

(3) the nature of the role of the army chief, as a warlord and as a protector,

formed a framework for mobility within the power-holding group and made for flexibility in the system. We can describe the system as flexible in that it allowed for considerable manoeuvering of relationships with office-holders through the exercise of pressure and the access to alternative channels of power. The flexibility therefore relates to the manipulation of relationships by persons lacking power.

The processes related to this mobility within and flexibility of the political system constituted an element of social cohesion in maintaining a degree of control over the power of the office-holders and in allowing and encouraging participation in the system at all levels through the exercise of pressures or the offering or withholding of support.

The system which provided this mobility and flexibility profited by these built-in mechanisms for its own protection for,

> "the political and clientage structure protected them (the ruled) against an exaggerated pressure which could have had disastrous consequences for the upper caste" (Maquet 1961 p.155).

This observation does not distract from the conclusion I have arrived at as the one does not necessarily exclude the other. However they conflict with Professor Codere's hypothesis according to which,

> "the more powerful oppressed the less powerful or or powerless, power was used to the hilt by those who possessed it"

and

> "the brutal and relentless struggle for power among the Tutsi kept them harsh and undistracted in their use of power"

and further comparing the "protection" element with the 1920 Chicago "protection racket". (1962 p.85).

As we have seen when dealing with the Mwami, the queen mother and the <u>biru</u> the impact of certain measures introduced by the Belgian administration disrupted much of the function of central government. Against this background we must now turn to a short survey of those measures affecting the administrative and army structures.

Shortly after the arrival of Belgian troops at the time of a great famine and widespread disease, Musinga was forced to sign a decree by which the lower parts of the slopes and the marshes, which had hitherto been reserved for grazing, especially in the dry season, were to be used for agriculture. In 1929 ibikingi land was abolished and so was the army structure including the position of army chief. The duplication of offices was abandoned being replaced by a single hierarchy.

In 1930 a beginning was made with reorganising the boundaries of the chiefdoms and sub-chiefdoms with the aim of drastically reducing the number. The same year also saw a reorganisation of the tax system imposing universal adult male taxation which was no longer administered through the inzu head. Taxation due to the Mwami in goods and labour was replaced by an annual payment of money. In 1953 councils to the various chiefs were established. However at the level of the sub-chief the electoral college was appointed by the sub-chief. The chief's council was elected by the sub-chiefs and some members of their council.

From what has been said of the army structure it is evident that the abolition of the army structure and the position of army chief constituted an important change in

the total system of social relationships relating to mobility within and flexibility of the system. Moreover the army units had provided a framework in which Tutsi, Hutu and Twa had a common membership. In times of war this involved active co-operation and although each group had specific but complementary duties, e.g. in plundering, herding or fighting, it formed a context in which common loyalties in face of a common enemy and sharing a common danger were involved. It moreover constituted a context in which division of labour effectively operated and in which the instrument of coercive power demonstrated itself as a means of protection for the whole community. Although there is insufficient evidence to assume that common membership in army units involved active co-operation between Tutsi, Hutu and Twa it might well have been that on the conceptual level, divisions of labour and co-operation operative in times of war on the basis of protection might not be unrelated to the easier acceptance of the same patterns of division of authority and labour in times of peace.

The conclusions arrived at in this chapter differ substantially from observations made by Codere (ref. p.176) and de Heusch, who describes the army as:

> "une armée entièrement vouée aux conquêtes Tutsi et au maintien de la domination Tutsi sur le Hutu." (1966 p.134)

However it must be noted that these authors have left out of their analysis the whole complex of the army in its administrative and judicial aspects.

C H A P T E R I I I

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC COMPLEX

In the previous chapter I have analysed the political system in Rwanda. The king clearly occupied a central position in the political structure. For the maintenance of his court and his army, for the execution of his orders and for support against potential rival groups he depended on the chiefs whom he had appointed and who were not necessarily bound to him by ties of close kinship. Moreover we have seen that there was intense competition for the various offices contained in the political system. The clientage system in Rwanda was closely related to this competition for political office. This has been described by Lemarchand (1966 p.311) mainly in terms of the protection secured by the client in exchange for economic goods and services rendered to the patron. L. Mair (1961) has analysed clientage relations in East Africa in broader terms of the mutual advantages gained by both, although unequal, partners in the relationship. Dr. Mair's analysis is in the context of the development of political systems. While I shall not be considering this developmental aspect of clientage relations I propose to analyse the clientage system in Rwanda in these

broader terms of mutual advantage and to further determine the nature of these advantages within the wider context of the political and economic systems.

The clientage structure in Rwanda is called ubuhake and has been described by Maquet (1961). Ubuhake denoted

> "the relationship between a person called garagu (client) and another called sjebuja (patron). That relationship was created when an individual, Hutu or Tutsi, who had an inferior social status and who was less provided with cattle, offered his services to and asked protection from a person of higher status and whose wealth in cattle was greater." (p.129)

> "The ubuhake relation could be ended when both client and patron or only one of them wanted this" (p.131)

Gravel describes the ubuhake system as

> "the institution through which an individual, be he peasant or herder, commended himself to a lord. The lord gave protection and support; he also gave the vassal rights to exploit a certain amount of land and he gave him a cow or cows. The vassal on the other hand, swore fealty and recognised unto himself duties of homage, payments in dues and kind, labour and service in general." (1968 p.24)

Gravel disagrees with

> "European scholars of Rwanda who have generally seen the cow as the sole benefice and completely distinct from land tenure..... The benefice, land, was the measure of service and the cow recorded the grant of benefice" (p.82)

However both descriptions imply the common factors of a

personal relationship, an exchange of economic goods and mutual support. On the other hand, Maquet (p.138) and d'Hertefelt (1962 p.69) call chiefs of the administrative and army structures clients of the king, "Les grands chefs étaient les garagu du monarque". Others go still further: "Lorsque un chef était établi sur une colline, tous ses sujets devenaient par le fait même ses clients" (Nothombe 1965 p.155).

Against this background of what has been said of the political structure it is clear that the word client, as used by the different authors or by the same author in different contexts, applies to different relationships and is therefore ambiguous. Maquet has designated as feudal all the relationships expressed in the ubuhake. L. de Heusch has taken exception to this: "les autorités politiques sont les représentants du roi avant d'être ses clients". In this thesis I do not intend to participate in this discussion as to whether Rwanda should be classified as feudal or nonfeudal. I shall follow L. Strauss (1964)[1] and Beattie (1964)[2] in avoiding the use of the "feudal terminology"

(1) "qu'une grande circonspection est requise dans l'emploi pour décrire des sociétes très différentes, de termes qui ont une sens très précis au regard des historiens"(Ecole Pratique des hautes études 1964 p.52).

(2) I consider it to be more useful and illuminating.... to describe the political institutions of Bunyoro and other African Kingdoms as far as possible in their own terms"(1964 p.25)

(Gravel 1968) with its inevitable implication of cross-cultural comparison. We have to consider the institution of ubuhake in Rwanda in the wider context both of the political system and of the economic complex. In this chapter I propose to deal with: (1) Rights in land, (2) Rights in cattle, (3) Ubuhake, (4) The clientage structure and its development.

PART 1 RIGHTS IN LAND

Cultivation and cattle-rearing formed the basis of the Rwanda subsistence economy. Rights in land related to both i.e. cultivation and grazing. While pasture rights excluded cultivation, cultivation rights did not exclude grazing on farmland after the harvest. Maquet and S. Naigisiki (1957) have categorised the various rights in land according to whether land was recently cleared from the bush or forest or had been under cultivation for some time. The former are called forest regions, the latter rural regions. Although this distinction based on an indefinite time-period is not very satisfactory it will be used in this discussion as a basis for further interpretation.

Rural areas were distinguished as either ibihutu, ibitutsi or ibikénke. Ibihutu were predominantly agricultural land and were densely populated by cultivators who were either Hutu or "poor Tutsi" (op. cit. p.342). The administrative officers living in these areas herded their cattle on the land of the cultivators after the harvest and on the uncultivated valley marshland. Ibitutsi were less populated areas and were largely pasture land although some cultivators lived there as well. Ibikenke were very

sparsely populated areas in which anyone who had cattle had free access for grazing except in certain parts which were reserved for "official cattle". The areas referred to as forest regions consisted of recently cleared bush or forest-land which were called ubukonde.

A. RURAL AREAS

(a) Pasture

Rights to pasture were called ibikingi and sometimes referred to land which was exclusively pastureland and at other times referred to the seasonal grazing rights on agricultural land. These ibikingi or rights to pasture were given by the political chiefs, who acted as representatives of the king. The institution seems to have been introduced not long before the arrival of the Europeans. The Rwanda attribute the introduction of ibikingi to the grandfather of Rwabugire, Yuhi, who reigned at the end of the last century. Before the ibikingi rights were introduced there was only common pasture to which all cattle owners had access. The cluster of rights and obligations associated with ibikingi are related to political power not only because of its introduction by the Mwami but also in as far as the distribution of these rights lay with the political authorities. Ibikingi primarily refers to rights to graze cattle on a

certain area granted by the political authorities in exchange for cattle and an annual payment of dues, the amount of which was related to the spatial extension of these rights. But he did not need to pay these goods or render these services himself but could use the labour and goods due to him by his tenants.

However the term ibikingi also referred to the actual area of the concession. When we dealt with the duties of the hill chief (p.153) we touched upon these rights. Although the holder of ibikingi land could reserve a part of it for the settlement of cultivators, the concession could neither be subdivided among his heirs nor could he sell parts of it. Those who were thus settled had to pay in regular goods and services and had to allow the ibikingi landholder to graze his cattle on the stubble after the harvest. Normally these cultivators settled on ibikingi land were the holders' clients. If the holder no longer exercised his rights either because he had no cattle or because he had left the hill, the rights reverted to the political chief, who could allocate these rights to whomsoever he wanted including his own kin.

These rights differed according to whether they operated in ibihutu, ibitutsi or ibikende areas.

In ibitutsi zones the concessions involved exclusive rights on certain pastures.

In ibihutu zones, the political chief reserved any pasture still available for himself and his kin and distributed grazing rights only on the cultivators' land after the harvest.

In ibikende zones the chief reserved certain grazing grounds for himself but the rest was free grazing ground for whoever had cattle; no ibikingi rights were needed.

At the death of a person holding ibikingi, the rights passed to his heirs. At the death or replacement of the political chief, rights to hold or allocate ibikingi and the income from already allocated rights passed to his successor who was not necessarily his heir. If an ibikingi land holder who had personal clients settled on his land, left the area and the ibikingi rights were redistributed to somebody else, the cultivators settled on the ibikingi land did not ipso facto become clients of the new holder nor did they owe him any dues.

(b) Agricultural land

Lineage holdings were called ingobyi. These referred to land which was exploited communally under the direction of the lineage head who allocated any land still available. If land became vacant either through lack of heirs or because

of departure of the current holder, the land returned to the general lineage holding and fell under the authority of the lineage head. He then parcelled out the land to each household according to its need.

The land holding of an individual household was called umunani. Although each household (rugo) had its own well defined land, no visible boundary marks were drawn. The lineage head, as holder of the ingobyi land, paid tribute to the Mwami; but neither the amount nor the time for payment were fixed. If an individual member of the lineage had a dispute with the lineage head over rights to umunani land, he could have recourse to a political chief to act as an arbitrator. These disputes were often related to reduction or division of umunani land ordered by the lineage head, due to population pressures. In such cases of dispute the lineage head was forced to accept the judgement of the political chief. Through this action however the discontented umunani holder cut himself off from his lineage and the land rights he held were henceforth considered as falling under the political authority. It was to the chief, as office holder, that the umunani holder and his descendants thereafter paid in goods (ibihunikwa) and services (ubuletwa). The chief could transfer these rights to a third party. He

could for instance direct that the services due to him should be rendered to a widow or allocate these rights to his personal clients. These holdings resulting from political intervention were called isambu.

There were several advantages to be gained by the political chief in intervening on behalf of an individual member of a lineage in land disputes.

1. More land came under his direct control which resulted in him obtaining goods and services;
2. If for one reason or another isambu land became vacant, it no longer reverted to the lineage but to the political chief who could re-allocate rights over it in whole or in part, e.g. rights on a banana plantation to one and arable land to another;
3. The individual concerned had from then on to pay tax directly to the chief and no longer through the lineage head as in the case of ingobyi land when it was only the lineage head who was taxed.

The general process of turning ingobyi land into isambu land was gradual and related to the establishment of effective political control by official chiefs who had sufficient influence to implement the transfer. In densely

populated areas where no land was available it constituted the only way open to the political authorities to extend their effective control over agricultural land.

If somebody wanted a plot of land in the less densely populated areas where land was still available, the political chief had the exclusive right to grant rights in land and to determine the boundaries, again in exchange for goods and services. Moreover if the land became vacant it reverted to his authority. Rights in land granted in this way were also isambu holdings. However in very sparsely populated areas, e.g. Bugesera, a man could simply occupy a plot without asking and there were no dues attached to it. However if a neighbour installed himself, the political authorities had to be called upon to indicate the boundaries. From that moment onwards the holding became isambu land and the holder had to pay ubuletwa, i.e. two days' of work per week and ibihunikwa. This taxation for all isambu holders was different from the taxation to the Mwami (ikoro), which was due twice a year.

By 1900 (in Central Rwanda) the political authority had established its control over land with its concomitant economic benefits for the office holders and the pattern of isambu land had become widespread and was indicative of

the influence of the political authority and the lack of lineage influence as regards rights in arable land.

An isambu holder could sublet all or part of his land either on a temporary or permanent basis. Only in the latter case could he build a homestead on the land but this right was only granted to him if he became the holder's client. It was the isambu holder however and not his settled client who paid the ubuletwa and the ibihunikwa to the chief, but he did not need to pay these goods or render these services himself but could use the labour and goods due to him by his tenant to discharge himself of these duties. The client himself could again sublet the whole or part of his land but could not allow his tenant to settle on the land nor could the tenant retain rights over a banana plantation if for instance he left the area. Payment by sub-tenants was exclusively in goods to the Mwami (ikoro)

Because the income of the chief was directly derived from taxation and hence depended on the number of taxpayers, he was not inclined to give too extensive plots of land, but welcomed as many settlers as possible and tried to provide conditions such that few wanted to leave. This relates to the situation of the land holder of which Maquet remarks: "Il jouissait d'une grande stabilité de fait" (1957, p.353).

Somebody desiring igikingi would approach the chief and make him a gift of a cow. This cow became the chief's private property and he could use it within the ubuhake system to make a client. Therefore this chief was also quite often the patron of some of his subjects. In this case it was not only to the benefit of the chief that both functions were held by him but also to the advantage of the client inasmuch as the total of the client-subject obligations were reduced and his political chief was also his protector. Thus the political function allowed office holders to extend the circle of their reliable clients while the clients helped them in upholding their position and were instrumental in the implementation of the chief's decisions. If the chief was replaced he remained the patron of his clients but the igikingi holder had to give the new chief a cow (indabukirano) as a gift.

B. "FOREST REGIONS"

The boundaries of Rwanda had been gradually expanding towards the North-East and East through clearing of the tropical forest which was the domain of the Twa. Through payment of an often small fee to the Twa lineage head, somebody who wanted to cut down the forest for cultivation was granted a concession which could be quite extensive.

The boundaries were clearly marked and the land within these boundaries was called ubukonde land while the holder was called umukonde. As more forest was cut down and family numbers increased, the land obtained was parcelled out by the umukonde, or lineage head, to his lineage members. In some cases several lineage heads were united under one head, the Muhinza. The lineage members did not pay tribute to the umukonde nor did the umukonde pay to the Muhinza. Most of the abakonde and Bahinza paid tribute to the Mwami, although they remained the heads of autonomous corporate groups. The umukonde or the Muhinza allowed non-lineage members to settle in his domain, but this was not on a clientage basis but on a basis of co-operation. No dues in goods or services were demanded but gifts were given, especially by newly arrived settlers. If the holder of ubukonde land left no heir or abandoned his land, the plot returned to the lineage and could be re-allocated by the umukonde or Muhinza. We find some cases in which patrons had sent their clients from central Rwanda to cut down a part of the forest to turn it into pasture. These too were ubukonde land and constituted the first infiltration of Tutsi from central Rwanda into these areas. However this was on a personal and not a political basis.

From this description it is clear that there was a close similarity between ibikingi and isambu land in that both were granted by the political authority. However they differed in that cattle had to be paid only for obtaining ibikingi land. Ubukonde and ingobyi land were similar in that they were both lineage land, generally belonging to Hutu lineages, but differed in that ingobyi land was situated in those areas where the political authority of central Rwanda was established and where there was pressure to turn ingobyi land into isambu land. Until 1900 ubukonde land had escaped these pressures. The holders of both types of land had escaped ubuletwa and ibihunikwa taxation although both paid inkore to the Mwami. In the case of inkore the ubukonde paid directly whereas the lineage heads of ingobyi land, insofar as it still existed, paid through the chiefs. It is unfortunate that there are no details as to the extent of ingobyi land in Rwanda around 1900.

The different patterns of rights in land as held either on the basis of allocation by the lineage or by the political authorities had a geographical distribution in Rwanda directly correlated with those areas in which the influence of lineage or political authority were respectively dominant. These different ways in which rights to land could be acquired

resulted in tensions when political authorities exerted pressure for the extension of their powers. The peripheral areas had succeeded in resisting these pressures up till the arrival of colonial rule.

It is against this background that we must see the following measures taken by the government.

1. The instalment of Tutsi chiefs in the peripheral areas as part of a unified system of administration. This meant that any land available came under political control, and that land which became vacant no longer returned to the lineage head but to the political chief. This in turn meant that the chief could and in fact did (Pauwels 1967 p.297) install his relations and their cattle or their Tutsi clients and their cattle on the land in terms of occupation by Tutsi.
2. In 1932 the granting of further ubukonde rights in the forest was forbidden and rights already held could no longer be used for turning the forest into arable land.
3. In 1932 universal adult male taxation for the Mwami was imposed. Thus rugo heads who in the ubukonde and ingoybi system had never paid tax were now

obliged to start paying. The tax, which required from all adult males three days of labour for the chief and ten days for the sub chief (ubuletwa and ibihunikwa+), also affected those who had hitherto succeeded in avoiding this taxation which was formerly reserved for isambu holders. Clients settled on ibikingi land who had so far been free of ubuletwa and ibihunikwa but who had to work for their patron and give him goods, now had to render both goods and services twice over. Those who had obtained ibikingi land in exchange for a cow had never paid in goods and services as the cow was supposed to be in lieu of this. The government accepted the continuation of this exemption. As a result, many rich Tutsi, who held ibikingi land, in fact neither paid in goods nor in services. Contrary to the actual situation, ibikingi rights were held to be of a private nature as was ubuhake. However since 1924 no new ibikingi land could be granted and all available pasture was to be held

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+ for chief 1 kg of small peas
2 kg of sorghum
for sub chief 2 kg of peas or beans
4 kg of sorghum

communally under the direction of the chief.

In 1952 ubuletwa and ibihunikwa were replaced by payment in money, viz. Art. 20 of the decree of 14.7.52,

"Les prestations dues coutumièrement, en nature ou sous forme de travail, aux bami, chefs et sous-chefs sont remplacées par des contributions en argent à leur profit." ø

ø in 1953: ibihunikwa: 1 F. for the chief and 3 F. for sub chief
ubuletwa: 13 F. for the chief and 40 F. for sub chief.

7 F. = 1 shilling

PART 2 RIGHTS IN CATTLE

Parallel to the system of land tenure with its competing lineage and government spheres of interest, we find in Rwanda a complex of rights and obligations in cattle which similarly differ in the context of individual and government control. In practice rights in cattle cannot be divorced from rights in pasture.

Before dealing with the rights in cattle themselves some attention should be given as to the total extent and the incidence of cattle possession in Rwanda especially in relation to the concept that Tutsi are pasturalists and Hutu agriculturalists. The data available are inadequate in many respects. For instance figures are given for the "possession" of cattle in which it is not clear whether "possession" refers to ownership or usufruct rights. Nevertheless some useful conclusions can be inferred from the data. According to one source (van Neessen, 1953 p.1027) 39.6 per cent of all Rwanda households possessed cattle in 1952. In areas with an above-average incidence of Tutsi in the population, i.e. between 15 and 25 per cent, the extent of cattle possession rises to 55 per cent. As for

other parts of Rwanda, Bourgeois notes of the provinces Shangugu, Kisenyi, Biumba and Ruhengeri, that the cattle generally belonged "en toute propriété à la population autochtone Muhutu et à des éleveurs Bahima" (1958 p.38). The latter group refers only to the province of Biumba, which had 7.5 per cent of all the cattle of Rwanda. According to the Plan Décennal moreover 30 per cent of all the cattle of Rwanda were to be found in these four provinces outside central Rwanda (1950 p.392).

Although these numerical data relating to cattle possession do not allow for too definite conclusions, they permit us to raise certain points which are of relevance to the extent of the ubuhake system and the classification of Tutsi as pasturalists and patrons and Hutu as agriculturalists and clients.

First of all 30 per cent of all the cattle were in those areas where there was no clientage system. Either the cattle were held in these areas " en toute propriété" by the Hutu population or by the Hima who "...n'offrent aucun contract de servage aux agriculteurs." (Ruanda-Urundi 1959 p.234). This contrasts with Maquet's observations:

> "those who have the final control of cattle were always Tutsi. As the Hutu had been granted only usufruct rights over cattle which were different from those enjoyed by the lords who were Tutsi,

there was no chance that the group of cattle owners could be invaded by Hutu" (1961 p.139)

or

"the feudal system permitted the Tutsi to keep control of all Rwanda cattle" (1961 p.148),

or

"By that agreement (ubuhake), almost any Hutu was linked to a Tutsi" (1961 p. 150).

These quotations seem to infer firstly that all Hutu were clients of Tutsi, who were lords. However this classification of the population of Rwanda would assume universal participation in the ubuhake system. This division is clearly not an adequate classification as it leaves out those areas where we find approximately 50 per cent of the population. Secondly these quotations infer that only Tutsi owned cattle. However, as we have seen, in these areas we find 30 per cent of the total cattle population in Rwanda in the hands of those who were neither Tutsi nor lords. Moreover in the centre of Rwanda, where we find an above-average incidence of Tutsi we know that 55 per cent of the households 'possessed' cattle (ref. p.198). If we take 'possess' as meaning ownership, we must infer that as many Hutu as Tutsi possessed cattle as in these areas the Tutsi constituted only 25 to 30 per cent of the population. If

If we take it as meaning ownership and/or holding cattle in usufruct, we must infer that the great majority of the Hutu did not have the usufruct of cattle and therefore were outside the ubuhake system. However we could still possibly reserve the term pasturalist for Tutsi if they were exclusively the herders of cattle. Maquet himself however notes that the actual herding was often done by Hutu who were then entitled to some of the milk. He notes: "les Tutsi sont experts en élevage mais ils confient le soin de leurs troupeaux à des Hutu." (1957 p.58). Herding itself cannot therefore be used for distinguishing Tutsi from Hutu on this occupational basis. Thus classification of Rwandese as patrons or clients or generalisations by which Tutsi are identified with pasturalists and Hutu with agriculturalists need reservation and further specification.

In the previous chapters we have already mentioned some of the uses to which cattle were put. These included the context of ritual, marriage alliances, accession to political office, succession to family headship, rewards for services or valour, gifts, indemnity and taxation. The economic role of cattle was limited. Cattle were not used for ploughing and manure was not used as a fertiliser. The animals did not produce much meat not only because they

they were not heavy but also because only about 40 per cent of the animals was usable for food (Adamantidis 1956 p.20).ø Young bulls were slaughtered for meat and hides but the majority of cattle were female. Despite this the total milk production was very low. Only one in seven cows were in milk at any one time (Plan Décennal 1950 p.417). These figures compare very well with Gravel's observations in Remera in 1960-1961. "Most of the cattle are female. In the herd of thirty one cows never more than four or five at a time give milk. When there is milk it was to be shared with the calf." The best cow may produce an average of one quart a day during its time of lactation, which is constantly interrupted by pregnancy (F. Marchi 1939).

However the economic importance of cattle cannot be measured exclusively in terms of the foodstuffs produced, but must also be seen in relation to its place within the total subsistence economy of Rwanda. We have already touched upon the fact that cattle constituted a reserve in times of famine when blood was consumed. Moreover access to milk is related to the well-being or even the survival of small babies since it was given to nursing mothers to feed their

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ø In the U.S.A. 60 per cent is usable as food (Gravel 1968 page 94).

children. Furthermore cattle were a preferred form of payment in marriage alliances. Moreover the economic importance of cattle cannot be divorced from the fact that we are dealing with a non-money economy where techniques for storing perishable goods were severely limited and where there were no markets for trading outside Rwanda. Cattle however provided a means of storing wealth in that they were only perishable through disease and old age and at the same time they produced calves as interest. Moreover cattle were clearly visible and constituted an external sign of wealth. In comparison with land the successful exploitation of cattle is not related to input in hard labour. Here again, whereas surplus land was unproductive, any number of cattle could be made to produce against a time of need.

In the chapter on kinship we have seen how cattle were used in relation to the registration of new relationships such as in marriage and in the designation of an heir. In the chapter on the political structure we have seen how the king and the army chief in the institution called umurendo were presented with cattle and how the ntore gave cattle to the king when he recruited them into the army. Gravel (1967 and 1968 p.168) gives several more instances of

transfer of cattle as gifts and notes that cattle moved not only down but also up the social scale, in both cases "recording new relationships". He sees them as recording devices but excludes their economic value. "In the light of what is known of them as recording devices, their production utility and exchange value becomes insignificant" (p.168). He considers cows as tokens and not symbols inasmuch as "cows are tokens which concrete an existing situation whether it is a situation of friendship or vassalage". However it is my opinion that because of the economic value attached to cattle this aspect cannot be divorced from the transfer of cows. Gravel has thrown new light on the significance of the transfer of cows by drawing attention to the fact that they moved not only down but also up the hierarchy. However the upward movement constituted a transfer of property while the downward movement constituted only a transfer of usufruct rights. Gravel has moreover the merit of seeing the transfer of cattle as a testimony or proof of a new relationship. But this does not necessarily, as he does, exclude the economic significance of cattle. Because of its economic value, the transfer of cattle not only bears witness to a relationship but is also

part of that relationship and this is not unrelated to the fact that cattle handed down the social scale remained the property of the giver. Cows were economically valuable signs or tokens. We can look upon it as a symbol "as far as it expresses something else" (M. Banton 1965 p.69) i.e. a particular relationship. However the important point is that even outside the context of receiving cattle in a marriage transaction, receiving or accepting cattle does not necessarily mean in other Rwandan contexts that the receiver becomes the giver's client.

Before passing on to the transfer of usufruct rights, rights of ownership must be considered. Official cattle which have been called "veritables monuments historiques" will here not be considered. Transfer of rights of ownership over cattle could occur through bridewealth, dowry, compensation after murder, reward for valour, in exchange for goods or labour, as a gift and through inheritance. These cattle were referred to as <u>imbata</u>. Of these rights Maquet notes,

> "the king kept the preeminent rights over all Rwanda cattle. Even if he did not use frequently his rights against Hutu, they were not forgotten: the very cows which were not received from a lord but acquired by one's own efforts and over which the possessor had usufruct plus bare ownership were called 'King's cows' (<u>inka z'umwami</u>) as often as imbata". (1961 p.148)

However this name refers to the fact that these cattle, in case of lack of an heir, became the property of the king and indicates that the rights the owner held were as good as the king's, i.e. nobody could touch them. Musinga in 1926 said of these rights, "Nul, pas même moi, n'à le droit d'en contester la propriété absolue" (Rapport annuel sur l'administration du Ruanda-Urundi, p.64). Cattle outside central Rwanda were generally imbata. Usufruct rights in these cattle could be given to other people in exchange for goods and services. In Rwanda we find three different institutions relating to this transfer of usufruct rights.

1. Ubugwate. Example: A. owns an imbata cow and needs other goods urgently and has no other way of obtaining them than through "selling" his cow but he does not want to lose his cow. A. would exchange his cow for B's male calf. A. would then exchange the male calf for whatever he needed and later receives from B. either the first female calf born from A's former cow while B. keeps the cow or B. keeps the female calf and returns A's cow. Other details as to who gets the milk and who gets a male calf which might be born from A's cow are negotiated beforehand.

2. Ugushega. In the South-West we find this contract between Rwanda Hutu and Mushi from the Congo. Example: the Rwanda A. gives five goats and one male calf in exchange for a cow belonging to the Mushi B. The cow becomes A's full property but A. must render services for a certain period to B. and return to B. the third female calf born from that cow. If it should die before being returned, any other calf has to be given and if there is one, a female calf.

3. Ubuhake. Since this institution covers a wider field it will be dealt with in greater detail in the next part of this chapter.

PART 3

THE CLIENTAGE SYSTEM, "UBUHAKE"

In the beginning of this chapter we have already introduced the institution of clientage called ubuhake, denoting the relationship between garagu (client) and sjebuja (patron). This relationship was initiated by the person in the inferior position. Before a patron would accept somebody as his client, the person seeking this relationship had to serve a time of apprenticeship lasting from six months to two years. During that time he was called umuhange. At the end of that period, the patron would let his future client know that he accepted him as a client. The client would assemble with his family in the homestead of the patron and in the presence of witnesses or other clients of the patron, the client would, with one knee on the ground, place his hands, palms together, in the open hands of the patron and say something like "I shall be forever faithful to you" (Gravel 1968 p.165). The patron would then give him a cow in usufruct and thus the agreement was sealed. The ubuhake relationship was perpetuated between the heirs of patron and client, subject to the approval of the patron.

In material terms the client had the full usufruct of the cow's products including the meat and skin when she died. Male increase became the client's private property while female increase remained the patron's although the client had full usufruct of the female increase. The client had the right however to use the ubuhake cow or its calf for bride price and in this case the patron could not reclaim it for whatever reason, even if the ubuhake agreement ended. In that case it was completely lost to the patron because it had become "imbata" of the bride's lineage. The cow could be used again by the client to become the patron of somebody else. Further the ubuhake agreement extended to all kinds of other material advantages for the client resulting from the patron's position as his protector and benefactor. The client in need of a hoe or clothing, additional supplies for a feast or meat and milk for a sick person, would ask his patron who was expected to give whatever was needed. In practice such gifts depended mainly on the strength of the relationship which had been built up, which was related to the client's support of his patron. If the client's widow or children were not taken care of the patron would do this. In later years it was the patron who paid the poll-tax imposed under Belgian rule. Moreover

the patron was supposed to support and help the client in all contexts and when a client had committed an offence the patron was expected to help or even pay the whole of the fine or the compensation. In these contexts the patron would accompany his client, he himself surrounded by all his clients. In case the client was murdered, it was the patron who demanded justice from the Mwami. All these instances of help or protection of the patron must be seen not as part of a prearranged detailed agreement but as an expected consequence and part of the relationship.

The client on the other hand had to support his patron. The nature of this support is related to the particular needs of the patron and the capabilities of the client. As in the client's case, we can distinguish two kinds of obligations, one of which is expressed in economic terms and one which refers to the field of power. In economic terms the client, if he was an agriculturalist, would help in cultivating the patron's field or provide him with some of the products of his own fields, collect firewood and act as night-watch. If the client was a cattle owner himself he would be required to help in milking, herding, accompanying the patron on his travels, etc. Moreover the patron had the right of <u>umurundo</u>, that is to say that once in his lifetime

he could review all the cattle of his client and choose one of them for his own private property. Imbata cattle were excluded from this. The extent of the support demanded was related to the status of the client as this status was part and parcel of the relationship between the two partners. The higher the status of the client the more support he could expect in case of need. Neither the type or frequency of labour nor the type and quantity of goods were pre-arranged in the agreement; it all depended on the support which the patron needed just as the support the patron gave depended on the needs of the client.

There were special sanctions against excessive demands from either side. Moreover this was contrary to the essence of the agreement since it was opposed to the "moral" support which was part of the relationship. Moreover in the subsistence economy, which lacked external markets and storing techniques, hoarding of agricultural products was impossible and in no way profitable. Although economic benefits definitely entered into the agreement on both sides, the ubuhake from the patron's point of view was primarily a personal relationship in which he could count on the loyalty of his clients, who were bound to him more closely than to anyone else outside his immediate kin. Therefore no client

could have two patrons, even if materially he could afford to satisfy both their needs. Moreover in effectively protecting his clients the patron had an opportunity to show and to test his strength. The support of his clients was not only of importance to the patron in court cases but had special relevance in the competition for and the protection against political power. In this he depended on a wider circle of relationships than could be relied on through kinship.

The patron could be a sufficiently wealthy private citizen, who wanted to prove his status. Often, however, the patron was a political chief and all political chiefs were patrons. Office, as we have seen, while describing land tenure, gave his access to cattle (e.g. ibikingi). These cattle he could and did use partly to build up his own herd and partly to establish relationships with clients. The ability to strike the right balance was not unrelated to being a successful chief. In the political structure cattle were passed up the social scale and in the ubuhake structure cattle were passed down but with the reservation that in a downward transfer ultimate control rested with the patron who kept the property rights over his cattle. In more than one sense the ubuhake system

is related to and conditioned by the political structure although it is not a direct part of it. Although one's patron could be one's political chief the nature of the ubuhake relationship, including the way it was entered and maintained, was essentially different from the relationship between chief and subject.

The ubuhake relationship, contrary to the chief-subject relationship, could be ended by either of the parties concerned. If the relationship was ended by the patron because the client did not fulfil his obligations, the patron would sue his client for damages. The client, being without a patron, would then be in a highly vulnerable position. However it was normally a stable relationship which if it was ended resulted in the patron taking his cattle back. Since 1920 however, when political chiefs and even other patrons broke off their ubuhake relationship, the patron would take all the client's cattle, including his private imbata cattle.

> "Administrative chiefs who were important lords are said....to have modified the custom to their own advantage by establishing the principle of merging cows received from a lord with those acquired independently of any shebuja"
> (Maquet 1961 p.132)

In this context it is however important to note that clients cannot be identified with Hutu, since both Tutsi

and Hutu were clients in the ubuhake system. Neither did being a client of one person exclude the same person from being patron to another. Categorisation as to clients and patrons cannot therefore be used as a basis of stratification of Rwanda society. Neither was the fact of being a patron or a client necessarily an index of higher or lower rank in that society. Respective rank depended less on the status of patron or client per se than on the actual social ranking of the person who was one's patron or the persons who were one's clients. The actual status of a patron depended also on the number of his clients. Nevertheless being a client but not a patron denoted a lower status in the system of distribution of power and authority than being both a client and a patron.

Ubuhake is therefore an interpersonal and normally hereditary relationship. It was freely entered into by two partners of unequal status and resulted in mutual support in matters relating to 'politics' and power. In its formation the patron gave a cow to the client as a proof and external sign of the relationship and as a part of the exchange of economic benefits in goods and services which differed in kind as between patron and client. Essentially therefore the relationship between patron and client is one

of mutual advantage. Without further attempt at analysis as to whether or in what way this advantage was unequal, I intend to further define the nature of this mutual advantage in terms of political inter-dependence and economic exchange, by setting the ubuhake system as such in the framework of the social system of which it was a part. My intention is to bring out the nature of this interpersonal relationship between patron and client by analysing the nature of the ubuhake institution as a part of the social system around 1900.

In Rwanda political power rested with the king who delegated his power to more or less close affines and traditionally important lineages. Within these lineages struggle and competition went on for the actual holding of power positions. Support in this contest could not be limited to the lineage as, firstly, in central Rwanda the lineages were not localised. Secondly, competition went on within the lineages and, thirdly, actual power not only extended over but involved the support of a wider group than the lineage. This meant in practical terms that official authority extended not only over pasturalists but also over agriculturalists, the persons in these two occupational categories being dispersed over the area of a

chiefdom. Those chiefs who remained sedentary had an evident advantage in the complex manipulation of support necessary in the Rwanda political system. By sharing out his cattle, the chief obtained a following on a local and not necessarily kinship basis, although it was possible to have close kin, e.g. siblings as clients. He also obtained the agricultural products he needed. Others having cattle and aspiring to political power also profited from becoming sedentary so that they could build up their following and assure agrarian products through sharing out their cattle in the ubuhake system. In both cases sharing out of cattle and support from the clients is clearly related to obtaining or maintaining political office. Other cattle owners who remained sedentary for whatever reason rather than being semi-nomadic, were necessarily drawn into the competition for power, through the need to protect their cattle from those who wanted them as an instrument to build up a following. This protection they had to obtain by becoming clients of the political chief, that is by receiving a cow from the chief in exchange for their support. This I will call primary clientage. The client could again establish his own client relationship with the same cow. This I will call secondary clientage.

The more widely a man managed to extend his own circle of clients the more support he would have in the locality. Moreover his own patron would benefit from this support and therefore he would receive in turn greater support and protection, from his own patron. Thus the small cattle owner was almost unavoidably drawn into the power struggle and power structure and felt that he played an important role in distributing his own and his clients' allegiances. From the point of view of political support it was evidently more profitable to bestow cows through ubuhake on those who were already cattle owners and likely contenders in the political competition since it was these men who would be likely to hand on the cows in creating secondary clientage relationships and thereby build up support for the original owner. If a cow was given to an agriculturalist or, more generally, to a non-contender in the power struggle he would be more likely to keep the cow for his own use and not extend the circle of clients through secondary clientage relationships. Thus the clientage system worked in favour of the cattle owners as they could rely on preferential treatment.

Those who had cattle, but did not participate in the political struggle, protected their cattle by leading a semi-nomadic life and did not have clients. It is in this

context that we should see the semi-nomadic owners of extensive herds in Eastern Rwanda, the Hima. Against this background we must see also the relationship of patron and client in as far as it enters the political field. It is a relationship of mutual advantage, but containing advantages of a different kind for patron and client and in the case of primary and secondary clientship. In the case of primary clientship cattle, from the point of view of the patron or chief, were an instrument for obtaining or maintaining power which was related to the fact that he had no coercive power at his disposal. From the point of view of the client, cattle were an instrument of protection and of obtaining power. In the case of secondary clientship, cattle were, from the point of view of both patron and client, a means of protection against abuse of political power. But in both cases obtaining or maintaining power and protection against that power depended on the support which the patron obtained. It was a two way street.

The ubuhake system was interrelated with the political structure just as the political structure was interrelated and partly depended on the ubuhake system, but this inter-dependence was effective mainly because the systems were not identical. Mobility within the political structure

made the working of the ubuhake system possible. As soon as the mobility within the political system was no longer operative the ubuhake would lose its fundamental meaning of inter-dependence, as holding office would no longer depend on the support gained through clientage. It would become a one way street. This is exactly what happened in the years of colonial rule as noted in the conclusions of chapter II.

To this must be added that the chief had from then on not only coercive force at his disposal but also that the checks and brakes operative through the army structure and the function of the army chief were no longer a part of the social system. Because of the ubuhake system, the ruled participated in the power structure and this made for integration, which was of special importance since chiefs did not have any institutionalised councils. Through the ubuhake system the cattle owning lineages who were in the power-holding group could control the instrument of power and through the institution of primary and secondary clientage eliminate the smaller cattle owners while allowing them a limited part within the power structure. In doing so thev kept them within but not an effective part of the structure.

The ubuhake system also served as a channel for the distribution of wealth and a means for the exchange of specialized labour. Although ultimate control of cattle remained with the patron in primary clientage and to a lesser degree in secondary clientage, cattle, as we have seen, was only a part, although an important part, of the material goods which were transferred from patron to client. Political office was a way of obtaining cattle which were redistributed among the supporters, without the patron losing control, except in the case of cattle used for bridewealth by the client. The amount of material support for the cattle owning patron must be seen in relation to his diet, which was largely limited to dairy products, to the number of clients which the patron had and to the fact that a surplus of agrarian products could not either be stored for long, sold or exchanged. The normal amount of services demanded and given by the client were limited by these factors.

Moreover in traditional Rwanda society the army chief provided an important means of protection against possible abuse. The inherent weakness of the system in which the patron would protect his clients against outsiders, was that within the ubuhake system itself the client had nobody

to avenge him against an unreasonable patron.

Breaking off the relationship was possible but left the client in a very vulnerable position. The main sanction against abuse was thus the patron's own dependence on his client's support and the client's possibility of appeal to and protection of the army chief. To prevent his private cattle (imbata) being taken by the patron when the client broke off the ubuhake relationship, the client could place them under the protection of the army chief. However both these checks disappeared from traditional Rwanda society after the impact of colonial rule. Firstly, there was no longer need for support from below either to obtain or maintain office nor for the implementation of the chief's orders as he now had coercive power at his disposal. On the other hand, the need of clients for protection remained and even increased due to greater competition for available resources resulting from population increase following the new health measures, control over famine and the cessation of warfare. Moreover with the introduction of a money economy labour and agrarian products could be converted into cash which was both non-perishable and which opened up new avenues for spending. Secondly, the army structure and the function of the army chief had been abolished, thus removing another check on possible abuse.

PART 4 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UBUHAKE SYSTEM

So far we have been analysing the ubuhake system and we have indicated some of the effects of the changes that took place during the colonial period so as to demonstrate from these effects the nature of the ubuhake relationship and the function it served in the framework of the social system of Rwanda. In 1952 the ubuhake system was abolished in the sense that no new ubuhake relationships could be established. Two years later all existing ubuhake relationships had to be ended and cattle held within the system had to be divided between patron and client. An analysis of this development demonstrates the wider changes that took place within the system. My contention is that the ubuhake relationships were abolished because they had already ceased to function effectively and this in itself is indicative of profound changes which had occurred in the society. The underlying factors which made the ubuhake system redundant are of relevance to the conflict situation which arose in 1961 rather than, as is often thought, the clientage system itself, because this had already been

effectively abolished over a period of several years.

By extension and analogy, because of certain similarities and despite obvious differences, superior - inferior relationships have been referred to by previous authors in clientage terminology. For instance: "The army chiefs are the clients of the king" and "Subjects on the hill are the clients of the hill chief" (cf. p.182). Indeed the army chief could be the client of the king and the Mwami often would appoint one of his clients to this office. However this appointment, although it brings with it certain relationships of dependence and service, was not identical to ubuhake relationship. Equally the subject on the hill could be the client of the hill chief and so could the tenant of the ibikingi holder, but these relationships were additional to and not a necessary consequence of the relationship resulting from political office or landholding. This is born out by the fact that the client's patron could be somebody who was not his political chief or landlord.

From the description of the ubuhake system in this thesis it is clear that the superior - inferior relationship expressed in the hierarchically ranked political power structure or the landholder and tenant relationships are not only different from one another but also both are

different from the relationships expressed in the ubuhake system. Moreover both have little bearing on clientage despite certain similarities either concerning loyalty or concerning dues in goods and services. It is important to note that these obligations were not the result of a personal relationship of inter-dependence and mutual support but pertained to the realm of taxation or a payment for rights in land. Confusion might well have arisen because the kinds of goods and services rendered to the hill chief or landlord were similar to those rendered to one's patron. However it must be realised that the bases of these relationships were different. In case of landlord - tenant and chief - subject relationships the amount of dues was pre-arranged and fixed while in the case of patron - client relationships these were neither pre-arranged nor fixed. A further possible source of confusion was that a tenant on ibikingi land was not liable to pay dues to the chief but the obligation which he owed to his landlord might be used by his landlord to discharge himself of his own obligation to his chief. (ref. p.186 and 191) This may have led to the assumption that all the inhabitants of the hill were clients of the chief. In the case of one person being in the position of both patron and chief or landlord, obligations

were not duplicated but those due to him as patron had priority. An account of the impact of the introduction of universal adult male taxation, which was intended to replace the complex customary system of dues and services, demonstrates the actual distinction between ubuhake relationships and those between chief - subject and landlord - client. One of the effects was that where a tenant's landlord had been at the same time his hill chief, after the reorganisation of the system of taxation, the chief collected the official tax while at the same time continuing to demand the dues and services owed to him as landlord. Similarly, where the client's patron was also his chief, the client continued to fulfil obligations to his chief as patron as well as paying the official tax now due to him as chief.

The first move to abolish the ubuhake system came from the important cattle owners who proposed it in a meeting under the chairmanship of the king in 1945. The Mwami publicly announced his intention to abolish the system by the first of January, 1946. The Belgian colonial government however refused to let it go ahead because it thought that on the ubuhake system "reposait la structure politique du pays" (Bourgeois 1958 p.11). After lengthy discussions and consultations the government decided in 1951 on

"l'élimination progressive de l'ubuhake" (Plan Décennal p.401). Because the government was convinced of the problem of overstocking, it was hoped that those who would newly acquire cattle, would be obliged to sell them owing to lack of pasture (op.cit p.401). This concern about overstocking may well be related to the fact that no proper measures were taken with regard to the redistribution of pasture.

In 1952 further ubuhake contracts were forbidden by the Mwami and in 1954 he gave details of the obligatory division of cattle held under the ubuhake system. Application for the division of cattle could be made either by patron or client or by both. Excluded from the division are "official cattle" which belonged to the country as a whole and personal cattle; i.e. those belonging to the lineage or those under private ownership. The division of cattle had to take place before appointed judges in such a way that one third of the cattle went to the patron and two thirds to the client but if the patron had already exercised his right of umurundo (p.210-211) the patron had only a right to one fourth. The cattle were classified on the basis of quality and colour and were evaluated by the judges in money if the two parties concerned could not come to an agreement. The

client received two thirds of the money value of the cattle and the patron one third. If cattle were divided in kind the client had the first choice. An example may illustrate this: (cf. Bourgeois 1958 p.35)

Patron: Bahaya

Client: Sebuhaya

Cattle to be divided: 4

Total value 8,600 fr.

1st cow:	3000 fr.
2nd cow:	1300 fr.
3rd cow:	1500 fr.
4th cow:	2800 fr.
	8600 fr.

1/3 patron = 2867 fr.

2/3 client = 5733 fr.

1st choice:	client:	cow no. 1	=	3000 fr.	
2nd choice:	patron:	cow no. 4	=		2800 fr.
3rd choice:	client:	cow no. 2	=	1300 fr.	
4th choice:	client:	cow no. 3	=	1500 fr.	
				5800 fr.	2800 fr.
The client has to pay to his patron				67 fr.	67 fr.
				5733 fr.	2867 fr.

If there were only one or two cows to be divided it was up to the client to decide whether he wanted money or the cow. Payment had to be made on the spot and if one was not able to provide the money the cow was sold by public auction and the money divided between patron and client.

Between April 1954 and the first of January 1957 we find that 224,420 head of cattle had been divided or 40 per cent of all the cattle in Rwanda including cattle which were excluded from the division. Unfortunately no figures are available as to what was the percentage of ubuhake cattle in the total national figure. But here we must refer back to the notes given on p. 200-201 as regards the extent of the ubuhake system in Rwanda. The conclusion seems justified that by far the greater part of the cattle in the ubuhake system was thus divided. It is indicative of the interest of both parties concerned that 40 per cent of divisions were demanded by the client and 41 per cent by the patron while 16.5 per cent were demanded by both parties. Only 2.5 per cent had to be arranged through a court case. The vast majority (97.5 per cent) were arranged 'à l'amiable' duly registered but not settled after dispute.

The first public move to have the ubuhake system abolished was started by the rich cattle owners themselves.

This can be correlated with the following factors:

(1) Mobility had gone out of the political system and appointment to office was no longer based on support but on educational achievement. The ubuhake system could no longer operate as an avenue of political mobility.

(2) The demand for abolition of ubuhake was made in 1945, that is just after the great rinderpest epidemic which had shown the economic weakness of cattle in the new context of the money economy.

(3) Because the protection of the client had become largely a responsibility of the administration and no longer depended on the support he gave to the patron, the clients gave little service and were moreover often absent through labour migration or employment.

(4) Because, although having ultimate control over cattle, patrons could not exploit them for financial gain, whereas clients could. e.g. through the sale of milk, butter or hides. Thus patrons were largely excluded from new avenues of economic gain from cattle. Status and prestige was no longer solely determined by the amount of cattle owned and the consequent number of clients but by office and access to money.

For the clients, acceptance of the termination of the ubuhake relationship had also many advantages, concomitant with the following changes:

(1) The flexibility had gone out of the system and they no longer had the protection of the army chief against the possibility of excessive pressures by the chiefs and patrons in their demands for goods and services.

(2) Access to money through wage labour and the production of cash crops meant that the customary rendering of goods and services appeared as a heavy liability and a financial loss. This was all the more so as there was a greater demand for money for payment of taxes, school fees, etc. Moreover government's pressure to extend cultivation in order to prevent further famines demanded more labour time on clients' personal plots. All these factors had resulted in clients not giving the patron the goods and services which he expected. This in turn had resulted in friction and bad relations.

(3) Clients in regular employment could be legally compelled by the patron to compensate in cash for non-fulfilment of their clientship obligations. The amount fixed for redeeming their obligations was

450 fr. but insistence on monetary compensation often caused disputes.

(4) Cattle were no longer needed for bridewealth as this could now be paid in cash.

Because of fundamental changes in the principles of social organisation related to the political structure of Rwanda, to which the clientage system was linked and on which the working of the system depended, the ubuhake system was no longer relevant for either of the parties concerned. To this must be added the economic changes which made the system burdensome for both parties. The "suppression de la coutume ubuhake" was no more than a winding up of the system which had already become redundant. Hence this winding up took place in complete calm and with hardly any disputes or contests.

However one of the effects of the division of cattle was that the rulers no longer had ultimate control over cattle. Although cattle were no longer instrumental to power, the abolition constituted a clear and evident sign of change in the system of access to office or land. Many of those who received cattle were obliged to sell them, as they had no access to pasture. This was particularly evident in the case of clients of ibikingi landholders,

who had cultivators settled on their land. Tenants who wanted the right of pasture, even on their own holding e.g. to have cattle graze on the stubble after harvest, had to pay for this to the ibikingi landholder as he possessed the right to pasture on all the ibikingi land. If the tenants, who had acquired cattle through the division, wanted to keep their cattle, they had either to pay cash or render services and provide goods. Hence many decided to sell their cattle. Although no figures are available as to how many ibikingi landholders there were in Rwanda, they were very numerous and widespread and all the rich cattle owners had ibikingi land. Thus the rich cattle owners stood to gain and the already hard-pressed (cf. p. 196) tenants, suffered.

C H A P T E R I V

THE RELIGIOUS COMPLEX

The scope of this thesis, which includes analysis of the impact of new opportunities on the traditional system, requires that the complex of religious and magico-religious beliefs and practices be included. This is for two reasons. In the first place they are related to the pattern of social relationships among living members of the community and support the social order. Secondly, christianity spread to a very considerable extent in a comparatively short time, replacing, in the younger generation, the traditional beliefs and practices. Although this widespread adoption of christianity does not imply necessarily that traditional practices were abandoned, it does mean that new opportunities had arisen. The published data on many aspects of the organisation of the traditional religious system in Rwanda is inadequate for complete sociological analysis. Nevertheless some of the basic beliefs and practices are important in the context of the present analysis.

Independent of social cleavages or regional variations, all Rwanda recognise a supreme being, Imana, the creator.

Although Imana figures widely in the different myths regarding the origin of the world, of men, of Rwanda, its king and its inhabitants with their different occupations and skills, he is not the object of an organised cult. His name is often used in greetings and his association with life is recognised in the names given to children. Imana, although closely linked in myth with the origin of Rwanda, is not a national God, but every night he returns to Rwanda, the place he entrusted to the Mwami, his visible representative and the guardian of his creation. In this way the concept of God entered the pattern of traditional social relationships in as much as it gave the seal of God's approbation on all the Mwami's words and actions. Rwanda was linked with God through the person of the Mwami. However there was no cult to Imana either through the Mwami himself or at the level of the lineage or individual. Since the social order was believed to be maintained by Imana, both its form and the Mwami's administration of it was sacrosanct. Since Imana gives life and is therefore good, there was no need to appease him through cult offerings.

Life itself is the linking by Imana of an invisible icuu to the body at the moment of conception. For this he needs a little water, to mould the two together. It is for

this reason that the Rwanda pours a little water in a bowl and places it next to his bed. While this cannot be interpreted as an offering to Imana, nevertheless the concept had a definite place in daily life. This was particularly important in that Imana was closely related to procreation and thus put men continuously in the presence of the supernatural.

Death occurs at the moment when icuu leaves the body and is transformed into a spirit, muzimu (plural bazimu). The body has served its purpose, that is to say it has contained the icuu and procreated a new bodily form for the icuu, i.e. the next generation. The body, having served its purpose, is rather casually disposed of. Thus life is what has been received from one's parents to be passed on to one's children. The concept of icuu was directly related to the actual form of the lives of forebears, including the observance of customary patterns of behaviour. It therefore constituted a sanction supporting the observance of customary norms. Non-observance of customary norms was liable to punishment by the bazimu during the life of the transgressors.

A state of happiness in the afterlife was not related to life on earth neither did it depend on offerings made to the bazimu. All Rwanda, with the exception of those who

are initiated into the Ryangombe cult, go to the same place of abode of the bazimu, where there is no further distinction as to status, rank or any other differences. The fact that punishment of infringements of tradition was not postponed to the afterlife but was always immanent constituted another sanction supporting observance of the traditional social patterns. Thus concepts of God, life, death and punishment were all directly related to upholding the established social system.

PART 1 CULT OF THE DEAD

Against this background we must now see the cult of the bazimu which constituted the most universal part of the religious practices of the Rwanda. At death the icuu was transformed into a muzimu whose existence was neither pleasant nor unpleasant. The Rwanda did not restrict the cult rendered to the dead i.e. bazimu, to their deceased ancestors, neither was it, where ancestor cult was rendered, restricted to father, grandfather or lineage heads, in this otherwise patrilineal society.

The Rwanda distinguish two categories of bazimu who have separate cults. These are the bazimu of the ancestors and those who are strangers to the lineage. However the cult of deceased relatives included both agnatic and cognatic kin of both sexes. A second distinction was made between the benevolent and malignant bazimu. Benevolence implied that no harm was to be expected from them as long as a person observed tradition, which included offerings to certain categories of deceased persons. The offerings themselves were more in the nature of a token than in the nature of deprivation of an economic good. The bazimu were transformed icuu and did not need any material goods for their well-being.

They only wanted to be remembered. Therefore some grains were offered or even a sheep but it was believed that it sufficed to kill the sheep so that the sheep's icuu could be received by the muzimu while the people who made the sacrifice or offering kept the meat. Firth's observations on the nature of sacrifice as necessarily entailing economic aspects do not seem applicable in the Rwanda context. (Firth 1963 p.1)

As soon as a person built his homestead he needed an ancestor as protector to whom he would regularly make offerings. Bazimu protectors could be either father, grandfather, mother, grandmother, father's brother or father's sister. There was however no definite pattern or system as to which ancestor within this group should become the protector of a particular homestead. The principal protector was not chosen by the householder nor by the lineage but by the diviner, who was not necessarily a kinsman and who was most often a Hutu. However there were Tutsi diviners. It is unfortunate that no data are available as to possible patterns in resorting to a diviner. The diviner might appoint any of the deceased close relatives, male or female, as the muzimu protector of the new homestead. In the case of polygynous marriages a new and different ancestor was

appointed by the diviner for the new homestead of each wife. All were chosen from the husband's relatives. A small hut would be built as an ancestral shrine and gifts were regularly made. Normally the head of the household had exclusive rights of access to the shrine. The rugo head would also participate annually in the cult rendered to the ancestor at the inzu level or in the peripheral areas at the umulyango level.

Next to this principal protector, the diviner, when asked in times of special adversity, might indicate that another muzimu protector was needed and would again indicate to whom of the ancestors cult should be regularly rendered.

All these ancestors within the cognatic descent group were considered to be benevolent, since they were concerned with the well-being of living members, but they could be ill-tempered and were supposed to cause trouble if the person had had disputes with that particular ancestor during his lifetime. Now that he was a muzimu he could argue from a position of strength unless submission was shown through special and frequent offerings. It was particularly and most frequently to these ancestors, who had to be appeased, that cult was rendered. This constituted a continuous reminder to the living of the advantages of living in peace with one's

lineage members and those who had married into it. It also enforced the authority of the older generation who were closer to becoming bazimu and might be appointed as the protector ancestor by the diviners.

Thus the descent group ancestor cult generally reinforced and strengthened good relations firstly and most importantly among that group of close kin who were eligible to become the muzimu protector and secondly, among the wider group of lineage members and their wives. In this sense the beliefs and practices of the bazimu cult reflected the areas of relative intensity in relationships between kin. It moreover strengthened the authority of the rugo, inzu or umulyango head, as he had control over access to the principal ancestor-protector. However on the other hand the potential retribution of the bazimu limited the exercise of his authority within the bounds of what was accepted or customary. Regional differences as to the level on which ancestor cult was rendered are correlated with the greater depth of the kinship structure in the peripheral areas.

J.D. McKnight (1967) has noted that in some cases one can build a strong case for explaining the character imputed to the descent group ancestor on the basis of ritual, jural and economic dependence of living members on him, i.e. in

terms of succession and inheritance and has stated that this approach is not applicable or successful when applied to extra descent group ancestors. He illustrates this with several examples.

In Rwanda the form taken by the ancestor cult seems only to be related to patterns of succession and inheritance in a negative way. First of all there is no systematic pattern in the appointment of the ancestor by the diviner, who is himself not a lineage member. This conforms to the absence of any fixed pattern in succession in that the father would appoint one of his sons as successor on the basis of personal choice. Secondly, the pattern of behaviour of the muzimu is related to previous good or bad relations towards the person before he was transformed into a muzimu, and as such served to promote good relations and to check competition between members of the lineage. This was of particular importance because of the lack of a fixed pattern of succession, resulting in competition and friction, into which certain persons married into the lineage might also be drawn. In this way we can say that in Rwanda the nature of the ancestor cult, relating to this particular group of bazimu, is concomitant with the system of succession to authority in Rwanda. Inheritance does not seem to be a

relevant factor as all male heirs received equal shares except for the successor who received an additional share if he still had special charges, e.g. the care of unmarried brothers.

However the cult of the dead was not confined to the above mentioned categories of close kin. The diviner could and often would indicate, when consulted in times of special misfortune, that a particular extra descent group muzimu needed to be placated. This could be a deceased affine with whom a person had had a quarrel, a neighbour or a patron or client, with whom a person had had an unsettled dispute when he died. This would be especially if he had died in abnormal circumstances and 'abnormal' were considered to be all circumstances except at home in old age. If something went wrong with the cattle and their owners had had clients whom he had not treated well, and who were now bazimu, the diviner would tell the cattle owner that the clients were now being revengeful and demanded to be appeased. This was a sufficiently well established pattern to have resulted in a special name given to a client's muzimu, Rwiru. If cattle were restless or were fighting one another, the cattle owner would say "Ni Rwiru" - Rwiru excites them - and some offering of cattle blood had to be made to avert greater disaster.

However the categorization of bazimu as friendly and unfriendly was not directly related to intra and extra descent group bazimu. All ancestors were supposed to be protectors unless one had had quarrels with them. Extra descent group bazimu had to be feared if one had not treated them well during their lifetime. All other bazimu did not enter the cult of the dead, they were neither friendly nor unfriendly. Hence the behaviour pattern of the bazimu seems primarily related to good or bad relations between agnates, cognates and affines, between patrons and clients and between neighbours.

Thus the cult of the bazimu supported the maintenance of co-operation in social relationships at different levels and sanctioned the socially accepted patterns of behaviour of which the bazimu were thought to be the pre-eminent protectors, not only within the lineage but in all face to face relationships. Thus the cult of the bazimu reflects the relative importance both of ties within the kinship structure and of other social relationships in Rwanda. There are variations related to differences between Central Rwanda and the peripheral areas where, for instance, no cult to Rwiru was rendered as there were no patron - client relationships.

The missionaries forbade all forms of ancestor cult. The missionary reports mention that reported or confessed transgressions were punished with public penance and that, before being accepted as a catechumen, the ancestral shrines had to be demolished. Access to specific data, which unfortunately do not exist, would be required for an evaluation of the impact of Christianity on the cult of the dead and on its function in upholding the traditional patterns of social relationships. However the conclusion seems justified that the cult of the bazimu was directed towards preservation of traditional patterns of behaviour while Christianity was not. Moreover punishment was no longer based on transgressions of traditional patterns and effective during one's lifetime but based on transgressions of a new code and postponed into the afterlife.

PART 2 THE RYANGOMBE CULT

Cult of the dead was not restricted to these spirits called bazimu. At a different level we find the Ryangombe cult in Central Rwanda, and the Nyabingi cult in the peripheral areas.

In Central Rwanda about thirty spirits were considered to be especially powerful. These were called Imandwa or heroes, whose Mwami was Ryangombe. They were considered to be able to control the malevolent activities of the bazimu. The cult rendered to them was very widespread. To come under the protection of Ryangombe and his Imandwa, a person had to be initiated in a trancelike initiation ceremony. Those who were initiated could count not only on a greater protection while living but also on a more pleasant after-life than that attained by the normal bazimu. The initiated were supposed to live, after death, on the slopes of the Karisimbi, a volcano in northern Rwanda, spending their time pleasantly drinking, gambling and smoking.

The cult had no other rite than the initiation ceremony and there were no regular officials. It was up to the diviner to determine whether a person, male or female, should be initiated. For the ceremony itself it was

required that someone should act the part of Ryangombe and the person to be initiated needed a male and female sponsor. All these persons were appointed by the diviner, who did not assist at the ceremony himself. The ceremony took place within the context of the lineage in that only initiated lineage members were allowed to be present and to participate. The cult was secret in the sense that no non-initiated were allowed to be present at the initiation ceremony and no initiated was allowed to tell others the secrets of the initiation, but a person's membership was publicly known and a subject of public boasting.

Maquet has noted:

> "The cult of Ryangombe has importance as a force of social cohesion. Batutsi, Bahutu and Batwa may all be initiated. This function is quite overtly stressed: Ryangombe has said himself that he should be called upon by everybody." (1954 p.171)

However its actual importance in relation to social cohesion must be measured against the fact that initiation took place within the initiant's own lineage and moreover that there is no evidence that common membership resulted in special face to face relationship on an inter-lineage basis. But one can conceptualize that common membership alleviated tensions in as much as these tensions would disappear in

the after-life and only comradeship of all the initiated would remain on the slopes of the Karisimbi. It would be difficult to establish any evidence as to the impact of this concept on actual relationships just as it would be difficult to establish whether and if so how much, future shared heavenly bliss in other cults affects face to face relationships and is a factor of social cohesion.

It is my contention however that the Ryangombe cult constituted a factor of social cohesion in as much as it constituted an escape from realities by making light of these realities including whatever cleavages existed, and secondly, in as much as it was a 'national' cult although in fact limited to Central Rwanda. Ryangombe and his friends, Tutsi, Hutu and Twa, are depicted in the myth as heroes in that they, on their own without the king's support, defeated the king of Karagwe, the neighbouring kingdom to the East. As such Ryangombe is a national hero, defeating a common outside enemy. Although the king of Rwanda was not an official of the cult, nor could he even be initiated, he always appointed somebody to represent the cult at the ceremonies at the court. King Rwabugire had for instance appointed his son, the full brother of Musinga. Banyarwanda were constantly reminded of this national hero and his abode,

as the mountain could be seen on a clear day from all over Rwanda. In this way the Karisimbi was like the spires on our churches. Thus the cult had definite national overtones and as such was a constant reminder of common values in the face of common enemies.

The Myth of Ryangombe

> Ryangombe, who is the youngest son, grows up playing, drinking, gambling and hunting. He gambles away all he has including his cattle, and leaves his parents' home. Roaming around he rapes several girls and leaves them with their illegitimate children. At last he is accepted as a guest by a friend but violates his daughter, A. He is allowed however to stay on and marry her but he does not pay any bridewealth. He leaves his wife before childbirth and returns home to his parents. A son is born from wife A. The child, barely a month old, kills his grandparents and sets out to find his father. On the way he kills everybody he meets, all the cattle he sees and several lions and leopards. At last he finds his father who is gambling and losing. He declares himself his son, Binego, and tells his father what is wrong with his gambling and orders him to play differently. In this way his father is saved from defeat. Binego is now in charge although he recognises Ryangombe as his father. They spend their time hunting with their friends, Tutsi, Hutu and Twa, and all share a great comradeship in danger and in feasting. One day Ryangombe's mother tries to stop him from going hunting but Ryangombe refuses to be restrained. She puts her charms across the entrance of the hut in an attempt to prevent him from leaving, but Ryangombe refuses to be stopped and goes hunting. During the hunt he is killed by a buffalo and his friends in despair throw themselves on the horns of the buffalo to be killed with him.

The myth of Ryangombe totally reverses the social order. Rape is not punished, he marries matrilocally, he does not pay bridewealth, he does not work and has no regard for cattle. He takes over the role of the king in defeating the royal enemy. He keeps the leopard skins for himself. However he perishes because he lacks respect for the taboo of his mother. His son is still more savage and kills whomsoever he wants without impunity, he gives orders to his father. Furthermore there is great comradeship between Tutsi, Hutu and Twa.

In the initiation ceremony, in which the initiated becomes an imandwa himself and is mystically married to Ryangombe, this reversal of the social order is re-enacted. The initiated is thus separated from the profane, i.e. the social order and starts a new life with a new name. This life will become fully effective when at death he is transformed into an imandwa and joins the joyful companions who are not bound by any law or order and in whose abode there is no authority and no cleavages of any kind.

The Ryangombe cult was widespread and very many people were initiated. It acted as a form of sublimation, involving a conceptual escape from realities without upsetting these realities. Comparison between the function

of joking relationships and the function of the Ryangombe cult is very tempting. The Ryangombe cult was not a revolutionary movement but made light of the stratification in the social order by projecting deliverance from all cleavages and distinctions, in the spheres of political authority, kinship, generation, sex and occupation, into the after-life. Expressions such as "We are all Twa" and "I don't like cattle" or "nobody is going to order me about" and "I am not responsible for anybody" (Arnoux 1912 p.871), used in the initiation ceremony, illustrate this. In the same vein were the shameless ritual actions which the initiated went through such as symbolic ritual incest and homosexuality. However to assess how the Ryangombe cult eased tensions of the reality, in what ways and to what extent this escape from reality was an alleviating factor making for easier acceptance of these realities is a task outside the scope of this thesis.

PART 3 THE NYABINGI CULT

In the Northern peripheral areas we do not find the Ryangombe cult but the Nyabingi cult. Gravel mentions that the Nyabingi cult spread from the North to Gisaka in the East shortly after the advent of the Europeans (1968 p.147). The Nyabingi cult is however not restricted to Rwanda as it is also found in Kigezi, Uganda (Edel 1957 p.148).

In Rwanda there are different versions as to the identity of Nyabingi. Summarising the different versions; Nyabingi was a daughter of the king of Ndorwa, belonging to a Tutsi lineage. She somehow managed to succeed her father to the kingship. But she is killed by a cousin who connived to do so with the co-operation of the king of Rwanda. After her death the Mwami of Rwanda forcibly occupied Ndorwa but never managed to establish proper administrative control. Nyabingi, who was killed with all her servants, supposedly never died but remained with her people, however she remained invisible.

Various points in the organization of the Nyabingi cult, which contrast with the Ryangombe cult, shows how it was able to, and in fact did, constitute a force opposing further annexation of the North by central Rwanda. The Nyabingi

cult had official priests and priestesses, who were believed to be able to intercede with Nyabingi in order to gain her protection. This protection could be given to anyone, contrary to the Ryangombe cult which offered a general protection only to those who had been initiated. However Nyabingi priests demanded substantial payment in goods for their services as intermediaries. Hence they were often extremely wealthy and had extensive powers. They further surrounded themselves with an armed retinue of servants for protection who could also be used in extorting any payment due to the priest.

The organization of the Nyabingi cult, which was widespread in the North, thus provided both the means for physical resistance of central government in the North and a religious rallying point against external threat to the area. On several occasions it has been recorded that the Nyabingi cult was in fact used in revolts. (d'Hertefelt 1962 p.86, Pauwels 1957 p.245).

The central government also realised the potential threat of the Nyabingi organisation in the North. For instance, during the invasion of the North by Rwabugiri, several of the priestesses were put to death. Contrary to the Ryangombe cult in central Rwanda, the Nyabingi cult can

be seen in some sense as a revolutionary movement both in its myth of origin and in the uses to which its actual organisation could be put. Pauwels gives several names of priests and priestesses who were in recent times either put to death or put in prison. (1957 p.253) Thus the organisation of the cult provided a framework for expressing opposition to the encroachment of authority in the North. This anti-authoritarian tendency carried over into the colonial era.

When the colonial powers introduced Central Rwanda administration into the North, it became a centre of opposition against all the recently introduced forms of authority. The Nyabingi cult was officially forbidden in 1922 and the movement went underground. Thus the Nyabingi cult was an element of social cohesion in the North in as much as it was a force, expressed in religious terms, which opposed the newly established authority. It provided a focus for common identity in the face of the same authority through which Nyabingi had perished and which now did not allow expression of the cult rendered to Nyabingi. Whether the spread of the Nyabingi cult into Gisaka, after the arrival of the Europeans, mentioned by Gravel, is related to these aspects could only have been established by research at that time.

To sum up this incomplete and summary survey of the religious complex in Rwanda, we may say that the cult of the dead was the most general and characteristic feature of religious practices. It had the function of upholding traditional patterns of behaviour and fostering good relations within and outside the lineage. The Ryangombe cult in Central Rwanda and the Nyabingi cult in the peripheral areas had definite sectional overtones and the Nyabingi cult had definite anti-central government tendencies.

PART 4 CHRISTIAN INFLUENCE

With the arrival of the Europeans, Christianity spread rapidly in Rwanda. I will not be concerned here with the impact of Christianity in terms of the introduction of egalitarian and individualistic ideas. Within the scope of this thesis a summary analysis of the spread of Christianity allows for certain conclusions as regards its impact on certain groups of people and on the power structure and in providing new economic opportunities, all of which are related to the conflict situation which arose.

The catholic missionaries were the first to arrive in Rwanda in 1900. The king allowed them to open a mission station in the North and later in the same year one in the East. From the earliest missionary reports we have detailed evidence of the very close co-operation which existed between the missionaries and the German authorities. In 1915 permission was granted by the king to open a mission in Central Rwanda. Figures from the reports show that from the start Christianity spread far less rapidly in the North and East than in the Centre. This might well be related to the evident alliance between the missionaries and the colonial powers who were very much occupied in trying to establish and

maintain central government authority in these areas against strong and often violent opposition. The following notes from the reports illustrate this point. When in 1904 the people rebelled against the newly established authorities and put them to flight, the German troops intervened:

> "Les gens voient leur huttes flambées, leur bananeraies coupées, leur vaches prendre le chemin de Rwanda central. Quelques morts complètent le châtiment. La punition nous la regrettons guère, car les gens sont vraiment peu sociables. C'était un châtiment uniquement pour venger l'autorité méconnue des chefs Tutsi .....venus de la capitale" (Nyundo 1904).

From the same mission we read in 1912:

> "Nous refusons de soigner les blessures pour faire perdre à nos gens l'envoie de se battre".

When in 1907 the first protestant missionaries arrived from Germany there were already 2,822 baptised catholics, most of them Hutu. Shortly afterwards however, when the Baganda catechists returned to Uganda, they were replaced by Hutu and several Hutu christians were given paid jobs by the europeans. At this point the Tutsi began to see that their adverse attitude to Christianity was doing them harm. They started to join in large numbers and everywhere special catechumenates were arranged for them. In the reports of 1906 we read still that christians were recruited principally from the Hutu stratum of the population. But in 1925,

> "Les jeunes gens Tutsi demandent leur admission en grand nombre. Ils ont des qualités qui en font vraiment une race supérieure".

In 1928 a full cousin of the king was baptised and in 1929 "Il ne reste guère des Batutsi importants payens". The number of catholics increased from 41,000 in 1929 to 289,000 in 1939 to 1,100,000 in 1962, or 37.5 per cent of the total population. In 1962 7.5 per cent of the population was protestant. There was a very notable increase in 1949 when the government decided that all catechumens should be exempt from "corvée" on the days they received religious instruction. Concomitant with this measure we see that during the following years the number of catechumens, largely Hutu, more than doubled from less than 100,000 to more than 200,000 annually.

The protestant mission developed much more slowly, not only because of a much later start but also because, when in 1916 Rwanda was occupied by Belgian troops, the german protestant missionaries left and were only replaced in 1919 by a very small number of Belgian protestant missionaries, later helped by the Danish mission and the C.M.S. While nearly all the catholic missionaries were Belgian, the protestant missionaries were largely non-Belgian. This was of no small importance in relation to the subsidies given to schools, which were, up till 1948, reserved to

In 1958 about 160,000 children were receiving primary school education all of which, except one, were run by the missions. Primary education was divided into two kinds: first degree, which consisted of a two year course attended by 105,000 children. About half of these went to primary school second degree for another two years, after which selection was again made and 4,000 or 2.5 per cent of those who had started primary school went to a fifth and last year of primary school education. From this last group were selected those who went on to post primary education. For this there were three possibilities.

In 1958 all three secondary schools were run by catholics. Two of these had been started in 1955. Up till then there was only one secondary school with 305 students. This school was called Groupe scolaire d'Astrida and had two sections; (a) a secondary school with 213 students and (b) a superior section for training of medical, veterinary and agricultural assistants and a school for chiefs. This last school had been started in 1929 to prepare sons of chiefs for their future task, which was not necessarily the same as the one held by their fathers. This superior section had in all 88 students. In 1958 the secondary schools had together 599 boys and 70 girls as students.

30 per cent of these students were Hutu. Of the students of the superior section at the Groupe scolaire d'Astrida only 5 per cent were Hutu.

Up till 1950 there was one teacher training school run by the catholics. In 1958 there were five teacher training schools for boys and three for girls managed by the catholic mission. Apart from these there was a mixed teacher training school managed by the protestant mission and another run by the government. However no details are available as to the relative numbers of Tutsi and Hutu among the students. The first technical school was started in Kigali in 1957 although for some time several missions had trained carpenters, masons and tailors.

The missionary reports often mention the fact that government officials and other europeans in private enterprise asked the mission for suitable personnel and thus the mission became the most important stepping stone for material advancement. This close co-operation was well expressed by Mgr. Classe the catholic bishop in Rwanda, in 1933, in his appreciation of the Mwami, who had become a catholic himself. "Mutara prend son role au sérieux. Il a des qualités de chef chrétien. Il prend souvent conseil à la mission et plus encore chez moi."

The number of primary schools allowed about 30 per cent of the catholic children access to primary education. However most of the places were given to Tutsi children. This was related to the fact that the Tutsi children were thought of as belonging to a "race supérieure", and that the children of the rich were less needed at home to help in cultivation. As we have seen, places in the school for chiefs, leading to a position as chief or subchief, were solely for the sons of chiefs, meaning important Tutsi. It is therefore not surprising to read the statistics of 1945 relating to the number of catholics among the chiefs and subchiefs:

1945	Catholic	Protestant	Pagan	Total
chief:	48	?	?	51
subchief:	579	39	25	643

In 1959 all chiefs and 98 per cent of all the subchiefs were Tutsi (Hubert 1965 p.13).

From the foregoing some conclusions seem justified in relation to the spread of christianity in Rwanda:

1. Widespread adoption of Christianity, especially of catholicism.
2. Close co-operation between government and church, both favouring catholic Tutsi.

3. Infiltration of Christianity greater in the centre than in the peripheral areas.
4. Massive conversions of the Hutu only after 1950 and government intervention.
5. Political power nearly exclusively in the hands of catholic Tutsi.
6. Education, especially at the post primary school level largely limited to Tutsi. Post secondary education nearly exclusively reserved for Tutsi.

C H A P T E R V

THE CONFLICT

In this thesis I have set out to establish correlations between changes in the principles of social organisation in the traditional Rwanda social system, the impact of new opportunities and pressures and the conflict situation which arose at the end of 1959. This conflict situation involved widespread violence and resulted in the overthrow of the monarchy before the attainment of independence from colonial rule in 1962. The violent conflict which erupted in 1959 was the result of, and its events reflected, a highly complex situation. In order to understand this situation we should first summarise some of the most important points which have emerged in the data and analysis presented in the previous chapters.

Important regional variations between Central Rwanda and the peripheral areas have been demonstrated. These were of a demographic, ecological, political, socio-economic, religious and historical nature. Following these variations we should distinguish at one level Rwanda society as a whole, united in the traditional system under the Mwami and subject to the same forces of political, economic and social change

during the period of colonial rule. At another level we should clearly distinguish the peripheral areas from Central Rwanda in that the peripheral areas at all stages of development resisted being brought under the control of the political system of Central Rwanda.

At the level of Rwanda society as a whole, a diachronic analysis has been made of the fundamental changes which took place in the traditional Rwanda social system as a result of the impact of the Western colonial presence. Principles of social organisation making for unity under and participation in the political system and also constituting mechanisms of control in the exercise of political power and providing alternative avenues for support and the seeking of justice were either drastically changed or taken out of the social system. These changes were clearly correlated not with any developmental processes in the traditional social system but with changes imposed by external agents - the Belgian administration and the Roman Catholic Church - as a matter of agreed policy. There was not only consensus between these two powers but also between them and the favoured Tutsi aristocracy of whose innate superior qualities they were convinced and found useful.

Corresponding to these two major spheres of variation and change, the conflict situation in Rwanda as a whole

must be seen as in fact containing two distinct conflict situations. One concerns the more general situation which applies to the whole of Rwanda but which was most clearly evident in the centre. The second concerns the specific issues of the peripheral areas in resistance to infiltration and control by the Central Rwanda administration.

It is my contention that the conflict situation as a whole cannot be explained wholly in ethnic terms but can only be understood if seen in relation to the profound changes in the principles of social organisation and in relation to the distinct regional variations. Before describing and analysing the open conflict situation which erupted in 1959 I propose first to analyse these two distinct latent conflict situations.

PART 1 THE RWANDA - WIDE CONFLICT SITUATION

We can distinguish two principal effects of the impact of western administrative and Church influence on the traditional Rwanda social system.

Firstly a new and changed form of political power had been created. In the traditional system the exercise of power depended on consensus and various hierarchies operated within the political system as a whole. Under the impact of colonial rule, however, administrative, judicial and executive powers were not separated but combined in the offices of the chiefs and subchiefs. Moreover these no longer depended for the execution of their orders on consensus and support but had coercive powers at their command. Nor were these chiefs subject to pressures from councils as no measures had been taken as late as 1956 to broaden the basis of political power through the establishment of popularly elected councils to the chief and the subchief. Thus while the abolition of many of the old institutions had resulted in the concomitant disappearance of many channels of participation in the exercise of power,

no new channels were created to allow for participation in the new system of government.

A second general effect of change introduced by the external powers concerns the western selective and protectionist policy towards the Tutsi aristocracy. In 1959, 100 per cent of all chiefs and 98 per cent of all subchiefs were still Tutsi. Moreover opportunities for advanced education were also the virtual monopoly of the Tutsi aristocracy since both church and administration reserved nearly all available places for them. In order to understand the full implications of the way in which these changes in the political system operated in the development of the conflict situation, we have to describe and analyse,

1. The rigidity and frustrations which developed in the political scene through the absence of democratic channels or representation and thus the effective elimination of competition.
2. The development of political parties with the formulation of goals which demonstrated the underlying conflict situation.

ad 1.

Ever since 1946 different U.N. commissions visiting

the Trusteeship complained about "the slow rate of political progress" (T/217 p.11) and advised that democratic institutions should be introduced (p.12). The 1952 commission repeated the same criticisms and stressed the urgency of reforms particularly as the chiefs exercised judicial functions in addition to their administrative functions (T/1031 p.6).

It was in 1953 that councils for the different levels of administration were created and details given as to how members on the councils had to be elected. The council of the subchief comprised the subchief as chairman plus between five and nine members on the basis of one member for every five hundred inhabitants. The members were chosen by an electoral college, whose members were appointed by the subchief. The number of voters had to be at least double the number of members of the council to be elected. In appendix I, I have given further details about the formation of councils at superior levels and the electoral processes involved.

The results of the first "election" can be summarised in the following graph:



The councillors were elected for a period of three years. At the next elections in 1956, members of the electoral college were elected by popular vote of all adult

males instead of being chosen by the subchief as in the 1953 elections. As a result of these 1956 elections, Tutsi representation on the electoral college fell by 20 per cent, but at the level of the different councils the proportion of Tutsi hardly changed as is shown in the following comparison:

	Tutsi representation in %	
	1953	1956
Electoral College	41.4	33.8
Subchief's Council	52.3	45.5
Chief's Council	88.6	84.8
Territorial Council	90.7	88.6
Supreme Council	90.6	96.9

Closer examination of these "elections" bears directly on the conflict situation.

1. In 1953 the "election" was on a highly restricted basis since the original voters list was drawn up by the subchief. It should be remembered that the subchief was himself a Tutsi and appointed by the administration. The elections of 1956 on the basis of adult male suffrage shows a marked decline in Tutsi representation. At the same time however a substantial number of Hutu voters must have

elected Tutsi members, as Tutsi representation on the electoral college is twice as high as their percentage in the total population. Moreover in certain areas in the centre, such as Kibuye and Astrida, Tutsi representation rose by 12 per cent and 17 per cent respectively. In northern districts such as Ruhengeri and Kisenyi, Tutsi representation fell by more than 50 per cent. In the northern districts therefore the results registered discontentment with the disproportionate presence of Tutsi on the council whereas the same cannot be said of the centre. Although the ubuhake system had been abolished, the Hutu leaders attributed the failure of Hutu to vote for representatives of their own group to continuing attitudes of dependency which were carried over from the traditional system in general and the ubuhake in particular.

2. A second and closely related point is that whatever popular wish had been expressed at the basis of the election, this was not carried through in the subsequent elections for the higher councils. Not only was the Hutu representation not carried through but also the increase in Hutu representation resulting from the 1956 election was in no way substantiated on the higher councils and there was even a decrease in Hutu representation on the Supreme Council.

In 1954 there were twenty nine Tutsi and only one Hutu on that council. Much of this frustrating discrepancy can be attributed to the particular system of electing the council members at the different levels, which was formulated in such a way that for the council of the chief upwards, the Tutsi were necessarily in the majority. All chiefs and practically all subchiefs were Tutsi and at least half of their councils were made up of chiefs and subchiefs, thus putting them automatically in the majority. However this does not explain the almost complete absence of Hutu on the higher councils. This can only explained by Hutu members voting for Tutsi.

Several important points can be made with regard to this analysis of the elections.

(a) The introduction of elections on the basis of adult male suffrage applied in the political field the same egalitarian principles as had been already applied in the abolition of the ubuhake system. The new stress on individual achievement in the economic and educational fields had followed the same pattern.

(b) The actual outcome of the elections and ex officio nominations to the various councils showed that the elections did not in fact provide avenues for the

expression and redress of grievances nor did they constitute a means through which public opinion could exert pressure. From the standpoint of the Hutu leaders the elections had twice proved that the mere provision of these democratic channels were an inadequate means for the redress of major grievances in the political and social system.

(c) The failure of the majority of the Hutu population in the centre to elect emerging Hutu leaders to positions of political power forced these leaders to attribute it to the limitations put on the Hutu voters by their social environment. Although the ubuhake system had been abolished, its effects on people's attitudes had not disappeared. More time was needed to change these attitudes and therefore independence needed to be postponed in order to have the opportunity to arouse greater Hutu group awareness. Concomitantly they were forced to formulate political and social issues in ethnic terms and claim support on ethnic grounds.

ad 2.

It is against this background that we must see the manifesto which was published by some of the educated Hutu in the year after the election. In this document they

demanded recognition of individual rights of land-ownership as a protection against the infringement on land by the holders of political power. They further demanded the actual promotion of Hutu to political office, modification of the composition of the councils and the abandonment of the selection practised in access to educational facilities which, especially in further education, was reserved to Tutsi.

They indicated two sources of these grievances. Firstly they blamed the old political structure of Rwanda and especiall the ubuhake system. Referring to the widespread Hutu attitudes in the centre, they stipulated that "the fear, the inferiority complex and the 'atavistic' need for a guardian are but surviving relics of the system". There is a clear correlation between this statement and the fact that, despite the abolition of the ubuhake system, many Hutu had voted for Tutsi. Secondly they blamed the way in which indirect rule had been applied, pointing out that some of the old institutions had disappeared without being replaced by "corresponding institutions on a western model".

The Hutu Manifesto is basically a document complaining about the political and educational monopoly granted by the administration and the church to the aristocracy among the Tutsi and therefore the manifesto was addressed to the

Belgian administration. It moreover indicated that independence was not desired before these grievances had been corrected.

On the other hand the king and the Tutsi aristocracy were pressing for independence. The publication of the manifesto enabled the aristocracy to express the broader issues of political and social reform in terms of the struggle for independence. They made their appeal to Banyarwanda at large on the basis of traditional loyalty to and unity under the king, who should be supported in his attempt to gain early independence from colonial rule. They condemned the Hutu leaders for their co-operation with the Belgian authorities in opposing independence. They castigated those who did not co-operate with the aristocracy in promoting independence as enemies of the king and of Rwanda. However the formulation of their appeal by the Tutsi aristocracy made them lose the protection of the administration on whom their whole position of monopoly was based.

Although the manifesto was addressed to the Governor of Rwanda, his answer was given only twenty two months later. The governor recognised the social issues formulated in the manifesto but restated them in economic rather than political terms. On the other hand the king and his Supreme Council

rejected the Hutu manifesto as an attempt to divide the country and delay independence. This rejection was interpreted and manipulated by the Hutu leaders in terms of identification of the king with the issue of rapid independence, his agreement with the monopoly situation of the Tutsi aristocracy and anti-Belgian sentiment. Hence objection to that monopoly became identified with pro-Belgian and anti-king sentiments. It was in this climate of the breaking up of the concensus between the administration and the monopoly-holding Tutsi aristocracy that political parties were formed around 1959.

The signatories of the manifesto started to organise the population in the north in the Social Hutu Movement. The initial location of this movement can be correlated with other specific factors elaborated in this thesis which differentiated these peripheral areas from central Rwanda. It is also related to the frustration of the Hutu leaders due to the increase in Hutu representation on the electoral college, elected in 1956, but which had no subsequent effect on the higher councils. The aims of the Social Hutu Movement were identical with those expressed in the manifesto but developed, through the identification of the independence issue as formulated by the Hutu leaders with opposition to

the king and the aristocracy, into a republican party. In October 1959 the movement declared itself a political party, Parmehutu (Parti du movement d'émancipation Hutu).

In the centre a Hutu leader, Gitera, had in the same year started a reform movement along the same lines to combat social injustice and to press for economic reforms. It was soon drawn into politics and in 1959 proclaimed itself a political party, Aprosoma (Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse). In July 1959 the king suddenly died. At the grave the Supreme Council proclaimed Baptiste Ndahindurwa king, who assumed the name Kigeri V. However his proclamation was more in the nature of a coup organised by the Supreme Council than following the traditional pattern of succession. Since the members of the Supreme Council had rejected the Hutu manifesto, the king also became identified with those who had rejected it.

In September a number of important chiefs who were also members of the Supreme Council and some Hutu formed the political party, Unar (Union nationale Ruandaise). Its president was Rukeba who was by origin Congolese and its general secretary was the Hutu, Rwagasana. The aim of Unar, as stated in its manifesto, was "to mobilise all Rwandase, regardless of ethnic origin, for the execution of a program

of reform under a constitutional monarchy" and for the rapid achievement of independence. It explained that the fact of Tutsi monopoly was not only due to historical reasons but also to the policy of the administering authority. It put the problem in social rather than ethnic terms and proposed a solution by democratic development.

A second monarchist party was formed by Tutsi leaders in September 1959 with the special aim of drawing attention to the majority of Tutsi who did not share the privileges of the aristocracy and who insisted on the dangers of the formation of political parties on ethnic grounds. It was a reform party on the same lines as Parmehutu and Aprosoma but demanding similar reforms under a constitutional monarchy. They joined the other two parties however in opposing the person of Kigeri V. The party was called Rader (Rassemblement démocratique Ruandais). Unar and Parmehutu became the two principal political parties.

It is evident that the policies formulated by the various political parties overlap to a considerable extent in that all expressed support for democratic reform of the political system. The issues between the political parties were not sufficiently clear to define the basis for obtaining support from specific groups within the population. The

analysis of the development of the political parties will show how the formulation of issues of democratic reform had to be expressed in terms which enabled them to rally this support.

This links up with the particular situation of the Hutu leaders. The traditional elite was essentially a political elite based on restricted membership of power holding Tutsi lineages. The elite is thus distinguished from the masses who included not only Hutu but also the vast majority of the Tutsi who were not members of the Tutsi noble lineages. By the 1950's criteria for membership of the elite included also educational qualifications. However following the agreed policy between the Belgian administration and the church in providing avenues for education and political power only to members of the traditional Tutsi elite, the traditional and modern criteria for elite status coincided.

However a minority of men of Hutu origin had succeeded in obtaining further education in Belgium and the Congo. These Hutu leaders found themselves barred from entry into the political elite despite their educational qualifications, on the basis of not belonging to the noble lineages. The impossibility of realising their expectations of obtaining political power which had been built up through their

educational careers, forced them to interpret this exclusion in terms of their status as Hutu.

The first formulation of their 1956 electoral disillusionment by the educated Hutu leaders was not so much expressed in the formation of political parties as in the starting of reformist movements. In the first, Gitera's movement, the aim was the reform rather than the overthrow of the political system.

The second, Kayibanda's movement, which developed into the Parmehutu party, was from the beginning much more articulated in the way it was organised and in its stated goals. The initial Social Hutu Movement clearly formulated its claims for participation by the ethnic groups in political and educational opportunities on the basis of their numerical proportions in the population. This would clearly reverse the monopoly of these opportunities granted by the government and the Church to the aristocracy among the Tutsi. The stating of these goals was an indictment of western policy in that it had granted that monopoly to a specific group of the population and that it had removed from the traditional social system channels for participation and pressures without replacing them.

They did not simply stress the need for corrections

or reforms in the system but demanded a complete reversal of the protectionist and selective policy. They realised moreover, as the 1956 elections had shown, that even if preferential treatment was withdrawn from the Tutsi nobles, the opening of democratic channels through elections, did not necessarily mean that, in central Rwanda, Hutu were going to achieve their aims through representation on an ethnic basis. One of the aspects of continuing Hutu attitudes which the leaders deplored was the general identification of authority with Tutsi. If the Hutu leaders were to count on general support among the Hutu population, this attitude had not only to be reformed but to be reversed in favour of the Hutu leaders. Gitera's movement demanded reforms from those who held authority with the aim of developing a democratic kingdom, Kayibanda's movement was revolutionary in that it envisaged a complete change of system to be attained by electoral process and emancipating the Hutu from their 'atavistic' need for paternalistic protection. To realise both objectives they needed a framework within which the numerical strength of the Hutu could be rallied. They had also to provide issues which were sufficiently strong to overcome the tendency of Hutu of the centre to defer to traditional Tutsi leaders.

Their stated goals and framework of organisation had therefore to be expressed in reference to the largest group whose numerical support could be effectively manipulated. Reference to the widest group of all those excluded from positions of power, including the majority of the Tutsi, was too wide to provide a distinct issue on which potential supporters of other reformist parties could be won over. Their issues had therefore to be framed in reference to the common loyalty of Hutu and set in opposition to another group that of the Tutsi, defined in ethnic terms. This coincided with the Hutu leaders' interpretation of the basis for their own frustration in obtaining political power.

The Hutu leaders did not however turn against the administering authority which had given preferential treatment to the Tutsi aristocracy. On the contrary they appealed to that authority for support in achieving their own aims. This support could be given to them through instituting structural political reforms aimed at establishing a constitutional monarchy, elections at all levels of participation in political authority on the basis of universal adult suffrage and allowing them time for emancipating the Hutu and rallying their support within the framework of their political party. The latter point

meant in practical terms, a not too rapid achievement of independence. This appeal to the administration fitted well in the wider framework of the Rwanda protectionist value system. It also coincided with their aim of promoting divisions which otherwise would have been neutralised by a common and national attempt to obtain independence from the Belgian authorities in Rwanda. They dissociated themselves from any nationalist movement making for unity in an attempt to reach independence and stressed divisionary issues expressed in ethnic terms.

One result of this attitude was that the issue of reform was identified with the postponement of independence. Conversely appeals to national unity to achieve independence could be and were identified by the Hutu leaders as anti-reformist. The Hutu leaders claimed that the Tutsi aristocracy wanted rapid independence only in order to retain their monopoly of political power after independence. They claimed that the Unar party's appeal to national unity and their denial of current divisionary issues must be interpreted as means to this end. In this way both the issues of reform and of independence were translated into ethnic terms. By opposing claims for rapid independence, the Hutu leaders were in a better position to obtain the

support of the administering authorities which were under attack and whose support of the aristocracy had for the moment been withdrawn.

Not only had the consensus between the Belgian authorities and the Tutsi nobles broken up, but so also had the consensus between the Church and the favoured aristocracy. Since 1954 the king had demanded a greater control for the government in matters of education which were almost totally, and on the levels of secondary and more advanced education totally, in the hands of the Church. Moreover whereas initially the Tutsi had been the largest group among the converts to Christianity, since 1950 the proportion had been reversed and the Hutu had come into the Church in greater numbers and now substantially outnumbered the Tutsi. The Roman Catholic Mission who monopolised the local press through "Temps Nouveaux" and "Kinyamateka" put this monopoly at the disposal of the Hutu leaders. In 1959 in his lenten pastoral letter the archbishop drew attention to the fact that there were different social groups,

> "Il-y-a dans Rwanda divers groups sociaux. Il-y-a des cultivateurs, des commerçants et artisans; il-y-s des gouvernants et gouvernés. La distinction de ces groupes provient en grande partie de la race. Dans Rwanda les différences et les inégalités sociales sont,

> pour une grande partie, liées aux différences de races. Des institutions, qui consacreraient un régime de privilèges, de favoritisme, de protectionisme, ne seraient pas conformes à la morale chrétienne."

For the leading aristocracy this meant a break with the ecclesiastical authorities. The Tutsi leaders accused the Church of first granting them a monopoly position in educational opportunities and then holding this situation against them when they were no longer useful by being instrumental in bringing Hutu into the Church. This break with the Church was inevitable since the pastoral letter stressed ethnic divisions, which coincided with the party aims of the Parmehutu and clashed with the Unar party goals. In September 1959 the catholic hierarchy addressed a circular letter to all the priests working in Rwanda condemning the Unar party by name because of its national-socialistic, communistic and islamic tendencies (C.R.I.S.P. 1961 p.139).

Following the appeal of the Hutu leaders to the allegiance of Hutu as an ethnic group, Unar had to formulate its appeal for support with reference to an even wider group. This had to be on the basis of a nation-wide appeal. One basis for this was the traditional unity of all Banyarwanda under the Mwami. Another was the rallying of all Banyarwanda against the colonial government in the struggle for

independence. On these terms they stigmatised the Hutu appeal to one section of the population as betraying the Mwami and the national unity required for gaining independence.

Thus the two issues of reform and independence became formulated in terms which were mutually exclusive and expressed in ethnic terms. Since claims for national unity and independence were interpreted by Hutu leaders as an expression of the aristocracy's refusal to realise the reforms demanded, they were therefore at the same time anti-Hutu. The formulation of an opposition against an ethnic group and not against a governing class resulted in greater group awareness among the Hutu, which was the basic aim of the Hutu leaders. The manifesto of the Unar, aimed at dispelling these fears by proposing a constitutional monarchy and reforms through democratic process. This was combined with an appeal to unity, in traditional terms, in order to obtain independence. The Unar manifesto was explained by the Hutu leaders as a device to obtain independence first, after which nothing would be changed.

The Mwami had identified himself with the independence issue and was thus thought of as being pro-Unar. This image could be conveyed all the more easily as the leaders

of Unar were also members of the Supreme Council. Thus the king became identified as both anti-reformist and therefore also anti-Hutu. Other factors also favoured this stigma attached to the king by the Hutu leaders. One was the fact that after the death of the former Mwami, Kigeri V had been proclaimed by the members of the Supreme Council. Another was that the Mwami-ship had, since the advent of Belgian administration and Church influence, been emptied of its ritual unifying force. Thus the Hutu leaders were able to eliminate one of the bases for the appeal of Unar in reference to the nation at large - that of traditional loyalty to the Mwami.

The movement for reform, which had started as a social movement, turned into a political party, putting issues in ethnic terms and appealing to the Hutu ethnic group. In the process it became a revolutionary and anti-monarchist party, headed by Kayibanda. A situation had developed in which aspirations were expressed less in terms of competition than in eliminating opposition. This does not only refer to the issue which focussed on the removal of the Mwami and the proclamation of a republic. Hutu leaders claimed that, if their aim was not attained, the Hutu would be held in servitude forever. The whole political issue was proposed

in terms of a once and for all opportunity to lose or to gain everything and was expressed in ethnic terms.

For the Tutsi aristocracy it meant that, if their aim was not attained, they would be eliminated from the political scene. Since, if the Hutu leaders succeeded, not only would the king be expelled but also Tutsi would be virtually excluded from all participation in power as issues would be decided by Hutu on ethnic grounds. This accounted for the fact that not only the Tutsi aristocracy but also the majority of Tutsi, regardless of their political and economic status, aligned themselves with Unar and the Mwami.

PART 2 THE PERIPHERAL AREA

CENTRE CONFLICT SITUATION

In the historical data we have noted the success with which the peripheral areas had withstood the attempted incursion of the traditional power structure of central Rwanda up to the time of colonial rule. We have also noted that with the support of the colonial administration Tutsi chiefs were imposed on the peripheral areas. In these areas we have to consider not only the effect of the monopoly of political power by a limited number of Tutsi lineages, forming the Tutsi aristocracy of these regions, who have the backing of an external power and whose abuses of political power cannot be effectively checked, but also the fact that these powerholders had been recently introduced by force into areas which had hitherto maintained their political independence from central Rwanda.

In addition these new and alien political agents had, ex officio, access to land in these areas. This is of particular importance in relation to the fact that these areas were the most densely populated in Rwanda, that the land had been most recently claimed from the forest zones and that no new areas were available. Furthermore land-

holding was directly related to the powerful lineage groups. Thus political domination resulted in a slow but steady movement of settlers from central Rwanda into these areas, the settlers being kinsmen of the political chiefs.

In the peripheral areas there thus arose a clear identification between the central Rwanda power structure, the comparatively recent introduction of Tutsi in positions of political power in these areas and the progressive occupation of land by Tutsi. Moreover the way in which the new rights over land were exercised was contrary to traditional patterns of allocation and occurred among a local population which was almost exclusively Hutu. On this basis conceptual categories of indigenous Hutu as opposed to alien, colonising and land occupying Tutsi were established.

The pre-existing tensions between the peripheral areas and central Rwanda had been controlled by the presence of the Belgian administration which protected the colonising group. However the existence of these tensions made for a greater awareness of common identity within each group. Because of the particular composition of the new power-holding and infiltrating group, this identity was not expressed in

categories based on a regional basis - such as northerners and southerners - but rather in ethnic terms referring to groups of people.

PART 3 THE ERUPTION OF VIOLENCE

It is not within the scope of this thesis to describe and analyse all the factors which contributed to the revolt that took place around 1960 as not only not all the data are available but also the assessment of factors such as the personalities of the leaders or the influence of the events in the former Belgian Congo during the period leading up to independence, belong to a different discipline. The period of violent clashes lasted for several years from November 1959, starting with a violent anti-Tutsi revolution in the peripheral areas of the North and North-West. This was followed by a violent reaction of certain Unar leaders in the centre of Rwanda.

I will be primarily concerned with the first violent revolt of 1959 and its subsequent reactions, considering later violence over the years 1960 to 1964 as reactions or counter-reactions to the initial revolt which set the pattern of violence laden climate of these years. However as will be demonstrated, the violence must be seen as an expression and culmination of the conflict situation which had arisen.

The first eruption of violence took place as a result of an incident which occurred on first of November 1959,

some miles from Kabgayi in central Rwanda. Some Tutsi youths, none of whom were armed, confronted one of the few Hutu subchiefs who was also one of the principal exponents of the new Hutu political movement. They teased him about his new found importance and a few blows were exchanged. The rumour spread that the subchief had been killed and the Hutu of Ndiza in the North, not the local people from the subchief's village, took to arms. The Hutu in the North, North-West and South-East started a campaign of driving Tutsi from their homes, burning their huts and destroying their plantations. Quotations from the report of the Belgian Parliamentary commission illustrate the issues and stress the locus of the revolt:

> "Ce fut dans le Nord du Rwanda que les destructions opérées par les Hutu furent les plus importantes. Les Tutsi y étaient considérés comme des intrus qui s'étaient approprié le sol et continuaient à le faire. En Territoire de Ruhengeri les Hutu semblaient bien décidés à n'épargner aucune habitation Tutsi et à dégoûter les Tutsi à tout jamais de s'élablir dans la région".
> (C.R.I.S.P. 1961 p.150)

Up until the sixth of November the Hutu action had been confined to the northern areas. On that day about two hundred northerners went down into Kibuye (Central Rwanda)

> "brûlant parmi les cases abandonnées, celles qui leur semblaient appartenir aux Tutsi. Il y eut de nombreuses erreurs. Les incendiaires semblent

> avoir détruit principalement les cases dont l'aspect indiquait une certaine aisance chez leur propriétair" (p.151).

The same day however the group was repelled,

> "La population Hutu et Tutsi attendit les incendiaires et les attaqua. Ce fut un véritable massacre".

In this counter-action at least fifty eight people died, all of whom were from the North (Kingogo and Ndiza).

This counter-action involving the defence of the people of Kibuye against the northern incendiarists was immediately followed by the systematic arrest of certain Hutu leaders in the centre of Rwanda, some of whom were killed. This was done on the orders of certain members of the Supreme Council who were at the same time the leaders of the Unar party. Their orders were executed by the army and the Twa. The Supreme Council members justified this action on the grounds that the Belgian administration had failed to maintain law and order and failed to punish the instigators, as they put it, of the revolt in the North. In the stated opinion of the Supreme Council members, the Hutu leaders had been responsible for the violence in the North.

Thus it is clear that the revolt started and spread unopposed in one of the peripheral areas where Tutsi political control was weakest since their incursion into

the area had been most recent. It occurred also in an area where a pattern of government, identical to that of central Rwanda, had been introduced by the colonial power. Both the specific events and the location of the conflict clearly indicate that the revolt was primarily a violent attempt at liberation from the political and economic control and infiltration of central Rwanda. The fact that it took only a false rumour to spark off the violent revolt in the North can only be understood when seen against the background of factors underlying the specific latent conflict situation contained in the opposition of the peripheral areas to central Rwanda, the context of the wider conflict situation with reference to Rwanda as a whole and the total absence of channels for the effective expression of popular opinion in political terms and of avenues for the redress of grievances.

The violent counter-reaction of the leaders of the Unar party, who were at the same time members of the Supreme Council, against some of the Hutu leaders had two direct results. It provided the Hutu leaders with the occasion to close the ranks between the Hutu of the North and the Centre, as the arrests and killing in the Centre were explaine as ultimate proof of anti-Hutu sentiment among the Unar party

chiefs and the extent to which they would go, i.e. the elimination of Hutu leaders to prevent the reforms demanded. The Unar party, which was the visible organisation of the Tutsi aristocracy, became the visible enemy of all Hutu. Another direct result was the imprisonment of the Unar leaders by the Belgian administration. Some however managed to escape abroad and continued their political activities from outside the country. When the king left the country to assist at the independence celebrations of the former Belgian Congo, the minister of the Colonies in Brussels decided that he should stay outside the country until the people had expressed their wish in a plebiscite on the continuation of the monarchy.

SUBSEQUENT EVENTS

After the violence, on 10th November 1959, the Belgian administration announced profound structural changes which were published on 25th December 1959. These introduced a constitutional monarchy, general elections and the separation of administrative and judicial powers. The first communal elections were to be held in June 1960. The leaders of Unar who were abroad gave instructions to their followers to boycot the elections. 25 per cent abstained from voting and this election resulted in the Parmehutu obtaining 70 per cent of the votes cast or 50 per cent of the registered votes.

The other party, Aprosoma, also appealing to Hutu, obtained 5 per cent of the votes.

Although this election gave the Parmehutu a very strong (70 per cent) representation on the councils of the subchiefs, who were henceforth to be called burgomasters, at the same time it demonstrated that a substantial number of Hutu had not supported their leaders. This was especially evident in Central Rwanda. During the following months of 1960, the killing of Tutsi, the burning of their huts and plantations and expelling them from their homes occurred on a considerable scale in three out of four districts of Central Rwanda - Astrida, Kigali and Nyanza (U.N. report A. 4706). This resulted in another exodus of at least 135,000 people (U.N. report 5126 p.35). At the end of 1960 the General Assembly of the U.N. passed a resolution postponing the date of the general elections and the referendum on the king, which were to have been held in January, 1961, to a later date. On the 28th January, 1961, during a convocation of all the burgomasters and their councillors at Gitarama a coup d'état took place. The monarchy was abolished and a republic proclaimed. The meeting elected a president with a legislative council, consisting of forty four members all of whom were Hutu.

On the same day the president presented his cabinet of ten ministers who were exclusively Hutu. A week later on 6th February, the Belgian Government formally recognised the new Rwanda Government.

The U.N. however declared the government "to have been established by irregular and unlawful means and not to be regarded as fully representative of all segments of the population in the absence of free elections" (U.N. Report A. 4994 p.23). It further recommended,

(a) the holding of elections and a referendum on the monarchy in August 1961 under U.N. supervision.

(b) a full and unconditional amnesty so as to enable political leaders who were in exile or imprisoned to resume normal political activities.

(c) the return and rehabilitation of refugees.

It noted moreover "with regret that the administering authority has arbitrarily suspended the powers of the Mwami of Rwanda and has not allowed him to return". A further request was made to the administering authority of the trusteeship "to facilitate his return to Rwanda". (Resolutions 1579 and 1580 Dec. A. 49994 p.8).

However the elections were presented by the Hutu leaders as the final contest in which they still might lose everything

The amnesty was granted but neither the Mwami nor the refugees were able to return. The republican flag continued to fly from all the public buildings all over the country. During the period immediately preceding the elections, violence again erupted resulting in another stream of refugees. "90 per cent of the refugees were members of the Unar party" (U.N. report A. 4994 p.86). It was in these disturbed conditions that the general elections and the referendum took place. Parmehutu obtained 77 per cent of the votes while Unar obtained 17 per cent. 80 per cent rejected both the person of Kigeri V and the monarchy. The republic was proclaimed. During the subsequent years several armed attempts to return were made by the refugees. These attempts resulted in extremely violent reprisals against Tutsi who had stayed in Rwanda. As a result thousands perished and still more fled the country.

CONCLUSIONS

In this thesis I have set out to demonstrate that the conflict which has been described and analysed in the previous chapter cannot be understood unless it is seen in relation to the Rwanda traditional social system and the impact of western influences on the principles of social organisation of Rwanda society. It has not been my intention to analyse all the factors which constitute the sum total of what could be called western influences but to indicate and analyse demonstrable changes in the Rwanda social system due to the presence of western authority in Rwanda.

The impact of these changes could not be measured unless the traditional Rwanda social system was first described and analysed. For this a cross-section in the diachronic development of Rwanda society was taken at the period around 1900 when the Rwanda social system came under the influence of new opportunities and pressures and became subject of an external authority. I have analysed the changes that took place in the social system and have pointed out correlations between certain characteristics of the traditional social system, the impact of western authority

on it and the conflict situation that arose, at the moment of independence from colonial rule.

The conflict itself fits closely Coser's definition of conflict as "a struggle over values and claims to scarce resources in which the aim of the opponents are to neutralise, injure or eliminate their rivals." Conflict is focussed on the removal of opposition. A twofold conflict situation had arisen, one concerning Rwanda as a whole and the other concerning the peripheral areas and central Rwanda.

As regards Rwanda as a whole the king was traditionally both the focus and the apex of the Rwanda social system. His position was upheld and given value in myth and his transcendental kingship was expressed in unifying ritual. Struggle for the kingship was kept within the bounds of personal challenges and did not develop into a struggle for independence from it. We have analysed in some detail the importance of the Mwami's position in relation to the overall cohesion of Rwanda society and have examined how this important principle of social cohesion lost its effectiveness. The kingship had been emptied of those elements making for unity and no longer constituted a symbol of Rwanda or of the well-being of its people.

On the level of delegated power, the whole complex of

social relationships tended towards the preservation of political power and its concomitant economic benefits within the confines of a relatively few noble Tutsi lineages. I have analysed the mechanisms of the principles of social organisation which led the struggle for power positions within the important Tutsi lineages to be dissipated into dependence on locally based support, and in this way resulted in locally based solidarity. Equally within these locally based groups of people political, military and socio-economic institutions provided avenues for the redress of personal grievances and channels for effective pressure on the political authorities.

Moreover the system provided for some participation in the lower echelons of the political hierarchy by Hutu land-chiefs and the absorption of possible challengers through the process of enoblement. In my diachronic analysis I have demonstrated how these principles of social organisation were taken out of the system while on the other hand political power positions were exclusively granted to members of the traditional noble lineages. By extension access to wealth, resulting from educational achievement, was reserved by the authorities to members of the same important lineages.

The traditional system had been emptied of its channels for exerting pressure and of its avenues for political competition while no new competitive institutions, modelled on a democratic basis, had been created. A situation had developed in which challengers or would-be competitors who did not belong to the important Tutsi lineages had no mechanisms at their disposal through which they could manipulate individual or locally based grievances for the successful achievement of their own aspirations. The removal of these principles of social organisation which, through a variety of channels, kept aspirations of a political nature at a personal or locally based group level, forced them to manipulate grievances and aspirations in the wider context of an attempt to change the whole system. Since the system could now only be collectively attacked and the privileged selection on which it was based could be expressed in ethnic terms, they were forced into a numerically based appeal to a wider group formulated in ethnic terms.

The actual incidence of events, as I have shown in my previous chapter, resulted in the formulation of appeals for group solidarity in ethnic terms. The analysis has also shown how response to the leaders' appeals was also

expressed in ethnic terms and moreover could no longer be dissipated through traditional channels. It therefore resulted in group solidarity at a national level on an ethnic basis. The formulation of appeals for group solidarity in ethnic terms and the response of actual ethnic group solidarity cannot be understood unless they are seen in relation to the traditional Rwanda social system.

Thus, when, through the educational system, challengers and competitors appeared, a latent conflict situation arose in that educated Hutu found themselves barred from competition and in order to reach their goal they had to eliminate the system. Issues became formulated in mutually exclusive terms in that continuation of the status quo, despite promised reforms, could be presented as an irrevocable elimination of the Hutu leaders from participation in political power and from access to wealth through education. On the other hand participation based on ethnic support of the Hutu would mean the virtual elimination from the political scene of those who had hitherto held the positions of power.

A second and additional conflict situation had arisen as regards the peripheral areas in their relations with central Rwanda. Despite its classification as a state

with centralised monarchical authority, Rwanda contained very definite regional variations of an ecological, demographic, political, socio-economic, religious and historical nature. The people themselves were conscious of these variations and expressed strong local loyalties. This point is demonstrated by the successful resistance against attempts to absorb them into a social system not their own. The developmental analysis has shown how incorporation of peripheral areas into the political system of central Rwanda was enforced by the German and later the Belgian authorities and how this had a wider socio-economic impact.

Initial continued resistance against these absorbing centripetal pressures from central Rwanda was forcibly overruled by the colonising and later administering authorities. Here we have a latent conflict situation in that the intrudim political authorities in these areas, in reaching their goal, were in the process of eliminating indigenous claims to scarce status, power and resources in the form of land. Redress of this situation could only be obtained by the removal of these authorities. As we have seen by 1959 no democratic channels existed to effect this redress and the situation continued only as a result of its being instituted

and upheld by the force of the administering authorities.

Exterior force will more easily contain a latent conflict situation and prevent it from turning into open conflict if, on the one hand, it continues to show support for the party which is challenged while on the other hand the challengers do not see the actual situation as irreversible and are therefore not prompted to take action by the need for an immediate solution. In 1959 both these elements for containment of the latent conflict situation had disappeared.

The Tutsi aristocracy had fallen out of favour with the administering authorities and the Church. On the other hand the Unar demand for self-government in 1960, set conditions for an immediate reaching of the goals set by the Hutu leaders. The time constraint demanded an immediate reversal while no democratic channels existed to effect this reversal. The factors hitherto preventing the latent conflict situation from turning into an open conflict no longer existed either in Rwanda as a whole or in the peripheral areas. The conflict started where those two conflict situations coincided.

Appendix

1. Council of the chief

It comprised, next to the chief, at least ten and not more than eighteen members. These were chosen as follows: five to nine members were chosen by the subchiefs and an equal number chosen from among the other members of the chiefdom. These latter were chosen as follows: each council appointed three members who together formed the electoral college which chose from among its members the remaining councillors to the chief.

2. Council of the Province

It comprised (a) all the chiefs and, (b) an equal number of subchiefs elected by the subchiefs, and (c) a number of others equal to that of the number of chiefs and subchiefs combined. This last group (c) was to be elected as follows: each council of the chiefs chose from among its members three members who together formed the electoral college which in turn chose from among its members the remaining councillors of the provincial council.

3. The Council of the King

It comprised the king and (b) the ten chiefs of the provinces, and (c) six members elected by and from among the chiefs and (d) one representative for each of the ten provincial councils elected by and from among its members and (e) eight more members co-opted by the members of the Supreme Council.

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